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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Agriculture contributes to economic development in several ways. It influences 
development not only directly through employment and better income from agricultural 
activities, but also indirectly by providing a market for agricultural inputs, transport services, 
technical assistance, etc. Agriculture also plays an important role in reducing poverty and is 
even linked to areas that are more exposed to international agricultural trade (Valdes and Jara, 
2008).  
It is frequently argued that rural development needs to be accompanied by farmers’ 
access to credit, for two main reasons. First, access to credit enhances production efficiency at 
the farmer’s level. If they are unconstrained in their access to credit, farmers can separate 
consumption from farm production decisions. As such, credit unconstrained farmers can 
optimally choose the inputs for the production processes they use (Carter, 1989; Feder et al., 
1990; Foltz, 2004). Second, access to credit facilitates investments which can improve the 
economic performance of the farmer by reducing costs through the adoption of better 
technology or by increasing income through adapting production to new challenges posed by 
phenomena such as global warming and changing customer preferences.  
Unfortunately, Rural Financial Markets (RFMs) often work inefficiently in the sense 
that both formal and informal financial institutions do not meet the total demand for financial 
products of rural households in a specific period. This mismatch between demand and supply 
can be explained by several market imperfections such as monopolies in credit markets as 
exercised by informal lenders (Bell et al., 1997a); large transaction costs incurred by 
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borrowers in applying for loans; imperfect information leading to adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Carter, 1988); and screening, monitoring and 
enforcement problems faced by lenders (Hoff et al., 1993). 
Although it is important to develop a model that reveals asymmetric information and 
points out its causes, limited research has been carried out on RFMs of middle-income 
countries such as Chile. Chile is an interesting case to study RFMs for three main reasons. 
First, the Chilean financial sector is one of the most competitive and deregulated markets in 
Latin America. As in other developing countries, however, the Chilean credit market is 
characterized by information asymmetry and other market imperfections, which result in 
difficulties in the screening and monitoring process, such as substantial transaction costs and a 
high risk of default in credit transactions. These difficulties may lead to lower rural credit 
allocation. In fact, of the total credit provision of commercial banks, private banks decreased 
their credit provision toward the agricultural sector in relative terms from 10% in 1990 to 
4.1% in 2009 (Table 1.1).  However, this situation may well reflect other causes, apart from 
credit constraints, such as lower demand for credit as a result of the financial crisis or the 
participation of other credit providers which may substitute for or complement formal sources 
of credit.  
 
Table 1.1: Credit in the agriculture and forestry sectors of Chile (millions of U$ at the end of 
February of each year), 1990 - 2009 
Sector 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Agriculture 1.275 1.260 1.836 2.017 2.553 3.023 4.242 4.283 
Forestry 123 204 210 275 484 445 448 375 
Total agriculture 
and forestry 
1.404 1.472 2.046 2.292 3.038 3.468 4.689 4.658 
Relative share (%) 10,3 5,2 4,4 3,7 3,7% 3,8% 3,6% 4,1% 
Total financial 
system 
13.652 28.545 46.321 61.969 81.533 92.331 130.624 114.417 
Source: ODEPA (2010) with information from SBIF(2009) 
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Second, the agricultural sector in Chile is a dynamic economic sector. Agriculture and 
forestry value added has grown at a stable rate of 4.8% during the last five years, while the 
other sectors of the economy have grown at a lower rate (Table 1.2). Within the agricultural 
and forestry sector, market-oriented farmers 1  make up the bulk of production and are 
estimated to account for 96.5% of the land owners, 96.4% of fruit farm area, and 94.9% of 
vegetable farm area (ODEPA, 2005). 
 
Table 1.2: Changes in GDP and agricultural and forestry value added, Chile, 1996 - 2005 
Year Share of agricultural and 
forestry GDP in GDP 
Annual percentage change 
 
  Agricultural and forestry GDP GDP 
1996 4.2 - - 
1997 4.0 1.7 6.6 
1998 4.1 5.0 3.2 
1999 4.1 -0.8 -0.8 
2000 4.2 6.0 4.5 
2001 4.3 6.1 3.4 
2002 4.4 4.5 2.2 
2003 4.5 6.0 3.9 
2004 4.6 8.8 6.2 
2005 4.5 5.7 6.3 
1996-2005 4.3 4.8 3.7 
Source: Banco Central de Chile (2010) 
 
Third, in Chile formal and informal financial institutions are widespread across the 
agricultural sector, especially in fruit and vegetable production. The formal institutions, 
mainly banks, are characterized as being competitive and deregulated, with a long tradition of 
working with farmers in Chile. The informal institutions are mainly trading or input supply 
companies. Fruit-trading companies usually play the role of marketing or processing a 
farmer’s harvest in exchange for credit and other services such as technical assistance. In the 
case of input supply companies, credit via in-kind loans instead of cash advances are 
provided. 
                                               
1
  The classification used in Chile according to the Economic Development Agency of Chile (CORFO), 
which distinguishes small-, medium- and large-scale farmers is as follows: Micro entrepreneurs are those who 
have annual gross income up to 78,000 $US; Small entrepreneurs from 78,000 $US to 808,000 $US; Medium 
entrepreneurs from 808,000 $US to 3,231,000 $US; and large entrepreneurs from 3,100,000 $US. Our definition 
for market-oriented farmers counts for small-, medium- and large-scale farmers. 
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Thus, a closer examination of deregulated rural financial markets for market-oriented 
farmers in Chile appears to be worthwhile. However, existing empirical literature on credit 
rationing of Chilean farmers is very limited. Despite some provisional evidence that credit 
rationing is a significant problem in Chile (Conning and Udry, 2007), the issue still awaits 
rigorous empirical examination in measuring credit constraints, in determining the effect of 
informal credit institutions on credit constraints, and in determining the credit constraint effect 
on production and investment patterns.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In section 1.2 the research 
questions and structure of this thesis are presented. In section 1.3 an overview of the 
agricultural sector in Chile is provided. Section 1.4 describes the study area and the main 
aspects that were taken into account to prepare the survey. Finally, section 1.5 discusses the 
methods of analysis applied in this study.  
1.2  Research aims 
The aim of the research presented in this thesis is to measure access to credit and 
empirically determine the effects of credit constraints on investment and production for 
market-oriented farmers in central Chile. More specifically, the aims of this study are to: 
 
• Identify the main factors that influence access to credit for market-oriented farmers.  
• Determine whether informal financial institutions act as complements to or substitutes 
for farmers’ strategies for funding. 
• Determine the effect of credit constraints by formal financial institutions on farm 
productivity. 
• Identify the factors that limit farm investment. 
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In approaching these objectives two innovative methods are used throughout this 
thesis. First, qualitative information collected in interviews is used to identify three categories 
of credit constraints from both the demand and supply side of the credit market, namely, 
quantity, risk, and transaction-cost constraints (Guirkinger, 2008; Guirkinger and Boucher, 
2008; Boucher et al., 2009; Fletschner et al., 2010). Second, a panel-data structure is used in 
all econometric analysis in this thesis, which allows us to obtain estimators that are more 
efficient than those based only on cross-sectional analysis. 
The choice of central Chile as study area is based on the presence of the predominant 
agricultural activities fruit (including vineyards) and vegetable production. Both activities 
account for 80% of agricultural export production. The area considered in this study, regions 
V, VI and Metropolitalina, represents 85% and 55% of fruit and vegetable production, 
respectively. In addition, the fruit and vineyard subsector is one of the most dynamic 
subsectors within agriculture, characterized by a high level of investment, with an increase in 
terms of land area by 38 and 57% respectively, during the last ten years (Qualitas 
Agroconsultores, 2009) .  
Together with this introductory chapter, this thesis contains six chapters. Because most 
chapters were prepared as articles, data and study area descriptions in different chapters can 
overlap. References for all chapters are combined at the end of this thesis.  
Chapter 2 identifies the main factors that influence Chilean farmers' access to credit. 
To better understand how rural financial markets function in Chile, the determinants of 
classifying credit provision and rationing into four categories are explored. Attention is paid 
to the role that social capital variables play in determining a credit constraint.  
Chapter 3 deals with the role of informal financial institutions in providing credit for 
market-oriented farmers in Chile. The hypothesis that firms with limited access to bank loans 
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have a lower demand for informal credit is tested, suggesting a complementary relationship 
between both sources of funding. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of a credit constraint on production in the vegetable and 
fruit sectors at the farm level. The hypothesis that credit unconstrained farmers can separate 
consumption from farm production decisions is tested. As such, credit-unconstrained farmers 
can optimally choose the inputs for the production processes they use (Carter, 1989; Feder, 
Lau et al., 1990; Foltz, 2004). The analysis is done by econometric estimation of the reduced 
form output supply equation for a subgroup of farmers found to be credit constrained. 
Chapter 5 extends the discussion about the effect of credit constraints on the decision 
to invest in farm assets. Again we test the hypothesis that credit-unconstrained farmers can 
separate investment patterns from transitory income shocks. As such, credit-unconstrained 
farmers can optimally undertake new investments and adopt new technologies (Khandker and 
Faruqee, 2003). 
Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the main findings and presents the key conclusions of this 
study. It points out the implications for the development of Rural Financial Markets in Chile 
and makes suggestions for future research. 
1.3 Overview of the agricultural sector in Chile 
1.3.1 Socio-economic aspects 
Among Latin-American countries, Chile is regarded as an upper-middle income 
country with a Gross National Income of US$ 9,400 per capita ($US 13,270 per capita at 
Purchasing Power Parity) (World Bank, 2010). Chile possesses one of the most open 
economies in the world, growing at an average annual rate of 4.4% over the last 8 years. 
Meanwhile, inequality is one of its largest problems, with a Gini coefficient of 0.58, the 
second highest value in the region after Brazil. 
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As in many developing countries, agriculture today is radically different from the way 
it was 30 years ago. Globalization has reshaped rural areas in many countries through the 
expansion of export-oriented crops, while farmers producing import-competing commodities 
have had to improve their efficiency in order to remain competitive (Fleming et al., 2010). 
Chile is no exception.  
Based on the 2007 agricultural census (the most recent census) of an estimated 
269,000 farms in Chile, 255,000 (95%) are classified as micro-scale farmers, 13,000 (5%) as 
small-, 1,050 (0.4%) as medium-, and 175 (0.1%) as large-scale farmers (Table 1.3). Micro-
scale farmers are estimated to account for 44% of the land owners, small-scale farmers 30%, 
medium-scale 13%, and large-scale farmers the remaining 13%. Together, small-, medium- 
and large-scale farmers represent the 56% of the owned land, and 78% of the total value of 
agricultural output (Table 1.3). 
 
Table 1.3: Distribution of number of farms, total area and total value of agriculture output by 
type of farmer in Chile, 2007 
Type of farmer Number of 
farms 
Land area Total value of 
agricultural output 
Average 
farm size 
  % Ha % Millions US$ % Ha 
Micro-scale farmers 254,906 95 4,459,168 44 1,902 22 17 
Small-scale farmers 13,184 4,5 3,060,922 30 3,391 38 232 
Medium-scale farmers 1,050 0.4 1,384,814 13 1,695 19 1,285 
Large-scale farmers 175 0.1 1,299,450 13 1,842 21 7,425 
Total 269,315 100 10,168,355 100 8,829 100 38 
Source: Qualitas (2008) with information supplied by the VII National Agriculture Census, INE 
(2007) 
 
Comparing census data from 1997 to that from 2007, the data show a movement 
toward larger production scales. In the last ten years the number of farms has declined 20% in 
central regions in Chile. These regions have the most sophisticated agricultural economies and 
have experienced a decrease in farm numbers and an increase in average farm size. This 
phenomenon causes a property concentration: 4,533 farms make up 79.7% of the total 
productive land, meanwhile 165,801 farms smaller than 10 hectares make up 1.8% of the total 
productive land (Qualitas Agroconsultores, 2009). 
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The concentration is also reflected in terms of the total value of agricultural output. 
While micro-scale farmers accounted for 30% of the gross productive value in 1997, their 
share declined to 22% in 2007. The same trend is observed for small-scale farmers, whose 
share in output declined from 44% in 1997 to 38% in 2007. Medium and large-scale farmers 
increased their share from 15% to 19% and from 11% to 21%, respectively (Table 1.4). 
 
Table 1.4: Distribution of total value of agriculture output by type of farmer, Chile,  1997 and 
2007 
Type of farmer Total value of agricultural output 
1997 
Total value of agricultural output 
2007 
  Millions US$ % Millions US$ % 
Micro-scale farmers 2,026 30 1,902 22 
Small-scale farmers 2,920 44 3,391 38 
Medium-scale farmers 990 15 1,695 19 
Large-scale farmers 723 11 1,842 21 
Total 6,658 100 8,829 100 
Source: Qualitas (2008) with information supplied by the VII National Agriculture Census, INE 
(2007) 
 
Another trend is that the agricultural sector is more sophisticated and technologically 
advanced than it was only 10 years ago. Fruit orchards, vineyards and forest plantations have 
increased in terms of land area by 38%, 58% and 19%, respectively. By contrast, annual 
crops, vegetables, and natural grasslands have declined in land area by 26%, 15% and 15%, 
respectively (Table 1.5). Irrigated land has increased by 3.4%. This increase is even more 
spectacular in technical irrigation such as micro-aspersion and mechanic irrigation with 
increases of 298% and 85% surface area, respectively. Meanwhile gravitational irrigation has 
decreased 16% in the same period. All these data illustrate the intensification and use of 
modern agriculture techniques. 
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Table 1.5: Land Area by farm activity in Chile, years 1997 and 2007 
Farm Activity Land Area (hectares) Relative change 
(%) 
 1997 2007 1997-2007 
Annual crops 648.111 480.833 -25,8 
Ornamental plants 1.472 2.193 49,0 
Seed 29.778 42.400 42,4 
Vegetables 111.871 95.194 -14,9 
Natural grasslands 608.538 518.502 -14,8 
Fruit orchard 234.480 324.279 38,3 
Vineyards 81.845 128.993 57,6 
Forest plantations 2.226.014 2.655.317 19,3 
Source: Qualitas (2009) with information supplied by the VII National Agriculture Census, INE (2007) 
 
Fruit export production is concentrated between Regions III and VII, in the central part 
of the country. These regions enjoy favorable natural and climate conditions for temperate 
fruit production and have relatively good infrastructural facilities. The whole sector is 
characterized by a high level of investments and use of modern agricultural techniques. Much 
of the technical expertise, originally from California, was acquired through a combination of 
initially government support, and later private-sector research investment. Large export firms 
own many of the advanced packing facilities and provide technical assistance and credit to 
medium-sized farms from which they receive the fruit. Hence the fruit-growing regions have 
been radically transformed, leading to a marginalization of peasant production, and are now 
dominated by modern agribusiness.  
 There is little detailed information available on buyer concentration in the Chilean 
agricultural sector. There is, however, some evidence of a high degree of buyer concentration 
and of increasing vertical coordination through contracts and integration in agroprocessing. 
This is reinforced by the growing concentration of retail food sales in supermarket chains, 
which puts pressure on the competitiveness of small producers in terms of sales volume and 
quality control. Foster and Valdes (2006) report that of the 16 most important agricultural 
products, only the market for potatoes corresponds to the stylized model whereby the 
activities of many market participants are determined by spot prices generated in open 
markets. All other product markets, which have a high degree of buyer concentration, are 
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coordinated through marketing or production contracts, or are completely integrated. The 
evidence suggests that the degree of industrial processing in agriculture is already high and 
that this process is intensifying. Interestingly, the export-oriented sectors of fresh fruit and 
wine have lower processor concentration relative to import-competing sectors. 
1.3.2 Agricultural policy 
Over the last 30 years Chile has pursued an open trade policy, with agriculture products 
as key exports, where fruits in particular have become both cash crops and non-traditional 
crops. At the same time, traditional crops, in particular cereals, continue to be an important 
source of income for many Chilean farmers, especially for those located in southern Chile. 
Unlike non-traditional crops, traditional food crops face import competitions, especially from 
South-American countries more specialized in cereals.  
In the mid-1970s the Chilean government introduced a more market-based resource 
allocation policy. The role of the government became less important, measures to liberalize 
trade were introduced, and trade and private-property rights were strengthened. In regard to 
financial-sector policies, interest rate ceilings as well as preferential rates for the agricultural 
sector were abolished. The reforms had a profound impact on land markets and on firms that 
provide services to the agricultural sector, such as input suppliers and transport companies. 
The new land policy provided unrestricted access to landownership and improved the 
protection of property rights. Individual land titles were redistributed to the beneficiaries of 
the land reform programs. Moreover, input and product markets were privatized.  
The agricultural sector was especially affected by trade liberalization, because it implied 
a reduction or even a complete elimination of nontariff barriers on most imports and an 
elimination of export restrictions. In addition, a uniform import tariff was introduced, starting 
at a rate of 90%  in 1975 and gradually falling to 10% in 1979.   
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The most influential trade policy change in recent years was the introduction of free 
trade agreements, with Canada (1997), Mexico (1999), the European Union (2003), the 
Republic of Korea and the United States (2004), New Zealand and Singapore (2005), China 
and Peru (2006), and Japan (2007). These agreements resulted in a reduction of the effective 
average tariff rate across all goods to about 2% in 2007.  
Trade liberalization attracted trade companies that saw great opportunity to export fruits, 
wine and processed food. Transnational fruit corporations such as Dole and Del Monte and 
large local export-oriented firms such as David del Curto, expanded Chile’s international 
markets due to their advanced global networks (Gwynne, 2003) and investments in new 
productions techniques (Barrientos, 1997). These types of firms utilized contract farming 
extensively in which export firms offered farmers credit for working capital, technical 
assistance and crop inputs in exchange for the farmers’ promise to provide the harvest that 
would subsequently be marketed by the export firm. Credit for farmers primarily financed 
fresh-fruit production with a few exceptions in such crops as sugar beets, tobacco, tomatoes, 
and certain types of horticultural production for the agro-industry.  
Agricultural trade liberalization has had two main effects. First, trade liberalization 
changed the composition of production and trade. As expected, the exportable subsectors—
fruits, vegetables and forestry—rose in importance, while livestock and field crops declined. 
Following the reforms, there was an increase in export growth rates. Annual growth rates 
averaged 10% or more for two decades for fruit and wine production. This growth was 
accompanied by a rise in the use of fertilizers per hectare, an expansion of irrigated land, 
greater use of machinery, the introduction of new varieties, and the adoption of non-
traditional crops. This occurred especially in areas where farmers had linked their operations 
with export firms and where contract farming was common.  
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Second, the tendency toward greater export orientation has made an important 
contribution to the increase in employment and household income and to the reduction in 
rural-urban migration. Recent literature reports that poverty reduction and lower rates of rural-
urban migration are linked to export agriculture rather than to agriculture as a whole (Foster 
and Valdes, 2006; Fleming, Abler et al., 2010). 
However, contract farming has not been without its critics. Primarily because the credit 
and insurance terms in these contracts can lead to dependency on the part of farmers and 
restrict flexibility in farmers’ decision process to market their production. On the other hand, 
some fruit corporations and large fruit farms have acquired land at low prices from small-
scale farmers, taking advantage of debt and low bargaining power created by fixed-contract 
farming (Carter, 1988; Gwynne and Ortiz, 1997).   
The government’s overall policy strategy continues to be conducive to the growth of the 
export-oriented sector and to the modernization of import-competing activities in agriculture. 
This policy induced cluster formation, which is seen by the Chilean government as an 
important instrument to improve linkages between firms and reduce problems of asymmetric 
information.  
However, one of the pitfalls of Chilean agricultural policy is the lack of detailed 
information about general and specific data for the agricultural sector. Lack of productivity, 
investment and cost data for Chilean agriculture limits any attempt to address any important 
question about the economic process taking place in Chile. Although intentions to get a 
general picture of the agriculture sector exist, these intentions are insufficient for such a 
dynamic and diverse sector as agriculture. For instance, the National Statistics Institute carries 
out an agriculture census every 10 years, and other institutions that have access to the data 
base on the agricultural sector, such as the Central Bank of Chile and National Tax Agency, 
do not share this information with other institutions for strategic reasons. This situation causes 
 13
misinformation in evaluating government programs and leads to slow reactions to improve 
poorly performing programs.  
1.3.3 Rural financial markets 
Financial services are delivered to the rural population by organizations that exist along 
a continuum from informal to formal, with often diffuse boundaries between categories. In 
general, formal financial institutions are licensed and supervised by a central authority. They 
include public and private commercial banks; state-owned agricultural or rural development 
banks; savings and loan cooperatives; microfinance banks and special-purpose leasing, 
housing, and consumer finance companies. Informal providers of financial services include 
rotating saving and credit associations, money lenders, pawnshops, businesses that provide 
financing to their customers, and friends and relatives. In between these two ends of the 
continuum are financial nongovernment organizations, self-help groups, small financial 
cooperatives, and credit unions.  
The general perception of informal lenders in developing countries concerns various 
money lenders, pawnshops, landlords, friends and relatives. For market-oriented farmers in 
Chile, however, the most important informal providers of financial services are trading and 
input supply companies. Although we recognize that the boundaries between formal and 
informal lenders are often blurred, we distinguish formal financial institutions as those which 
are licensed and supervised by a central authority. In fact, in many respects these firms 
operate today in much the same essential way that informal trade-money lenders have 
operated in Chile and elsewhere in the world (Conning and Udry, 2007). The latter is 
especially relevant for the analysis in Chapter 3 where the definition of informal lenders 
includes only traders and input suppliers.  
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1.3.3.1  Formal financial sector    
Chile's banking system has changed significantly over the last 30 years. During the 
period 1974–83, the Chilean government almost completely liberalized the financial sector by 
abolishing virtually all financial controls. However, the liberalization destabilized the 
economy, forcing the government to step in and rescue failing banks in 1983. The government 
also introduced a supervisory system for the financial sector (Superintendencia de Bancos e 
Instituciones Financieras), which is still in place. This regulatory framework is intended to 
reduce bank failures and helps to ensure an adequate level of bank solvency (Fuentes and 
Vergara, 2003).   
The Chilean banking sector is now one of the most developed and promising of the 
region. The sector contains 20 active commercial banks2: 12 foreign-owned, 7 Chilean-owned 
and one state-owned bank. During the last 20 years, the financial sector has experienced 
outstanding growth. In 2001 the ratio of credit allocated by deposit money banks to GDP was 
63.6%, the highest figure in Latin America, surpassing that of Brazil (Gallego and Loayza, 
2004; Hernandez and Parro, 2004).  
                                               
2
 Excludes branches of foreign banks that are mainly devoted to cash and portfolio management 
activities. 
 15
Table 1.6: Loan portfolio in agriculture in Chile, 2003-2007 and number of bank offices, 2007 
 Loan portfolio in Agriculture (million US$) Number of bank 
offices 
BANK 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Rural 
Central 
Area 
Total 
country 
Scotiabank Sud 
Americano 18.463 67.759 91.480 10.459 130.964 
15 40 
Banco Chile 662.517 792.148 726.838 768.575 979.733 55 280 
Banco Itaú 
Chile 9.045 18.709 30.277 77.872 139.359 
15 40 
Banco Estado 144.670 111.588 105.163 188.010 280.774 60 320 
Banco Bice 88.515 107.813 142.144 212.088 289.132 15 30 
Banco Del 
Desarrollo 142.329 178.037 219.992 263.895 297.410 
21 40 
Banco Bilbao, 
Vizcaya 12.559 12.889 177.923 244.526 775.137 
15 40 
Corpbanca 147.909 252.376 318.454 338.493 398.999 25 190 
BCI 30.848 413.673 476.453 64.709 822.778 31 210 
Santander 
Santiago Chile 488.622 583.684 789.898 1163.259 1243.409 
40 250 
TOTAL 1745.474 2538.676 3078.622 3331.885 5357.697 299 1930 
 Source: SBIF (2009) 
 
As shown in Table 1.6, the primary agricultural credit provider in Chile is Banco 
Santander (a foreign bank), followed by Banco Chile (a Chilean bank), Banco Bilbao 
(foreign), and Banco BCI (Chilean). These loans are characterized by being heavily 
collateralized and made available mainly to medium-sized and large farms. While bank 
officials in Chile do sometimes visit farm borrowers, these visits usually tend to take place 
prior to a loan approval and with the aim of appraising the value of collateral assets, not to 
monitor the project during execution (Conning and Udry, 2007). Table 1.6 also shows that 
while all the commercial banks have offices across the country, branches are mainly 
concentrated in the central area.  
Generally speaking, a formal loan application has to go through the following process in 
rural financial markets in Chile: Prospective borrowers have to submit a loan application at 
the local bank branch, together with a business plan describing the purpose of the loan. This 
loan application has to be accompanied by a description and official proof of collateral. A 
local loan officer visits the prospective borrower, evaluates the business plan, and decides 
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whether to extend the loan. However, as pointed out by Karcz (1998) and Petrick (2004b), the 
reliability or reputation of a borrower as indicated by previous punctual repayment of loans is 
at least as important for obtaining credit as is the sufficient availability of collateral. It is 
important to note that in Chile all banks have access to a financial recording system 
(DICOM), which records previous formal loan performance including defaults and delayed 
payments and thus acts as a reputation score. 
In general, default rates in Chile’s financial system are quite small (4%) and the delayed 
payments are in the order of 8%. 
1.3.3.2  Informal financial sector 
Informal financial institutions obtain credit from formal financial institutions, which is 
then reloaded to farmers, households or traders (Moll, 1989). The latter are sometimes eligible 
for a direct loan from these formal institutions, but prefer to use informal channels for reasons 
related to transaction cost, financing advantages or marketing. A common characteristic of 
these informal lenders is that they perform active monitoring (Conning and Udry, 2007). This 
means that informal lenders keep agents focused on efforts to improve the chances that the 
financed projects will not fail, and/or to reduce the possibility that the project cash flow may 
be diverted to purposes other than meeting promised repayments. In this sense, they act as 
delegated monitors.  
Attracted by economic liberalization, monitored loans via contract farming 
arrangements offered by export and agroindustry trades grew from a relatively small base to 
become the dominant mode of finance by the mid 1990s, well ahead of bank lending 
(Conning and Udry, 2007). Thus, the informal financial sector in rural areas in Chile mainly 
consists of contract farming and input suppliers. Although moneylenders, relatives and friends 
still exist as a source of credit in some areas, using their services is very limited in the central 
area. 
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Contract-farming firms 
Contract-farming firms provide in-kind or cash short-term credit advances. Usually the 
credit is tied to transactions on other markets such as credit advances provided by fruit-trading 
companies or agro-industry traders. Under such arrangements farmers are offered heavily 
monitored production financing tied to the provision of technical assistance and crop inputs in 
exchange for the promise to market all or a part of their harvest through the trader at agreed-
upon terms. This type of credit primarily finances fresh-fruit production, with a few 
exceptions in crops such as sugar beets, tobacco, tomatoes and certain types of horticultural 
production for the agroindustry (Conning and Udry, 2007).  
 In the case of fruit production, installments are offered at the beginning of the season 
and are paid back at the harvest. Trading companies may visit the farmers’ fields at the time 
of harvest or at other important decisions. For this reason, this kind of credit is known as 
monitored credit. Interlinked credit contracts may provide means to alleviate screening, 
incentive and enforcement problems (Hoff, Braveman et al., 1993). The 15 largest exporting 
companies process 50% of Chile’s total fresh fruit and vegetable exports, and they play a 
fundamental role in marketing Chilean production (Decofrut, 2008). These companies 
frequently contract to market or process a farmer’s harvest in exchange for credit and other 
services such as technical assistance and farm input sales (Conning and Udry, 2007). The 
most important fruit-trading companies are Dole, Unifrutti and David del Curto, processing 
13.8%, 10.8% and 9.6% of the fruit-trading volume, respectively, in the 2007-2008 season 
(Table 1.7). 
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Table 1.7: Main fruit-trading companies operating in Chile, 2007-2008 
Company Owner Main Trading Products Traded Volume, season 
2007-2008 (ton) 
Dole Non-resident Apple, grapes, pears 157,030 
Unifrutti Non-resident Apple, grapes, pears 120,997 
David del Curto Resident Apple, grapes, pears 109,296 
Copefrut Resident Apple, kiwi, pears 102,512 
Del Monte Non-resident Grapes, apple, pears  86,227 
Frusan Resident Grapes, apples, pears 82,302 
Rio Blanco Resident Grapes, kiwi, avocados 76.994 
Agricom Resident Avocado, grapes, apple 73,872 
Geenvic Resident Apple, grapes, kiwi 61,624 
Aconex Resident Grapes, apple, plum 59,259 
Subsole Resident Grapes, kiwi, avocado 57,347 
Propal Resident Avocado, lemons, oranges 51,134 
Verfrut Resident Grapes, apples, peaches 49,672 
Frutam Resident Apple, pears ,grapes  44,027 
Rucaray Resident Apple, grapes, pears 41,536 
Others   1,136,390 
Total   2,310,219 
Source: Author’s computation based on the data provided by Decofrut (2008) 
 
Input supply firms 
Input supply firms provide in-kind short-term credit usually repayable at harvest. 
Usually they operate in a restricted geographic area or in a specific section of the market. 
These firms sell inputs such as seeds, fertilizers or farm machinery. The in-kind product is 
both the type of credit provided and an avenue for active monitoring. This form of credit 
delivery can be interpreted as monitoring because it makes it more difficult for borrowers to 
divert credit to other private uses. The input supply sector consists of 18 companies which 
generate a combined overall turnover of US$ 100 billion per year. Together these companies 
have 93 offices throughout the country, 54 of which are located in central Chile.  Based on the 
number of offices, the most important input suppliers are Copeval, Coagra and Tattersal 
(Table 1.8). Other companies are smaller with a lack of open access information about 
turnover or market participation.  
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Table 1.8: Main input supply companies operating in Chile, 2004 
Company Starting 
year 
Input Sold  Number of 
branches 
Total turnover 
2004  
(million US$) 
Copeval 1972 Seed, fertilizer, pesticides, machinery 17 7,417 
Coagra S.A. 1970 Seed, fertilizer, pesticides, machinery 10 5,270 
Tattersall 1950 Seed, fertilizer, pesticides  10 4,698 
M y V 1965 Seed, fertilizer, pesticides, 9 w/i 
Source: Author’s computation based on the data provided by each firm. w/i stands for “without 
information” 
 
Together input supply firms and contract-farming firms provide a wide-ranging supply 
of short-term credit with convenient contract terms as flexible repayment and credit delivery 
at the beginning of the crop cycle for farmers in Chile. Informal lenders are able to extend 
those flexible loans to farmers because they actively monitor their clients through visits, 
interlinked credit contracts, or in-kind product delivery. In contrast, formal credit is more 
inflexible in terms of contract conditions, but is able to provide long-term funding. This 
situation leads to a complementary scenario where farmers may likely use rigid formal credit 
to meet their long-term credit needs, because the credit volume is large enough to cover the 
screening, monitoring and enforcement costs of formal credit contracts. On the other hand, 
farmers would use informal credit to meet their short-term credit needs with flexible contract 
conditions. 
1.4 Research methodology 
1.4.1  Study area  
The study area is the regions V, VI and Metropolitana, the central part of Chile. This 
area selection is based on the country’s most important fresh fruit and vegetable production, 
and includes the Los Andes, San Felipe (V Region), Rancagua (VI Region), San Bernardo, 
Buin, Paine and Melipilla (Region Metropolitana) counties. Figure 1.1 provides an overview 
of the counties included in the study area. Agriculture in this area is mainly irrigated, and a 
well-developed system of reservoirs, irrigation and drainage canals greatly reduces the risk 
associated with the amount and timing of water delivery. The predominant agricultural 
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activity is fruit production; major crops are table grapes, kiwi fruit, nectarines, apples, 
apricots, pears and avocados. Much of Chile's fruit production from this area is exported 
during the northern winter to the United States, Canada and Europe. Chile also produces and 
exports large quantities of wine, forest products, planting seeds, fresh flowers and processed 
fruits and vegetables. 
 
Figure 1.1: Map of the study area in central Chile 
 
Large estates (fundos) occupy a substantial part of Chile's agricultural lands. These are 
remnants of the Spanish colonial period, when extensive land grants were made to army 
officers and colonial officials. In the early 1920s, nearly 90% of the farmland in central Chile 
was in large estates. Although a massive land reform was introduced in 1967 and reinforced 
in 1971, during the liberalization period in the 1980s and 1990s individual land tittles were 
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distributed to the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. The land title distribution 
started a dynamic land market, which facilitated the merging of land into large productive 
firms. Based on the 2007 agricultural census, the average land size for agricultural activity is 
60 hectares, with 21 hectares for the study area. If we focus on farmers with a minimum of 10 
hectares, a characteristic linked with market-oriented farmers, the average size for individual 
farms in Chile is almost 64 hectares (Table 1.9). 
 
Table 1.9: Average farm size for different regions in Chile, 2007 
Regions of Chile Range of hectares 
 0-9.9 10-1,000 Total 
XV de Arica y Parinacota 2.39 150.81 25.97 
I de Tarapacá 1.51 83.92 12.07 
II de Antofagasta 1.67 39.50 3.02 
III de Atacama 2.25 85.40 16.51 
IV de Coquimbo 2.63 74.74 18.15 
V de Valparaíso 2.67 80.42 21.85 
Región Metropolitana de Santiago 3.32 68.39 27.87 
VI de O'Higgins 2.72 62.73 23.98 
VII del Maule 2.80 55.68 23.28 
VIII del Bío-Bío 3.15 50.25 19.63 
IX de La Araucanía 4.38 53.79 27.23 
XIV de Los Ríos 4.23 65.50 36.02 
X de Los Lagos 4.50 63.27 37.65 
XI Aysen 3.97 241.09 203.03 
XII de Magallanes y Antártica 2.56 225.82 89.68 
Total country 3.32 63.83 60.16 
Central Chile 2.83 68.40 24.21 
Source: Author’s computation based on the data provided by Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas 
(2007)  
 
1.4.2 Data collection  
The data used for this study have been obtained from a survey of a random sample of 
farms in central Chile, recorded by the Natural Resources Information Center (CIREN). The 
survey only considers market-oriented farmers, defined as farmers who manage a minimum of 
10 productive hectares and who sell their crops to a third party. Subsistence, non-cultivated 
and recreational farms are excluded because formal financial institutions primarily target 
market-oriented farmers, who are the primary players in the Chilean agricultural sector. The 
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minimum of 10 productive hectares was chosen because it is considered the minimum farm 
size required to support family life expenses in Chile. 
In early 2006, the questionnaire3 was pretested and slightly modified afterwards. In the 
pre-test survey we collected information from 52 farmers located in four counties in the 
central region of Chile. In this pre-test we also aimed to collect information about production 
cost. However, due to the variation in farm outputs and misunderstanding of some cost 
management concepts, we decided to leave out the cost items. The pre-test and the final 
version of the survey were conducted by a well-trained group of students from the agricultural 
department of Universidad Santo Tomas. 
The final version of the survey consists of 13 sections. Section 1 covers the 
identification of the respondent and general information about the firm. Section 2 includes the 
core questions dealing with credit behavior, including information on loan sources, loan 
applications, credit contracts, credit from suppliers, traders and collateral. Section 3 looks for 
information about production activities including yields, sales channels of plant and animal 
products production, and agricultural practices. Sections 5-9 encompasses tallied information 
on assets and machinery of the farm, communication systems, accounting, and the labor force. 
Section 10 contains questions about marketing and problems with sales channels. Section 11 
asks questions about investment and finance, including information on current and past period 
investment expenses. Section 12 closes with questions related to the biggest problem reported 
in the previous season. Section 13 is intended to provide information on the course and 
success of the interview.  
The survey was carried out in 2006 and 2008 and contains data on the 2005–06 and 
2007–08 seasons, respectively. In terms of weather conditions, 2005 was considered a dry 
                                               
3
 For the final version of the questionnaire see Appendix 1. 
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year, while 2008 was considered a representative year. On the other hand, 2008 was the 
beginning of the world financial crisis which also hit the Chilean financial sector.  
The first wave of the survey contained a random sample of 200 farms located in the 
seven counties in the central region of Chile mentioned before. The second wave contained 
information from 200 farmers, 177 of which were in the first wave. The same questionnaire 
was used for the two waves. The difference in the sample set for the two rounds was due to 
the fact that out of the original sample of 200 farmers, five could not be traced again, two left 
farming altogether, seven refused to participate in the second round, seven did not want to 
share “strategic” financing information, and two failed to meet the minimal land-size 
requirement. In the second wave, we introduced two additional questions to the survey: the 
distance to the closest bank office and the duration of the relationship with that institution.  
The same data base is used throughout the thesis, although different variables are used 
in each chapter as dependent and explanatory variables. Thus in Chapter 2, social-capital 
variables, such as the number of relationships that a farm has with an export and/or input 
supplier and the length of farm-bank relationships, are introduced and analyzed in their effect 
on determining credit constraint status. Chapter 3 focuses on variables representing formal 
credit constraint status and its effect in use of informal sources of lending. Chapter 4 intends 
to explain the influence of credit constraint on farm productivity, while in Chapter 5 the credit 
constraint is used as a variable explaining the intention to invest.  
The proposed survey addresses explicitly specific questions related to access to credit 
which are absent in most of the datasets in the country. As explained before, Chile lacks a 
detailed data base in the agricultural sector, and so the data collected for this thesis during the 
two rounds of questioning are innovative in studying the Chilean market. Using appropriate 
econometric techniques for panel data is convenient in this case because it limits the effect of 
unobservable heterogeneity due to individual characteristics.   
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Limitations of the survey include a number of potential sources of measurement errors 
encountered during the implementation of the survey. As previously explained, in the pre-test 
we tried to collect information about production cost. However, production cost information 
that was collected had errors due to misunderstanding some cost concepts and to the reluctant 
reaction of some farmers to answer these questions. Consequently, all return and efficiency 
variables were measured without considering production costs.  
Another limitation is the variable that measures investment. Investment is a dynamic 
variable that changes over time where the amount of change depends on the initial investment 
level. Thus we need to know the initial values of investment for each farmer.  This problem 
was managed by using past values of investment collected by memory. Although this method 
may cause measurement errors, it was the best possible way to collect information needed for 
Chapter 4. 
Finally, data collection inevitably suffers from some degree of sample selection bias. 
Although farmers were randomly selected from each county, in many cases farmers refused to 
answer the questionnaire, and had to be replaced by other farmers. This may cause sample 
selection problems because willingness to answer the survey could be correlated with the 
likelihood of being credit constrained.  
1.4.3  Methods of analysis 
1.4.3.1  Credit constraints 
According to the literature, credit constraints refer to a situation where the demand for 
credit exceeds the supply of credit at the prevailing interest rate (Feder, Lau et al., 1990; 
Kochar, 1997; Petrick, 2004b). This definition is referred to as “pure credit rationing” (Jaffee 
and Stiglitz, 1990b). Under this definition individuals in some cases are able to obtain loans, 
while other seemingly identical individuals, who are willing to borrow at precisely the same 
terms, do not. Borrowers are either rejected or receive a lower amount than desired.  
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Boucher et al. (2009) introduced a broader definition of credit rationing. They consider 
not only “pure credit rationing” or in Boucher’s words, “quantity rationing” but also risk and 
transaction-cost rationing. Farmers are transaction-cost rationed if the effective demand for 
credit is zero due to transaction costs. Risk rationed farmers are farmers who decide not to 
demand a loan since they prefer to undertake a safe lower-return investment for which no loan 
is needed instead of a higher-risk investment for which a loan is needed. This situation arises 
because the credit contract forces the borrower to bear a minimum amount of risk by showing 
collateral. The main implication of using the definition by Boucher et al. (2009) is that credit 
rationing may also be identified in cases where the effective demand for credit is lower than 
the supply of credit. 
Boucher et al. (2009) define five categories of borrowers: 
a) Unconstrained borrowers. The household is unaffected by a credit limit from the formal 
financial sector and obtains the desired amount. 
b) Unconstrained non-borrowers. The household is unaffected by a credit limit, but does 
not borrow in the formal sector because it has no profitable project that requires a formal loan. 
c) Quantity rationed. Households face a binding credit limit because their loan application is 
rejected, do not seek a formal loan because the loan requirements cannot be met, or they 
obtain a loan but a lower amount than requested.  
d) Transaction-cost rationed. Households do not face a binding credit limit, but they do not 
seek a formal loan because the transaction costs associated with the loan application are too 
high.  
e) Risk rationed. Households do not face a binding credit limit, but they do not seek a formal 
loan because the risk related to the collateral needed to obtain the loan is too high.  
 26
The direct-elicitation method (Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009) is applied to 
determine the relevant borrower category for each firm throughout this thesis (see Appendix 
2).  
Petrick (2005) explains six methods to determine credit constraints: 1) direct 
measurement of loan transaction costs (Cuevas and Graham, 1986; Meyer and Cuevas, 1992); 
2) qualitative information collected in interviews (Feder et al., 1989; Jappelli, 1990; Boucher, 
Guirkinger et al., 2009); 3) quantitative information collected in interviews (Diagne, 1999; 
Diagne et al., 2000; Zeller and Sharma, 2002);  4) spill-over models (Bell, Srinivasan et al., 
1997a); 5) static household models (Feder, Lau et al., 1990; Moschini and Hennessy, 2001; 
Petrick, 2004a); and 6) dynamic investment models (Bond and Meghir, 1994).  According to 
Petrick’s classification, primary qualitative information collected in interviews is used in 
Chapters 2 and 3, a static household model in Chapter 4, and an approximation of a dynamics 
investment model in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, all the chapters rely on the three categories of 
credit constraints: quantity, transaction cost and risk constraints.  
1.4.3.2  Multilevel analysis 
Multilevel analysis refers to modeling when data are clustered in some way. In panel 
data for instance, data are clustered because multiple observations over time are nested within 
individual observations. Such a structure of the data provides rich information on process 
operation at different levels. Multilevel analysis capitalizes on this richness of data allowing 
for dependence or correlations among responses observed for units within the same cluster.  
Although with a different purpose, multilevel analysis is applied throughout this 
thesis. In Chapter 2 multilevel analysis is applied in a multinomial-modeling context to allow 
for each mutually exclusive credit constraint alternative depending on a set of farm-specific 
variables, capturing individual unobservable heterogeneity by using alternative-specific 
random intercepts.  
 27
Alternatively, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 use multilevel analysis to consider both potential 
endogeneity problems and individual unobservable heterogeneity. In doing so, a system of 
equations is estimated simultaneously: the main equation that we want to estimate and an 
endogenous dummy equation. To induce correlation, a shared random-effect term is 
introduced in both equations. Although in each of these three chapters mentioned above the 
endogenous dummy variable stands for credit constraint status, the main equation in Chapter 
3 is whether informal credit is used. In the case of Chapter 4, the main equation represents 
output production, while in Chapter 5 the main equation is whether or not a farmer invests. In 
both Chapters 3 and 5, the credit constraint dummy variable is included in the main equation 
and is treated as an endogenous variable. In Chapter 4 the credit constraint variable is the 
selection condition and is not included in the main equation. The main equation is observed 
only if the selection condition is met. Although in different ways, all these three chapters take 
in consideration endogeneity problems using multilevel analysis. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Credit Constraints of Market-Oriented Farmers in Chile4 
2 Credit Constraints of Market-Oriented Farmers in Chile 
Abstract 
 
Using data from two surveys conducted in 2006 and 2008 with 177 farmers, this chapter 
determines whether market-oriented farmers in central Chile are credit constrained, and it 
identifies the main factors that influence formal credit provision. In so doing, this study 
explicitly tests whether social capital variables play a role in determining credit constraints. 
That is, the authors explore the determinants of classifications into four categories of credit 
provision and rationing, using a panel multinomial logit model. The results suggest that most 
market-oriented farmers are unconstrained. Empirical evidence supports the importance of 
relationship variables for improving access to financial capital.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The study of access to credit in rural areas is important because Rural Financial Markets 
(RFMs) link to national-level financial markets. This linkage reduces seasonal, sector and 
regional fluctuations in the demand for and supply of credit; subsequently, it creates the 
potential for rural populations to participate in investments outside the rural sector (Moll, 
2005). Moreover, access to credit may increase the production efficiency of rural small 
businesses, including farmers, and help promote a dynamic business environment in rural 
areas. Without credit constraints, consumption and investment decisions get separated, which 
enables businesses to set the inputs for the production processes at an optimal level (Carter, 
                                               
4
 This chapter is accepted as : Reyes, A. and R. Lensink, The Credit Constraints of Market-Oriented Farmers in 
Chile. Interaction of Formal and Informal Rural Credit Institutions in Central Chile. Journal of Development 
Studies. In press. 
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1989; Feder, Lau et al., 1990; Foltz, 2004). Access to rural credit also may stimulate new 
investments and induce new technologies (Khandker and Faruqee, 2003). 
However, RFMs are often inefficient, which means they cannot provide all the financial 
products that rural households demand during a specific period. This mismatch in demand and 
supply reflects several market imperfections, including (1) monopolies in credit markets, as 
exercised by informal lenders (Bell, Srinivasan et al., 1997a); (2) large transaction costs 
incurred by borrowers applying for loans; (3) imperfect information that leads to adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Carter, 1988); and (4) 
screening, monitoring, and enforcement problems faced by lenders (Hoff, Braveman et al., 
1993). 
The imperfection of RFMs is especially severe in developing countries. According to 
Moll et al. (2000), only large-scale farmers in El Salvador’s RFMs receive credit from formal 
financial institutions. Moreover, the loans provided by these formal institutions are 
substantially larger than those provided by other suppliers. Similar results emerge in India 
(Bell, Srinivasan et al., 1997a; Kochar, 1997), Tunisia (Foltz, 2004), Pakistan (Khandker and 
Faruqee, 2003), and Poland (Petrick, 2004b). This study aims to examine whether market-
oriented farmers in central Chile similarly are credit constrained, as well as identify the main 
factors that influence formal credit provision and constraints for market-oriented farming in 
Chile.  
Our contribution is threefold. First, this study applies a broad definition of credit 
constraints to market-oriented farmers in Chile. In line with Guirkinger (2008), Boucher et al. 
(2009) and Fletschner et al. (2010) we explicitly differentiate between credit constraints due 
to high transaction costs or risk aversion and quantity constraints. By using this approach, we 
can also distinguish different categories and thus provide a more detailed picture of credit 
constraints and their determinants. Boucher et al. (2009) focus on Peru, and find evidence for 
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the importance of credit constraints. Their study suggests that the fraction of households that 
is credit constrained is about 50%. Unlike Peru, Chile has a financial sector that is highly 
competitive and deregulated, which may mitigate financial market imperfections. In 1974–83, 
the Chilean government liberalized the financial sector by abolishing virtually all financial 
controls. However, this liberalization destabilized the economy, forcing the government to 
step in during 1983 and rescue failing banks (Fry, 1994). The government also introduced a 
financial supervisory system (Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras) that 
remains in place. This regulation framework attempts to reduce bank failures and helps ensure 
an adequate level of bank solvency (Fuentes and Vergara, 2003).  
The Chilean financial sector comprises 20 active commercial banks:5 12 foreign-owned, 
seven private Chilean-owned, and one state-owned (SBIF, 2009). In the past 20 years, the 
financial sector has undergone outstanding growth; in 2001, the ratio of credit allocated by 
deposit money banks to gross domestic product was 63.6%, far greater than the next highest 
ranking, Brazil (Gallego and Loayza, 2004; Hernandez and Parro, 2004). Yet anecdotal 
evidence suggests persistently severe financial constraints for farmers; in the period between 
1990 and 2009, private banks decreased their credit provision to the agricultural sector in 
Chile from 10% to 4.1% of the total credit provided by commercial banks (ODEPA, 2005). 
Thus it is important to investigate the extent to which rural Chile is still plagued by credit 
constraints.  
Second, this study focuses on the importance of social capital, in the form of long-term 
relationships, for broadly defined credit constraints in the context of market-oriented farming 
in developing countries. Several authors have argued that private information occupies a 
central place in bank–customer relationships and that the extent of private information 
increases with the amount of contact between a bank and its customers over time (Diamond, 
                                               
5
 Excluding branches of foreign banks that are mainly devoted to cash and portfolio management activities.  
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1991; Rajan, 1992; Berglof and von Ernst-Ludwig, 1994; Boot and Thakor, 1994; 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; von Thadden, 1995; Ongena and Smith, 2001).  
When a bank evaluates a request for credit, it can collect private information about the 
applicant first-hand or obtain this information from other lenders that already have dealt with 
it. Theory suggests that information sharing may overcome an adverse selection problem in 
the credit market (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and reduce moral hazard by raising borrowers’ 
efforts to repay loans (Padilla and Pagano, 2000) or causing them to avoid excessive lending  
because each borrower can patronize several banks (Brown et al., 2009). Thus, interconnected 
relationships, such as a business cluster, can signal that the borrower is trustworthy, so 
bankers may be willing to require less paperwork in loan applications. In addition, from 
farmers’ perspective, the more interconnected are firms with different clusters, the better 
information they can gather about alternative funding sources for their project. 
Third, this study uses a rich data set, based on a panel of 177 farmers for over two years. 
Most comparable studies rely on cross-section data. A key advantage of our study thus is that 
it uses efficient and unbiased panel estimators. Specifically, we identify determinants of credit 
constraints by estimating a multinominal logit model with random effects, which controls for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
We focus particularly on market-oriented farmers, the main players in the Chilean 
agriculture sector. In the Chilean agricultural and forestry sectors, market-oriented farmers6 
account for 96.5% of the landowners, whose holdings constitute 96.4% of the total fruit farm 
area and 94.9% of the total vegetable farm area (ODEPA, 2005). 
We organize the remainder of this chapter as follows. Section 2 explains some basic 
concepts with respect to social capital, and the relationship between social capital and credit 
                                               
6
 The Economic Development Agency of Chile (CORFO) distinguishes micro, small, medium, and large-scale 
entrepreneurs as follows: micro entrepreneurs have an annual gross income up to US$78,000; small 
entrepreneurs earn from $78,000 to $808,000; medium entrepreneurs take in $808,000–$3,231,000; and large 
entrepreneurs make at least $3,100,000. Our definition of market-oriented farmers applies to small, medium, and 
large-scale farmers. 
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constraints. It also sets out our focus on two proxies for social capital, clusters and the length 
of bank relationships. In section 3 we provide a description of business clusters in the Chilean 
context. Section 4 contains a literature review regarding measures of credit constraints and 
explains our approach. We then describe the empirical model and present the results in section 
5. Section 6 summarizes the findings.  
2.2 Social capital and credit rationing 
The economic backwardness of many countries can be explained by massive failures in 
co-ordination (Kondonassis et al., 2000). Co-ordination failures occur if there is no individual 
incentive for market agents to trade and benefit from transacting with each other. The 
following example may help explain this: If farmers could obtain a loan, they would probably 
invest in the resources to produce higher-quality output. A bank manager is willing to lend a 
farmer money if the farmer is able to repay the loan, and the farmer would be able to repay 
the loan if (s)he could sell the produce to a trader. The trader, in turn, would guarantee the 
purchase if (s)he knew there was sufficient volume and quality to cover the costs, which 
depends on the farmer’s access to finance. However, these transactions may never happen 
because of high mutual uncertainty over quality and volumes. In rural economies this 
uncertainty is the rule rather than the exception due to long production cycles, small volumes 
of transaction, uncertain demand, and poor quality assurance tools.  
In order to improve economic performance of farmers, market transactions need to be 
coordinated by either market or non-market mechanisms. However, inducing more 
competition on such failing markets may not be the solution. It may also not be advisable to 
increase the role for government interventions since governments are “neither sufficiently 
informed or sufficiently accountable to correct all market failures” (Bowles and Gintis, 2002,  
F409).    
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In recent decades, there has been a striking interest in the importance of social capital 
for reducing co-ordination problems. However, social capital is a broad concept which is 
defined differently across studies. Some authors measure social capital in terms of cultural 
values, for example, by accounting for the degree of altruism in a society (Fukuyama, 1995). 
Others, such as  Putnam (2000, p.19), define social capital as “connections among 
individuals— social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them”. According to most definitions, social capital is strongly related to trust. It refers to the 
set of rules, norms and values that permit people to work with each other, and trust each other. 
The importance of social capital is clear since developmental problems are strongly related to 
a lack of mutual confidence and trust. Every commercial transaction has within itself an 
element of trust, especially in credit markets since these transaction are conducted over a 
period of time.   
 There is vast literature on the role of social capital; see for example Durlauf (2002),  
Bowles and Gintis (2002), Glaeser, et al. (2002), and the references therein. This literature 
shows that social capital becomes important when market institutions fail. Especially in credit 
markets in developing countries, which are characterized by asymmetric information and 
consequently severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems, the development of social 
capital is important. The reason is that social capital, such as in the form of networks, may 
facilitate screening and monitoring of borrowers, and hence improve access to credit. In credit 
markets where efficient information services are absent, the development of social capital 
may help to improve information sharing between borrowers and lenders.  
Empirical studies have used dozens of proxies for social capital (see for example 
Durlauf, 2002). In our study we focus on how social capital is related to bank-farmer 
relationships. We do not intend to cover the entire spectrum of bank-farmer relationships. 
Rather we focus on two variables, the number of cluster relationships and the length of the 
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bank relationship, to shed some light on the importance of social capital in explaining access 
to credit for market-oriented farmers in Chile.   
A cluster is broadly defined as a group of supply chain actors — input suppliers, 
farmers, processors, traders, extension agencies, and banks — who  interact repeatedly. Being 
a member of a cluster measures different aspects of social capital, which is normally 
understood as the quantity and quality of interpersonal relationships. Chain actors’ access to 
key resources is critical (Slack et al., 1995), but may be hindered by co-ordination problems. 
Clusters may allow improved access to organizational capability at the grassroots level; 
information on markets, technologies and product quality; and finance. For our analysis, the 
cluster effect on credit is especially important. We hypothesize that financial access is 
positively related to social capital. 
We also consider the importance of the length of the relationship with the bank . In line 
with the cluster effect, a longer bank-farmer relationship may increase trust, and hence social 
capital in credit markets. By means of relationship lending, banks collect private information 
on rural farms, which is rare and costly in developing countries. Consequently, the farm and 
the banks enter in a long-term relationship that assures the farm’s access to credit and gives 
the bank access to information about the farm (Baas and Schrooten, 2006). Schaefer (2003) 
argues that in such relationships banks increase the value of the farm or firm’s information. 
This implies that by means of long-term relationship, a firm transmits information about the 
company and its projects to the bank, who may consequently reduce the loan interest rate and 
collateral requirements. Long-term relationships may also reduce transaction costs of applying 
for a loan. The transaction costs decrease because the borrower does not need to provide as 
much information to the bank (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Moreover, knowledge about the 
procedures to be followed when applying for a loan will increase over time.  
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2.3  Business clusters in the agricultural sector 
In the mid-1970s, the Chilean government introduced a more market-based resource 
allocation. The role of the government became less important, measures to liberalize trade 
were introduced, and trade and private property rights were strengthened (Valdes and Jara, 
2008). With regard to financial sector policies, interest rate ceilings as well as the preferential 
rates for the agricultural sector were abolished. The reforms had a profound impact on land 
markets and on firms that provide services to the agricultural sector, such as input suppliers 
and transport companies. The new land policy provided unrestricted access to landownership 
and improved the protection of property rights. Individual land titles were redistributed to the 
beneficiaries of the land reform programs. Moreover, input and product markets were 
privatized. 
The agricultural sector was especially affected by trade liberalization because they 
included a reduction or even a complete elimination of nontariff barriers on most imports and 
an elimination of export restrictions. In addition, a uniform import tariff was introduced, at 
90% in 1975 gradually falling to 10% in 1979.   
The most influential trade policy change in recent years was the introduction of free 
trade agreements, with Canada (1997), Mexico (1999), the European Union (2003), the 
Republic of Korea and the United States (2004), New Zealand and Singapore (2005), China 
and Peru (2006), and Japan (2007). These agreements resulted in a reduction of the effective 
average tariff rate  across all goods to about 2% in 2007 (Valdes and Jara, 2008).   
The trade liberalization attracted trade companies who saw great opportunity to export 
fruits, wine and processed food. They organized themselves as business clusters, led by export 
and input supplier firms. Within these clusters, different companies such as specialized 
suppliers, service providers and associated institutions, cooperated in order to increase 
productivity by means of, for example, getting access to credit and marketing their products.  
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Within such clusters, export firms offered farmers credit for working capital, technical 
assistance, and crop inputs in exchange for the farmers’ promise to provide the harvest that 
would subsequently be marketed by the export firm. Credit for farmers primarily financed 
fresh fruit production, with a few exceptions in such crops as sugar beets, tobacco, tomatoes 
and certain types of horticultural production for agro-industry (Conning and Udry, 2007). As 
the cluster coordinator, input supplier firms provide in-kind short-term credit, generally 
payable at harvest. Usually they operate in a restricted geographic area or in a specific section 
of the market. These firms not only sell inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, or farm machinery, 
but also offer technical assistance, training courses, and fruit quality certification. 
2.4  The sample 
The survey is based on a random sample of farms in central Chile, recorded by the 
Natural Resources Information Center (CIREN). We only consider market-oriented farmers, 
defined as farmers who manage a minimum of ten productive hectares and sell their crops to a 
third party (market). We exclude subsistence, non-cultivated, and recreational-oriented farms, 
because formal financial institutions do not primarily target them; instead, as we noted, 
market-oriented farmers are the main players in the Chilean agricultural sector. We choose ten 
hectares as the minimum productive area because it represents the minimum size required to 
support a family in Chile. 
The survey, conducted in 2006 and 2008, refers to data about the 2005–06 and 2007–
08 seasons, respectively. The first wave contains a random sample of 200 farms located in 
seven counties in central Chile (Los Andes, San Felipe, Rancagua, San Bernardo, Buin, Paine 
and Melipilla), selected because they represent the most important fresh fruit and vegetable 
production regions. The second wave contains information from 200 farmers, 177 of which 
were in the first wave. The same questionnaire applies across both waves. However, in the 
second wave, five farmers could not be found again, two had left the farming industry, seven 
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refused to answer, seven did not want to share “strategic” financing information, and two 
failed to meet the minimal land size requirement. Furthermore, the second wave contains an 
additional question, that is, the length of time the firm had had a relationship with a bank. 
This variable appeared in the first wave but only for farmers who had obtained credit. The 
second interview asked the rest of the sample if farmers recalled having a bank relationship.  
In Table 2.1, we provide the descriptive characteristics of the 177 farmers, separated 
by year. The mean farm size is 78 and 76 hectares for 2006 and 2008, respectively, similar to 
the average size for all individual farms in central Chile with a minimum of ten hectares (see 
Table 1.9). The average firm–bank relationship was relatively long, at 13 years in 2006.  
  
Table 2.1: Sample statistics by year (n = 177, each year) 
  2006  2008  
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
CLUSTER Number of relationships that a 
firm has with export and/or 
input supplier firms.  
1,27 0,66 1,56 0,88 
LENGTH Length of firm–bank 
relationship (years) 
13,30 12,53 14,92 12,61 
HECTARES Owned land (hectares) 77,57 95,44 76,02 91,38 
YEAR_ADM Amount of farming years 0,03 0,18 0,03 0,18 
INSURANCE Binary dummy with a 1 if the 
firm use insurance instruments, 
0 otherwise 
0,26 0,44 0,20 0,40 
NO_PROGRAM Binary dummy, equal to 1 if 
the firm had neither an 
employee-training program nor 
a GAP certification, 0 
otherwise 
0,05 0,21 0,05 0,21 
ALMOND Binary dummy, equal to 1 if 
the farm’s main product was 
almonds, 0 otherwise 
0,07 0,26 0,07 0,26 
AVOCADO Binary dummy, equal to 1 if 
the farm’s main product was 
avocados, 0 otherwise 
1,27 0,66 1,56 0,88 
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2.5  Are market-oriented farmers in Chile credit constrained? 
2.5.1 Method to measure credit constraints 
Credit constraints exist when the demand for credit exceeds its supply at the prevailing 
interest rate (Feder, Lau et al., 1990; Kochar, 1997; Petrick, 2004b). This definition involves 
“pure credit rationing” (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990b). Thus some people obtain loans, whereas 
seemingly identical persons, willing to borrow at precisely the same terms, do not. These 
borrowers are either rejected or receive less credit than desired. Boucher et al. (2009) 
introduce a broader definition of credit rationing though that also includes risk and transaction 
cost rationing. That is, farmers are transaction cost rationed if no effective demand for credit 
exists due to the transaction costs. Risk-rationed farmers decide not to demand a loan because 
they prefer a safer, lower return investment that demands no loan, rather than a higher risk 
investment that requires a loan, because the credit contract forces the borrower to bear a 
minimum amount of risk in the form of collateral. Boucher et al.’s (2009) definition therefore 
implies that credit rationing occurs even when effective demand for credit is lower than its 
supply. In turn, Boucher et al. (2009) identify five categories of borrowers: 
a) Unconstrained borrowers. The household is unaffected by credit limits in the formal 
financial sector and obtains its desired amount. 
b) Unconstrained non-borrowers. The household is unaffected by a credit limit but 
does not borrow in the formal sector because it has not undertaken a profitable project 
that would require a formal loan. 
c) Quantity rationed. Households face a binding credit limit because their loan 
application is rejected, do not seek a formal loan because they cannot meet loan 
requirements, or obtain a loan but for less than requested.  
d) Transaction cost rationed. Households do not face a binding credit limit, but they do 
not seek a formal loan because the transaction costs associated with the loan 
application are too high.  
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e) Risk rationed. Households do not face a binding credit limit, but they do not seek a 
formal loan because the risk implied by available credit contracts is too high.  
We apply a direct elicitation method (Guirkinger, 2008; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009; 
Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 2010) to determine the relevant borrower category for each farm. 
Depending on responses, we classify farmers into the five categories listed above.7 Table 2.2 
contains common answers and the associated rationing category.  
 
Table 2.2: Common answers to qualitative questions 
Answers Constraint Status 
I received the desired loan from formal lenders in the past three years. Unconstrained  
(borrowers) 
I do not need a loan. Unconstrained  
(non-borrowers) Interest rate is too high. 
Farming does not give me enough to repay a debt. 
I received a loan from formal lenders in the past three years, but not 
the desired amount. 
Constrained  
(quantity rationed) 
I applied for a loan in the past three years but my application was 
rejected. 
I did not apply for a loan because I did not think the formal institution 
would accept my application. 
I did not want to risk my land. Constrained  
(risk rationed) I did not want to be worried/I was afraid. 
Formal lenders are too strict; they are not as flexible as informal ones. 
Formal lenders do not offer refinancing. 
The bank branch was too far away. Constrained  
(transaction-cost rationed) Banks require too much paper work associated with application. 
 
2.5.2 Results 
In Table 2.3, we summarize the results of interviews that classified the farmers as credit 
constrained or unconstrained8 (Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009). A remarkable outcome is 
that most farmers believed themselves credit unconstrained—the percentage of unconstrained 
farmers even increased over time, from 83.6% in 2006 to 86.4% in 2008.  
The percentage of farmers constrained due to risk rationing also was very low: 2.8% in 
2006 and 3.4% in 2008. A similar finding holds for the percentage of farmers constrained by 
transaction costs, or 2.8% and 0.6% in 2006 and 2008, respectively. The percentage of 
                                               
7
 See details about direct elicitation methods in Appendix 2.  
8
 See section 1.4.2 for details on data used. 
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quantity-constrained farmers was 10.7% and 9.6% in 2006 and 2008, respectively. Within the 
group of quantity-rationed farmers in 2006, 8.5% were borrowers and 2.3% were non-
borrowers. In 2008, these values were 9% and 0.6%, respectively. 
 
Table 2.3: Classification of farmers by credit constraint status (%) 
Credit Constraint Status  2006 2008 
Unconstrained   
Borrowers 36.2 36.7 
Non-borrowers 47.5 49.7 
Total credit-unconstrained farmers 83.6 86.4 
Constrained   
Quantity rationed 10.7 9.6 
Risk rationed 2.8 3.4 
Transaction cost rationing 2.8 0.6 
Total credit-constrained farmers 16.4 13.6 
Note: Results are percentages and refer to surveys in both rounds (n = 177, each year). 
Without a comparable counterfactual country, we cannot unambiguously determine 
why perceived credit constraints might be relatively low in Chile compared with other 
developing countries. Yet it seems as if the financial sector policies in Chile—including 
deregulation and an adequate regulatory framework—have been successful and resulted in the 
widespread locations of commercial banks. With our data set, we cannot determine why the 
degree of credit rationing would be relatively low at the country level. Instead, we conducted 
a further study of the reasons for differences in credit status within Chile.   
2.6  Determinants of credit constraints  
2.6.1 Econometric specification 
The analytical model distinguishes five categories of borrowers: price-rationed borrowers; 
price-rationed non-borrowers; and quantity-, risk-, and transaction cost-rationed borrowers. 
The percentage of risk- and/or transaction cost-rationed farmers is very low, so we merged 
these categories, which simplified the analysis considerably without affecting the main 
results. Hence, in our econometric analysis we focus on the following four categories: price-
rationed borrowers; price-rationed non-borrowers; quantity rationed borrowers, and 
transaction cost and risk-rationed borrowers.    
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We use a multinomial logit model with random effects to determine the factors that 
influence credit constraint. For a detailed technical description of this model, see Appendix 3. 
This convenient approach focuses on a single category from mutually exclusive categories in 
which the dependent variable is multinomial. In our case, we have four mutually exclusive 
categories that depend on a set of farm-specific variables.  
The multinomial logit model with random effects estimates the probability that a farmer 
managing at least ten hectares in central Chile belongs to one of the four mutually exclusive 
alternatives. The coefficients we will estimate measure the effect of a variable on the 
probability of being classified as one of the alternatives, compared with a reference category. 
We chose unconstrained borrowers as the reference category.  
There are several advantages of using a multinomial logit model with random effects. 
First, it allows us to capture individual unobservable heterogeneity by allowing alternative-
specific random intercepts. It is likely that farmers belong to different categories of credit 
constraints, and that part of the credit constraint status heterogeneity is related to the 
unobservable farm and individual characteristics. Second, it accounts for the fact that each 
individual makes several choices which cannot be assumed to be independent. Probabilities of 
each category for repeated observations on the same individual share the same unobservable 
random effects and are assumed to be correlated. 
However, the multinominal logit model with random effects also has some 
methodological limitations. The random effects model does not control for endogeneity 
problems due to unobserved time-varying and time invariant variables that are correlated with 
the error term.  The choice to enter a business cluster may be endogenous, and be induced by 
credit constraints. However, this is not very likely in the Chilean context since the formation 
of the clusters is induced and coordinated by the export firms and the input suppliers to attract 
clients, and not by the borrowing farm.  It may also be the case that unobserved management 
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characteristics are correlated with the choice of a particular production program, which would 
bias our parameter estimates. While our approach may partly suffer from these drawbacks, we 
do not believe that endogeneity problems would invalidate our main results with respect to the 
relationship variables. The reason is that clusters are formed for relatively long periods, and 
are predetermined with respect to the different categories of rationing, which implies that it is 
likely that the relationship variables are exogenous with respect to the different credit 
constrained categories.  
2.6.2 Variables explaining credit constraints 
The credit market is characterized by asymmetric information, with adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems that induce commercial banks to ration credit (Freixas and Rochet, 
1997). Several variables may reduce credit constraints. We focus our analysis on two social 
capital/ relationship variables that have received relatively little attention, especially in 
developing countries: the number of clusters and the number of years the farmer has had a 
relationship with the bank. In Table 2.4, we list the expected sign for each variable that we 
consider. 
Table 2.4: Explanatory variables for multinomial logit model and expected results compared 
with reference category (unconstrained borrowers) 
Groups  Variable Unconstrained 
Non-borrowers 
Constrained 
(quantity 
rationed) 
Constrained 
(transaction cost or 
risk rationed) 
Relationship 
variables 
CLUSTER - - - 
LENGTH NS - - 
Control 
Variables 
HECTARES + -  
YEAR_ADM  -  
INSURANCE  +/-  
NO_PROGRAM  + + 
ALMOND  +  
AVOCADO  -  
2.6.2.1  Relationship variables 
According to prior literature, participating in a business cluster may increase firm 
productivity, because it increases cooperation among the participating firms. More 
cooperation implies more information about alternatives funding sources and less paperwork 
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required by banks to provide a loan. In addition, more cooperation may lead to more risk 
sharing and/or to better access to some form of insurance.9  
We therefore hypothesize that an increase in the number of relationships that a farm 
has with export firms and/or input supplier firms (number of clusters) has several effects. 
First, the probability of being a quantity-constrained borrower decreases because belonging to 
more clusters signals that the farm is creditworthy. If a farm is related to more clusters, it 
would also make more funds available, reducing the need to borrow from outside sources and 
hence the probability of becoming a quantity-constrained borrower, especially relative to the 
probability of becoming an unconstrained borrower. Second, the probability of becoming a 
transaction cost- and risk-rationed borrower declines, because relationships with more clusters 
suggest that the farm is creditworthy, so the need for the bank to screen the farm declines, as 
does the demand for paperwork. Third, we predict that the probability of becoming an 
unconstrained non-borrower, relative to probability of becoming an unconstrained borrower, 
decreases as the probability of becoming an unconstrained borrower increases due to the 
decline in the probability of being rationed. 
A longer bank relationship also improves the accuracy of the bank’s information about 
the creditworthiness of the farm and reduces monitoring costs (Degryse and Ongena, 2005; 
Baas and Schrooten, 2006). It is more likely that a bank would be willing to extend a loan if 
its relationship with the farm were longer. In addition, the transaction costs related to applying 
for a loan decrease, because the borrower probably can provide less information to the bank. 
Degryse and Ongena (2005) report that to obtain a loan, a new borrower may have to visit the 
bank branch between two and three times, whereas a repeat customer is not required to 
undertake additional visits. Yet the impact of this trend on the probability of becoming an 
unconstrained non-borrower is unclear. Alternatively, the probability of becoming a 
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 We thank a referee for this suggestion. 
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constrained, quantity-rationed farmer may decline if the length of the bank–farm relationship 
increases. The same trend should hold for the probability of becoming a risk- and/or 
transaction cost-rationed farmer. 10 
It should be noted that we have used the log of the length of the lender-borrower 
relationship, while the cluster size is not taken in logs. The reason is that by using logs for the 
lender-borrower relationship we want to control for the fact that it is highly likely that the 
length of the relationship is especially important in the beginning of the relationship, and 
becomes less important when the relationship has lasted for a long time. After several years, 
banks know their clients, such that increasing the relationship time even longer does not have 
a substantial effect. 11 
2.6.2.2  Control variables 
We include control variables that empirical bank literature cites as important for 
explaining credit constraints. Collateral can signal the quality of a borrower (Bester, 1985), 
and the availability of collateral may reduce moral hazard (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Boucher, 
Guirkinger et al., 2009). A bank should be more willing to provide a loan when the borrower 
can back the loan by pledging some collateral. An increase in the availability of collateral 
therefore should reduce the probability of being a quantity-rationed borrower. We use total 
land owned by the farmer as a proxy for collateral; it includes cultivated and non-cultivated 
areas in the field. We expect that the probability of becoming an unconstrained non-borrower 
increases if the amount of collateral increases, because wealthier, unconstrained farmers have 
more financial capital to self-finance.  
                                               
10
 In principle, an increase in the length of the bank-firm relationship may also increase the probability that the 
borrower reaches a credit ceiling since, for example, the bank knows better the capacity of repayments of the 
firm. Although we hypothesize that an increase in the length of the relationship will reduce credit constraints, the 
econometric tests may suggests otherwise.   
11
 For robustness we also estimated the models by taking logarithms of both relationship variables. This didn’t 
change the results in terms of significance.  These results can be obtained on request.  
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For constrained, quantity-rationed farmers, we expect the sign for the collateral 
variable to be negative, which implies that an increase in the amount of hectares available 
decreases the probability of being classified as a quantity-constrained borrower, because 
farmers with more land have more collateral to show formal credit institutions and thus 
should receive the loans they request. 
Farmers’ management skills also may reduce credit constraints (Barry and Robison, 
2001), because a high quality entrepreneur should be more likely to repay a loan. High-quality 
entrepreneurs also can better convince potential lenders that they are creditworthy. We use 
several variables to represent management skills, including years of farming experience 
(Feder, Lau et al., 1990; Petrick, 2004b), and whether the farmer has completed a training or 
certification program. We hypothesize that the probability of becoming a constrained 
quantity-rationed farmer relates negatively to management skills. We also included a dummy 
variable indicating whether the farmer has made use of insurance instruments. The impact of 
insurance on credit constraints is ambiguous. On the one hand, more insurance may reduce 
risks for the bank, and hence improve access to credit. On the other hand, full insurance may 
be a signal for bad borrowers. In this case, insurance will increase the probability of being 
credit constrained. This latter argument is based on Leland and Pyle (1977). They use a model 
with asymmetric information and two types of borrowers: good and bad borrowers, who only 
differ in their probability of success. The good borrowers take less risk than the bad 
borrowers, and hence have a higher probability of success. The bank, because of asymmetric 
information, cannot distinguish the good from the bad borrowers and accordingly sets a 
common interest rate for both groups. This common interest rate discriminates against the 
good borrowers, who therefore wish to convince the bank, i.e. signal, that they are good 
borrowers. In the model of Leland and Pyle, the good borrowers can signal that they are good 
by taking incomplete insurance. The reason is that both types of borrowers are risk averse, 
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and hence would prefer to have full insurance. The cost of not being fully insured is, however, 
lower for the good borrowers than for the bad borrowers since the probability of failure is 
lower for the good borrowers. The bank knows this, and hence will understand that only the 
good borrowers will decide to be less than fully insured, and consequently decides to ask a 
lower interest rate from the good borrowers.  
Finally, we use variables that reflect farm characteristics (Barslund and Tarp, 2008), 
which may relate to farmer management skills. We also assume that the degree of skill the 
bank’s officer has in terms of assessing an agricultural project is important. In other words, 
banks should be willing to extend a loan if their officers have more experience assessing 
certain types of project. We include two variables to take into account the farm’s activity: 
avocado and almond. Chile has a strong tradition of producing avocado, which is the second 
biggest export in its agriculture sector. Almonds represent a new agricultural project with less 
tradition in Chile. Therefore, for constrained quantity-rationed farmers, we anticipate a 
negative sign for well-known activities such as avocados but positive signs for new projects 
such as almonds.  
2.6.3 Results 
We present in Table 2.5 the results of the multinomial logit model (MNL) with 
random effects. There is some evidence in support of the random effects model over a MNL 
model without random intercepts (see Appendix 4, Table A4.1). The likelihood ratio (LR) test 
compares the MNL model with and without random effects and shows that the random effect 
of individual farms varies significantly between categories. The Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) and Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) are provided to compare the 
different specification models12. Using BIC, the model presented in Table 2.5 is preferred 
                                               
12
  As a proof of robustness of the estimation, we tested two complementary models. The results produce similar 
estimations for all models (See Appendix 4, Tables A4.2 and A4.3). 
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over the others in Appendix 4, Table A4.2 and A4.3. Although the AIC favors the model in 
the Appendix 4, Table A4.2, we chose model presented in Table 2.5 because is simpler. 
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Table 2.5: Coefficient of regressors on different categories of credit compared with 
unconstrained borrowers 
Variable Unconstrained 
Non-
borrowers 
Constrained 
Quantity 
Rationed 
Constrained 
Transaction 
Cost and Risk 
Rationed 
Relationship variables: 
CLUSTER -1.636*** 0.626 -12.16** 
 [0.002] [0.296] [0.019] 
Ln(1+LENGTH) -0.473 -0.213 -22.26** 
 [0.354] [0.705] [0.031] 
Control variables    
HECTARES 0.00524 -0.0513** -0.0632* 
 [0.384] [0.010] [0.055] 
YEAR_ADM 0.0679* -0.0101 0.912** 
 [0.080] [0.776] [0.029] 
INSURANCE -0.572 14.53** 45.74** 
 [0.741] [0.011] [0.017] 
NO_PROGRAM 0.966 1.759** -1.170 
 [0.256] [0.041] [0.439] 
ALMOND 2.234 4.734* 5.918** 
 [0.159] [0.053] [0.041] 
AVOCADO -2.389 1.478 67.79** 
 [0.198] [0.297] [0.034] 
CONSTANT 2.302 -2.841** -67.69** 
 [0.160] [0.041] [0.040] 
Random effects    
Var (
njµ ) 4.564*** 2.910*** 64.90** 
 [0.000] [0.010] [0.033] 
Corr ( 2jµ , 3jµ ) -1.072  
 
 [0.271]   
Corr ( 3jµ , 4jµ ) 0.467 
 
 
 [0.437]   
Corr ( 2jµ , 4jµ ) -2.420 
  
 [0.444]   
   
 
Tests    
ROC 0.6707 0.8003 0.7774 
Wald test(27) 43.94***   
Log-Likelihood 279.9   
Number of observations 354   
Number of individuals 177   
BIC 753.43   
AIC 625.75   
LR test (6) 95.2***   
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; All 
variables are estimated using robust standards errors based on the White’s heteroskedasticity consistent 
estimators of variance; Wald test is for test of joint significance of all regressors; Using Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC),  this model is preferred over the others in Appendix 4, Table A4.2 and A4.3. Although  the 
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) favors the model in the Appendix 4, Table A4.2, we chose this model 
because is simpler; Likelihood ratio test (LR test) tests (H0) simple multinomial logit model (see Appendix 4, 
Table A4.1) against (Ha)  this model (multinomial logit model with random effects).  
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The unexplained variance in all categories and correlation between categories three and 
four, as captured by random effects at the individual level (Var
njµ ), differ statistically from 
zero, which means that the individual effect captured by the MNL model with random effects 
explains a considerable portion of total heterogeneity. The Wald test for the hypothesis that all 
coefficients except for the intercept term are equal to 0 is rejected at a 1% level of 
significance, confirming the theoretical predictions of this model. In contrast, the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) 13  coefficients in the MNL model with random effects 
indicates acceptable results. As we explained previously, we compared the coefficients of the 
regressors for the different categories of credit access and constraint with unconstrained 
borrowers as the base category.  
2.6.3.1  Relationship variables 
The first relationship variable is the number of clusters that a farm belong to; it has a 
negative significant effect on the probability of farmers being either unconstrained non-
borrowers or transaction cost- and risk-rationed farmers. Therefore, when they are less 
connected, farmers have fewer alternatives for investing and funding their projects, so their 
demand for credit decreases. Farms that belong to more clusters face lower transaction costs 
and risk associated with credit contracts, whether because of their collaboration with other 
firms in the cluster or because the bank requires less paperwork to complete the contract. 
However, we find an insignificant effect of the number of clusters a farm belongs to on the 
probability of farmers being quantity rationed. Instead of screening clients through more 
informed lenders, banks may prefer to screen their clients by other strategies. We test later 
whether banks use collateral as a screening process. 
                                               
13
 An ROC curve is a plot of the true positive rate (sensitivity) against the false positive rate (1 – specificity) for 
all possible classification thresholds of a diagnostic test. It shows the trade-off between sensitivity and specificity 
(any increase in sensitivity is accompanied by a decrease in specificity). The ROC curves conventionally lie 
above the diagonal, such that the area under the ROC curve should be greater than 50%. A rough guide for 
classifying the accuracy of a diagnostic test is as follows: 0.90–1 = excellent; 0.80–0.90 = good; 0.70–0.80 = 
fair; 0.60–0.70 = poor; and 0.50–0.60 = fail. 
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In addition and as the results suggest, longer relationships reduce the probability that 
farmers are in the transaction cost- and risk-rationed categories. A long-term relationship 
between farms and banks probably reduces transaction costs and risks because the borrower 
has more experience filling out credit application forms and the bank requires less paperwork 
from these known clients. An increase in the length of the relationship does not seem to affect 
the probability of being quantity constraint. This may be explained  by the fact that an 
increase in the length of the relationship may, as explained in section 2.6.2.1, reduce quantity 
constraints, but it may also increase the probability that the borrower reaches a credit ceiling 
since, for example, the bank knows better the capacity of repayments of the farm. 
2.6.3.2  Control variables 
Regarding the control variables, we find a negative significant effect for possession of 
land on the probability of being quantity rationed. According to prior literature (Hoff, 
Braveman et al., 1993; Crane and Leatham, 1995), access to title may affect a farmer’s credit 
market participation through two main mechanisms. First, titled land may be used as 
collateral, which helps formal financial institutions overcome adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Second, after receiving the land title, a farmer who previously was 
discouraged from borrowing, due to risk or transaction costs, may seek a loan. These results 
support the argument that farmers with less collateral are more likely to be quantity 
constrained by formal credit institutions. 
We find a positive significant effect of farming experience on the probability of being an 
unconstrained non-borrower. This seems plausible since farmers with more experience are 
more capable of self-financing, largely due to the greater efficiency they achieve through their 
experience with farming processes. In addition, the results suggest that an increase in farming 
experience increases the probability of becoming transaction cost-and/or risk rationed. This 
can be explained as follows. On the one hand, more experience may reduce the probability of 
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becoming transaction cost rationed. On the other hand, however, more experience may be 
related to becoming older and becoming more risk averse. If this is the case, the probability of 
becoming a risk-rationed borrower increases. If this latter effect is bigger than the former 
effect, an increase in farming experience will increase the probability of being transaction 
and/or risk rationed.  
Also as we expected, we find a significantly positive sign for farmers who lack training 
or certification programs. Such farmers represent, to formal financial institutions, bad 
entrepreneurs, so the banks restrict their access to formal credit. We also find a significantly 
positive sign for almond growers, suggesting that the bank’s officers have less experience 
assessing almond projects, because almonds are not a typical crop in Chile, and thus that 
banks are less willing to extend a loan for these lesser known enterprises.  
Finally, we find a positive, significant effect for the use of insurance on transaction cost- 
and risk-rationed farmers, and on quantity-rationed farmers. The outcome with respect to 
quantity-rationing is in line with the Leland-Pyle model (1977). According to this model, bad 
firms will try to get full insurance, whereas good firms try to signal their quality by being 
incompletely insured. This implies that the farms that are insured are the bad firms, which will 
have a higher probability of being quantity rationed, see also section 2.6.2.2.  The positive 
impact on the probability of being transaction costs and/or risk rationed may be explained by 
the fact that farms that take more insurance, are more risk averse and hence demand less 
credit because they don’t want to take more risk. 
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2.7 Discussion and conclusions 
We have attempted to determine whether market-oriented farmers in central Chile are credit 
constrained, as well as identify the main factors that influence formal credit provision for 
market-oriented farming in Chile. We define a farmer as credit constrained if the farm’s 
effective demand for credit exceeds the available supply. However, we consider quantity 
rationing from the supply side, as well as rationing from the demand side, in line with 
Boucher et al. (2009). In so doing, we can investigate the extent to which credit constraints 
mainly stem from demand- or supply-side factors. Moreover, by distinguishing several 
categories of constrained and unconstrained borrowers, we provide a more detailed analysis of 
which variables are important for explaining the probability of belonging to a particular group 
of borrowers or non-borrowers.   
A notable outcome of our study is that most farmers consider themselves credit 
unconstrained, irrespective of the type of credit constraints they face. We hypothesize that this 
perception results from long-term relationships between farmers and banks in Chile, which 
helps improve screening processes and ensure repayments. Although a long-term relationship 
between farms and banks has no impact on the probability of being a quantity constrained 
farmer, it does affect risk and/or transaction cost rationing because probably the borrower has 
more experience filling out credit application forms and the bank requires less paperwork 
from these known clients. The negative relationship between the probability of being 
transaction cost and/or risk rationed and the length of the relationship between farmers and 
banks may also be explained by the fact that a farmer that has been borrowing for a long time 
is less risk-rationed.  
Our study also suggests that among the group of credit-constrained farmers, quantity 
rationing seems much more prevalent than risk and/or transaction cost rationing. To explain 
the main factors that affect the probability of belonging to a particular group of borrowers or 
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non-borrowers, we estimate a multinominal panel model with random effects. We focus 
primarily on the effect of two social capital variables: the number of relationships that a farm 
has with export and/or input supplier firms and length of the bank relationship. Our main 
result reveals that farmers with more social capital are less risk and/or transaction cost capital 
constrained. In Chile, in contrast with Boucher et al.’s (2009) predictions, demand factors do 
not seem to play an important role in restricting credit, again probably because of the 
relatively long-term relationships between banks and farmers. 
An overall evaluation of the pros and cons of the Chilean policy to liberalize the rural 
financial market, and to liberalize foreign trade, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Nevertheless, our results indicate that these policies will not necessarily destabilize the 
economy in the long run, or reduce access to credit for market-oriented farmers. Our study 
shows that an important prerequisite for this not to happen is the development of social 
capital, for example in the form of clusters. An important question is whether these 
relationships need to be organized and governed by the state. The Chilean example suggests 
that where credit markets fail in providing credit to farmers, the development of clusters may 
be the result of a spontaneous process, driven primarily by economic objectives. Thus, 
explicit government involvement may not be necessary. Further research is required to 
indicate to what extent this result also holds for other economies.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Interaction of Formal and Informal Rural Credit Institutions14 
3 Interaction of Formal and Informal Rural Credit 
Institutions 
Abstract 
 
This study examines whether formal and informal loans serve as complements or substitutes 
for farmers in central Chile. As a special feature, the study explores the determinants that 
influence access to informal credit using a panel probit model that controls for the 
endogeneity of credit constraints. With a control for the endogeneity of credit constraints, the 
analysis suggests that formal and informal credit are complements. This complementary 
relationship appears due to their distinct uses; that is, formal credit funds investments, 
whereas informal credit funds working capital. If farmers invest less because they are credit 
constrained by formal institutions, they need less working capital, so their demand for 
informal credit also declines. 
3.1  Introduction 
For decades, economists have discussed why formal and informal financial institutions 
coexist. Informal lenders appear to survive despite widespread descriptions of their usurious 
interest rates, and neither government-sponsored credit programs with subsidized interest 
rates nor market liberalization that encourages lower interest rates by formal financial 
institutions have pushed them out of the market. Perhaps the reason for their persistence is 
that informal and formal loans serve as substitutes or complements (Gupta and Chaudhuri, 
1997). In either case, formal and informal lenders can coexist. If they are substitutes, the 
relationship between formal and informal financial institutions is horizontal (Floro and Ray, 
                                               
14
 This chapter is under review as: Reyes, A. and R. Lensink, Interaction of Formal and Informal Rural Credit 
Institutions in Central Chile. Submitted.  
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1997), so the formal sector banks compete directly with informal providers of funds. 
Borrowers then should try to obtain loans first from the formal market, and then their excess 
demand spills over into the informal market. Accordingly, borrowers who confront greater 
credit constraints from formal lenders should increase their borrowing from informal lenders.  
If informal and formal loans are complements, the informal and formal financial 
sectors exhibit a vertical relationship (Floro and Ray, 1997). For example, in agricultural 
markets, a complementary relationship might emerge because informal credit is the only type 
available at the beginning of the crop cycle, whereas formal credit becomes available later 
(Gupta and Chaudhuri, 1997). Inputs needed at the beginning of the production process then 
get financed by informal credit, but later inputs can be financed by formal credit. Such a 
complementary relationship also implies a positive relationship between informal and formal 
credit, such that an increase in formal credit constraints decreases demand for informal credit.  
Understanding how informal lenders serve market-oriented farmers’ demand for 
financial services, as well as how they interact with the formal credit institutions, is crucial for 
the design of an effective credit policy. Only if the government knows why households use 
informal finance, appropriate instruments to improve the efficiency of formal financial 
markets can be developed. If informal and formal credit are complements, they fulfill 
different functions, and formal credit, if available, can never completely eliminate the role of 
informal credit. An increase in formal credit through a credit subsidy program instead leads to 
an increase in demand for informal credit, which raises the informal credit interest rate and 
can adversely affect farmers. Alternatively, if informal and formal credit are substitutes, an 
increase in access to formal credit will decrease demand for informal credit, lower the 
informal credit rate, and thus benefit farmers. In general, a better understanding of how formal 
and informal credit markets interact can lead to credit policies that better support the 
agricultural sector.  
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This study therefore tests whether formal and informal loans are substitutes or 
complements. We focus on formal and informal credit for market-oriented farmers in central 
Chile. The Chilean agricultural sector provides a good setting for studying this interaction, 
because both formal and informal credit sectors have a long tradition in the deregulated 
Chilean economy. The countryside in Chile also has been transformed dramatically by an 
agro-export boom and the entry of new financial intermediaries and product market traders, 
which have offered various financing options and contract forms. Monitored loans that rely on 
contracted farm arrangements, as offered by exporting firms and agro-industry traders, also 
grew from a relatively small base to become the dominant mode of financing by the mid-
1990s (Conning and Udry, 2007).  
As a unique feature, our study empirically identifies whether formal and informal 
loans are complements or substitutes by taking into account the possible endogeneity of 
formal credit constraints. To explain the use of informal credit, researchers have applied 
different methods empirically to identify the interactions between formal and informal lenders 
(Kochar, 1997; Conning, 2001). For example, Guirkinger (2008) uses panel data to estimate 
why the informal sector persists but fails to take endogeneity problems into account. Giné 
(2010) uses structural models of credit supply in formal and informal lending, which solves 
for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity problems, and Kihanga et al. (2010) use a 
structural model to estimate supply and demand for trade credit. Our study extends these prior 
works by incorporating individual unobservable heterogeneity in the estimation. More 
specifically, we use a maximum likelihood estimator which allows to estimate an endogenous 
switching binary variable (in our case credit constraints)  in a panel context.   
Our analysis suggests that controlling for the possible endogeneity of credit 
constraints is  highly important. If credit constraints are incorrectly  assumed to be exogenous, 
our results suggest that the demand for informal finance is not affected by formal credit 
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constraints. However, if we control for the endogeneity of credit constraints, our results 
indicate a complementary relationship between formal and informal credit. This is in contrast 
to the study by Guirkinger (2008), who, using a model that does not control for endogeneity, 
finds that formal and informal credit in Peru are substitutes.    
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature 
review of the theories and explanations of the interaction between formal and informal 
lenders. In section 3, we explain the formal and informal credit sector in Chile, followed by a 
description of our data in section 4. We then explain the empirical methodology and present 
our results. Finally, section 7 offers some conclusions and implications.  
3.2 Theories on the interaction between formal and informal lenders 
The ongoing debate about the relationship between formal and informal credit 
institutions began with Floro and Ray (1997), who noted that formal and informal credit 
institutions may be complements or substitutes. If they are substitutes, formal sector banks 
compete directly with informal lenders, such as traders and input supplier companies, and 
borrowers first try to obtain a loan from the formal market, but their excess demand spills 
over into the informal market. That excess demand, assuming formal and informal loans are 
substitutes, can be explained in three ways (Guirkinger, 2008).  
First, firms with insufficient collateral that are involuntarily excluded from the formal 
credit market may obtain an informal loan, because informal lenders rely on information-
intensive screening and monitoring instead of collateral. Therefore, firms that lack access to 
formal credit should exhibit a higher demand for informal credit (Bell et al., 1997b; Kochar, 
1997; Peterson and Rajan, 1997; Nilsen, 2002; Huyghebaert, 2006), whereas firms with such 
access exert less demand for informal credit (Howorth and Reber, 2003). According to this 
theory, informal sources are the lenders of last resort (Giné, 2010).  
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Second, informal lenders may have a comparative advantage over banks with regard to 
their offer of low-cost credit, because they can better manage client information (Jain, 1999; 
Conning, 2001), which reduces their moral hazard (Aaronson et al., 2004; Giannetti et al., 
2004) and enables them to enforce contracts. Therefore, informal lenders actually are 
preferable to formal lenders, because their informal loans may be cheaper than formal ones 
(Chung, 1995; Mushinski, 1999). This theory also suggests that high transaction costs related 
to loan applications in the formal sector may discourage farmers from taking formal loans. If 
the transaction costs associated with informal credit are lower, suppliers and customers seek 
informal credit.  
Third, informal loans may be preferable to formal loans because of a difference in 
risk. That is, informal lenders often have better information about farmers’ activities and 
characteristics, so they can write contracts that ignore collateral and are less risky for 
borrowers. For most farmers, land is the most valuable asset they own, and they are not 
willing to pledge it as collateral. They may prefer instead to avoid formal loans and seek 
informal ones. 
However, the relationship between formal and informal lenders also could be vertical 
(complementary). In this case, informal lenders have access to formal sources of lending, and 
they simply relend funds they borrow. A market for informal credit exists because the supply 
of formal credit is inadequate in terms of repayment or because formal credit is not available 
in particular instances, such as at the beginning of the crop cycle (Gupta and Chaudhuri, 
1997). Such a complementary relationship is justified if informal and formal credit are 
available at different times. The expenditure of inputs required in the initial phases of the 
production process then can be met by the use of informal credit, but the costs of inputs 
needed in later stages can be financed by formal credit. If inputs in different stages involve a 
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technically complementary relationship, the desired production function should reveal a 
complementary relation between formal and informal credit.  
Several examples feature such an outcome. First, in a lean season, informal credit may 
be used to finance consumption, whereas formal credit is reserved for production loans. In 
this case, an increase in the amount of formal credit raises the farmer’s income and thus 
demand for a consumption loan in the next season. Second, some wage costs might be met in 
advance, before the crop starts, and financed by informal credit. Then, formal credit serves to 
finance the cost of non-labor inputs. In this case, the complementary relationship between 
labor and non-labor input establishes a similar relationship between formal and informal 
credit. Finally, a complementary relationship may occur when formal financial institutions 
have rigid terms of repayment that do not correspond with agro-project cash flows. Most 
formal lenders require fixed monthly payments that do not align with the needs and cash 
flows of most of the farmers, who have concentrated cash flows only during harvest periods.  
3.3  The rural financial market in Chile 
Before empirically testing the relationship between formal and informal credit, we 
provide some background information about these financial sectors in the specific context of 
Chile.  
3.3.1 Formal financial sector  
As do many developing countries, Chile contains both formal and informal lenders. The 
formal sector provides credit and mobilizes saving under the direct supervision of the 
National Regulatory Agency of Banks and Financial Institutions, the agency that controls 
commercial banks, state banks, and non-bank financial institutions, such as investment 
houses, insurance companies, financing companies, and security markets. The banking sector 
consists of 20 commercial banks: 12 foreign-owned, 7 Chilean-owned, and 1 state-owned. 
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Table 3.1: Loans in the Chilean Agriculture Sector by Banks, 2000-2007 (in million US) 
 Year        
BANK 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Scotiabank Sud 
Americano 36.701 47.680 43.753 18.463 67.759 91.480 10.459 130.964 
Banco Chile 661.617 630.089 643.454 662.517 792.148 726.838 76.858 979.733 
Banco Itaú 
Chile 3.503 9.344 8.320 9.045 18.709 30.277 77.872 139.359 
Banco Estado 297.835 278.464 222.236 144.670 111.588 105.163 188.010 280.774 
Banco Bice 105.133 101.578 79.286 88.515 107.813 142.144 212.088 289.132 
Banco Del 
Desarrollo 138.301 130.089 134.893 142.329 178.037 219.992 263.895 297.410 
Banco Bilbao, 
Vizcaya 39.821 32.713 34.033 12.559 12.889 177.923 244.526 775.137 
Corpbanca 230.536 221.462 191.242 147.909 252.376 318.454 338.493 398.999 
BCI 217.832 241.898 251.944 30.848 413.673 476.453 64.709 822.778 
Santander 
Santiago Chile 447.903 4.591 483.673 488.622 583.684 789.898 1163.259 1243.409 
TOTAL 2179.182 1697.910 2092.832 1745.474 2538.676 3078.622 2640.167 5357.697 
Source: SBIF (SBIF, 2009) 
  
As Table 3.1 shows, the most important agricultural credit provider is Banco Santander 
(foreign bank), followed by Banco Chile (Chilean bank), Banco Bilbao (foreign bank), and 
Banco BCI (Chilean bank). 
3.3.2 Informal financial sector 
The term “informal” refers to financial services that are not regulated by banking laws. 
Informal financial institutions obtain credit from formal financial institutions, then 
redistribute it to farmers, households, or traders (Moll, 1989). The recipients may be eligible 
for a direct loan from formal institutions, but they prefer to use informal channels for reasons 
related to transaction costs, financing advantages, or marketing.  
The informal financial sector in rural areas in Chile mainly comprises contract farming 
and input supplier firms. Moneylenders and relatives or friends are relatively less important as 
a source of informal credit in central Chile. Therefore, we refer to contract farming firms and 
input supplier firms in our analysis of the informal financial sector.  
Contract farming firms. Contract farming firms provide in-kind or monetary short-term 
credit advances. Usually the loan is tied to transactions on other markets, such as credit 
advances provided by fruit trading companies or agro-industry traders. In such arrangements, 
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farmers obtain heavily monitored production financing, tied to the provision of technical 
assistance and crop inputs, in exchange for a promise to market all or a part of their harvest 
through the trader at agreed-on terms. This type of credit primarily finances fresh fruit 
production, with few exceptions for crops such as sugar beets, tobacco, tomatoes, and certain 
types of horticultural production (Conning and Udry, 2007).  
In the case of fruit production, installments offered at the beginning of the season get 
paid back upon the harvest. Trading companies may visit the farmers’ field at harvest time or 
for important decisions. Therefore, this kind of credit is known as monitored credit. 
Interlinked credit contracts provide means to alleviate screening, incentive, and enforcement 
problems (Hoff, Braveman et al., 1993). Furthermore, the 19 largest exporting companies 
process 50% of Chile’s total fresh fruit and vegetable exports and play a fundamental role in 
marketing Chilean products (ODEPA, 2005). These companies frequently contract with 
farmers to market or process their harvests in exchange for credit and other services, such as 
technical assistance and farm input sales (Conning and Udry, 2007). 
Input supplier firms. Input supplier firms provide in-kind, short-term credit, usually 
payable at harvest. They tend to operate in a restricted geographic area or specific section of 
the market. These firms sell inputs such as seeds, fertilizers, or farm machinery. The in-kind 
product is both the form of credit and the avenue for active monitoring, in that this type of 
credit cannot be diverted to other private uses. The input supplier sector consists of 18 
companies that generate a combined overall turnover of US$ 1,000 million annually. 
Together input supplier firms and contract farming firms provide a wide supply of 
short-term credit with convenient contract terms, including flexible repayment and credit 
delivery at the beginning of the crop cycle for farmers in Chile. Informal lenders can extend 
those flexible loans to farmers because they actively monitor their clients through visits, 
interlinked credit contracts, or in-kind product delivery. In contrast, formal credit is inflexible 
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in contract conditions but provides long-term funding. Accordingly, formal and informal 
loans appear to be complements, as we test formally next.  
3.4 Empirical approach 
To determine whether formal and informal loans are substitutes or complements, we 
follow Guirkinger (2008), who uses an empirical model in which the different categories of 
credit constraints provide explanatory variables related to the demand for informal credit. The 
main difference between our model and Guirkinger’s is that we control for endogeneity in our 
estimation procedure. Guirkinger’s broader definition of credit constraints includes not only 
traditional pure credit constraints (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990a), but also transaction costs and 
risk-rationed borrowers (Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009). As Boucher et al. (2009) explain, 
transaction cost–rationed farmers have a positive demand for credit but no effective demand 
because the transaction costs are too high. Similarly, risk-rationed farmers prefer the lower 
return from a specific reservation activity (e.g., renting out land) to taking out a loan. 
Guirkinger’s model indicates: 
 
itiititititit xRRTCRQRy µδβαααα ++′++++= 4321*   (3.1) 
 
where ity  is a dummy variable for whether informal credit is used; QRit, TCRit, and RRit are 
dummy variables that indicate the three rationing categories; subscripts i denote individual (i 
= 1, …, N) and subscripts t denote time periods (t = 1, …, T); the tδ  term is a time-invariant, 
individual-specific unobservable effect; itµ  is the error term; and itx  is a vector of control 
variables that affect informal loan supply and demand. We are interested mainly in the 
significance and signs of the coefficients for the dummy variables that indicate the rationing 
categories: If they are positive, formal and informal credit are substitutes, and if they are 
negative, formal and informal loans are complements.  
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Guirkinger (2008) also assumes that all independent variables are exogenous. 
However, the credit constraint dummies are likely to be endogenous (Conning and Udry, 
2007; Giné, 2010), as demand for formal and informal credit is likely affected by the same set 
of unobserved factors. Farmers with more entrepreneurial ability are likely to be less 
constrained and also have less demand for informal loans; similarly, farmers who own more 
land are likely to be less constrained and have greater demand for informal loans. In contrast, 
farmers with less land should be credit constrained and have less demand for informal credit.  
We therefore control for the potential endogeneity of the credit-constrained variables 
by using the following endogenous switching framework (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006), 
adjusted for the panel structure15: 
ititiititit xCCy 121
* µλζδβαα +++′++=  (3.2) 
such that  
1=ity  if 0
* >ity , and  
0=ity  if 0
* ≤ity , 
where itx  represents 1×K  vector of explanatory variables affecting loan supply and demand 
in the informal sector; itCC  is a dummy variable indicating all credit constraint categories 
from formal institutions, which we assume to be endogenous; iδ  is a time-invariant, 
individual-specific random effect. Finally the error term has been discomposed into two 
terms: itζ  is a shared random effect to induce dependence between a dummy variable 
indicating whether informal credit is used and an endogenous dummy variable itCC ,  and it1µ  
which is a random error term specific for the informal credit equation. λ captures the 
correlation between equation (3.2) above and equation (3.3) below. The coefficients α
 
and β  
are the parameters to be estimated. Similarly, the endogenous variable itCC  depends on a 
                                               
15
 The adjustment of the endogenous switching model  for  the panel structure is based on guidelines provided by 
the STATA meeting Rabe-Hesketh, S. (2002) Multilevel selection models using gllamm, Stata Users Group .  
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1×L  vector of explanatory variables itz . We specify a similar latent response model for the 
endogenous dummy: 
ititiitit zCC 2
* µζτγ +++′=    (3.3) 
such that  
1=itCC  if 0
* >itCC , and 
0=itCC  if 0
* ≤itCC , 
where itCC *  represents a latent continuous variable, γ  represents an 1×L
 
vector of 
parameters and iτ  is a time-invariant, individual-specific random effect for the endogenous 
dummy equation. Again itζ  and it2µ  represent the residual term.  For identification 
alternatives see Appendix 5. 
 
3.5  Data 
The data we use are derived from a survey of a random sample of farms in central 
Chile, recorded by the Natural Resources Information Center (CIREN). We only consider 
market-oriented farmers, that is, farmers who manage a minimum of 10 productive hectares 
and sell their crops to a third party (market). We exclude subsistence, non-cultivated, and 
recreational farms, because formal financial institutions do not target these farmers, and 
because market-oriented farmers are the main players in the Chilean agricultural sector. We 
choose 10 hectares as the minimum productive area because it represents the minimum size 
required to support a family in Chile16.  
Table 3.2 provides the descriptive characteristics of the farms in the sample, separated 
by year. The mean farm size is 78 and 76 hectares for 2006 and 2008, respectively. This large 
size reveals that most of the farmers in our sample own land. Even though the Chilean judicial 
system works efficiently and it is possible to enforce contracts for larger loans, most 
commercial banks require land titles as backing for their loans. 
                                               
16
 See Chapter 1 to see details on data (section 1.4) and Appendix 1 to see questions applied in the survey.  
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Table 3.2: Sample statistics by year (n = 177, each year) 
  2006  2008  
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
FORMAL DEBT Average loan size from 
formal lenders (MM$) 
44,12 113,89 49,86 118,31 
INFORMAL 
DEBT 
Average loan size from 
informal lenders 
12,03 30,84 11,48 33,17 
NO_PROGRAM Binary dummy, equal to 1 if the 
firm had neither an employee-
training program nor a GAP 
certification, 0 otherwise 
0,26 0,44 0,20 0,40 
CLUSTER Number of firms connected with 
the firm as a cluster 
1,27 0,66 1,56 0,88 
HECTARES Owned land (hectares) 77,57 95,44 76,02 93,77 
INSURANCE Binary dummy, equal to 1 if the 
firm used insurance instruments, 
0 otherwise 
0,03 0,18 0,03 0,18 
WINE_GRAPE Binary dummy, equal to 1 if the 
farm’s main product was wine 
grapes, 0 otherwise 
0,06 0,24 0,06 0,24 
TABLE GRAPE Binary dummy, equal to 1 if the 
farm’s main product was table 
grapes, 0 otherwise 
0,30 0,46 0,29 0,46 
CHERRY Binary dummy, equal to 1 if the 
farm’s main product was 
cherries, 0 otherwise 
0,06 0,23 0,06 0,23 
AVOCADO Binary dummy, equal to 1 if the 
farm’s main product was 
avocados, 0 otherwise 
0,07 0,26 0,07 0,26 
ALMOND Binary dummy, equal to 1 if the 
farm’s main product was 
almonds, 0 otherwise 
0,05 0,21 0,05 0,21 
CANNED 
PEACH 
Binary dummy, equal to 1 if the 
farm’s main product was canned 
peaches, 0 otherwise 
0,06 0,23 0,06 0,23 
Notes: $1,000 Chilean = $1.58 US 
 
In Table 3.3 we list the characteristics of borrowers from the formal and informal 
sectors. According to this table, the most important source of credit is the formal sector 
(banks), for which 29% and 17% of the farmers use long-term and short term-credit, 
respectively, closely followed by exporting and input supplier firms with 34% and 14% of the 
market, respectively. However, if we consider loan size, formal credit (long- and short-term 
credit) accounts for 80% of the market, a greater total percentage than the informal sector. 
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That is, despite the expansion of formal credit, market-oriented farmers continue to do loan 
business with informal lenders. 
 
Table 3.3: Characteristics of borrowers from formal and informal sectors in Chile (pooled 
sample) 
Credit Source Farmers(1) 
 
Number (%) 
Average debt  
 
(MM$) 
Total debt 
(MM$) 
Loan market 
participation 
(%) 
Banks, long term 
credit 
103 (29) 115.30 11,875.90 57% 
Banks, short-term 
credit 
60 (17) 79.81 4,788.60 23% 
Exporting Firms 121 (34) 27.49 3,326.29 16% 
Input supplier 
firms 
48 (14) 17.39 834.72 4% 
Total Sample 354 58.83 20,825.51 100% 
Notes: $1,000 Chilean = $1.58 US. 
(1)These percentages may sum up more than 100 because some farmers have more than one 
source of funding. 
 
We reveal the structure of credit market participation according to the use of one or 
several sources of credit in Table 3.4: 46% of sampled farmers use only one source of credit, 
and 22% use mixed sources. The remaining 32% do not use any source of credit. These 
figures aside, banks and exporting firms are the most important exclusive sources of credit; 
formal and exporting firms are the most important mixed sources. These results illustrate the 
interconnections between sources. Formal credit meets the demand for long-term credit, but 
exporting firms provide short-term credit, mostly for working capital.  
Wealthier farmers also appear to use input suppliers as an exclusive source of credit. 
Apparently they have enough capital to self-finance their long-term investments, and they use 
input supplier firms simply as an easy way to finance their fertilizer, seed, and machinery 
purchases, then repay those costs at the end of the season. In contrast, less wealthy farmers 
rely on both banks and exporting firms, which suggests two potential explanations. They may 
feel credit constrained and redirect their demand to informal sources, or they could demand 
both long-term credit for fixed assets and working capital to support their investments, but use 
informal lenders also as a source of working capital. We test this latter hypothesis. 
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Table 3.4: Single and multiple credit sources and characteristics of farmers (pooled sample) 
Credit sources Farmers, numbers and characteristics 
Number  Average 
Owned 
Hectares 
Average 
Long-Term 
Debt 
(MM$) (1) 
Average 
Short-Term 
Debt  
(MM$) (1) 
Average 
Assets 
 
(MM$) 
Average 
Gross 
Income 
(MM$) 
Banks only 71 76.53 (46) 116.88 (34) 77.65 1216.05 384.58 
Exporting firms 
only 
65 82.87 0.00 31.12 1449.87 423.03 
Input supplier 
firms only 
26 92.78 0.00 15.77 1771.07 343.21 
Banks and 
Exporting firms 
55 67.58 (43) 127.10 
0.00 
(17) 49.64 
(55) 23.23 
1204.72 335.76 
Banks and 
input supplier 
firms 
21 87.86 (14) 73.86 
0.00 
(8) 91.22 
(21) 17.84 
1534.83 540.94 
Banks and 
exporting and 
input supplier 
firms 
1 55 0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
15.00 
25.00 
50.00 
674.86 125.10 
Total/average 
 
354 76.80 (103) 115.30 (202) 41.53 1328.96 358.32 
Notes: $1,000 Chilean = $1.58 US. 
(1)
 Numbers of farmers appear in parentheses. 
 
With Table 3.5 we report the frequency of formal sector rationing categories and the 
percentage of farmers who use informal loans in each category. All categories of farmers use 
informal lenders, especially the transaction cost–rationed farmers (83%).  
 
Table 3.5: Informal loan use by formal sector rationing categories and type of informal lender 
(pooled sample) 
 
Exporting 
Firms 
Input Supplier 
Firms 
Total Informal 
Credit 
Total 
sample 
Formal sector rationing 
categories 
Sample 
size 
% Sample 
size 
% Sample 
size 
% Sample 
size 
Borrowers  43 36.4 18 15.3 61 51.7 118 
Nonborrowers  54 29.3 26 14.1 80 43.5 184 
Quantity rationed 14 38.9 3 8.3 17 47.2 36 
Transaction cost rationed 5 83.3 0 0.0 5 83.3 6 
Risk rationed  4 40.0 0 0.0 4 40.0 10 
Subtotal of Credit-
Constrained Categories  
23 44.2 3 5.8 26 50.0 52 
Total 121 29.9 48 13.6 168 47.5 354 
 
We also observe from Table 3.5 that the number of farmers who are transaction cost or 
risk rationed is very low.  
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3.6 Are formal and informal loans substitutes or complements? 
We now present the estimation results for the model we outlined in section 3.4. We are 
mainly interested in the sign of the coefficients for the credit constraint dummies, which can 
indicate whether formal and informal credit are substitutes or complements. We include some 
control variables in the model, including variables that proxy for farmer management skills, 
such as the farmer’s participation in a training or certification program.  The definitions and 
means of all the variables appear in Table 3.2. In addition, we include control variables 
indicating farm activity, which may reflect competition in a particular sector. If competition 
increases, input suppliers and contracting firms should offer more informal credit. For 
example, because the table grape market has grown more competitive as a result of 
cooperation between exporting companies and grape growers, we expect a positive coefficient 
for this variable. However, we expect negative coefficients for the cherry and wine grape 
sectors, because cherry growers are relatively new to Chilean agriculture, and wine grape 
farmers face an oligopolistic market in which demand comes from just a few buyers. 
We present two sets of estimation results, using different estimation techniques. We start 
by estimating the model with a random effects probit model, which does not control for 
endogeneity. Table 3.6 contains these results. We use a random effects instead of fixed effects 
model, because our panel contains only two years, which reduces the possibility of obtaining 
time-variant variables. In the random effects model, we incorporate the individual effect into 
our estimators and also include time-invariant variables.  
We therefore estimate three models of the random effects probit model that differ in 
terms of their specification of the credit constraint variable. The first model includes three 
different dummy variables that account for quantity, risk, and transaction cost rationing, in 
line with Guirkinger (2008). As the first column of Table 3.6 indicates, none of the credit-
rationed variables is statistically different from 0 at the 5% level.  
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Recall from Table 3.5 that the number of farmers who are transaction cost or risk 
rationed is very low. Therefore, we estimate a model in which we only include a dummy for 
quantity rationed, and another model for which we use a dummy for the merger of the three 
categories of credit constraints. For the model with only the dummy for quantity constraints, 
the coefficients again are not statistically significant. The third estimation, with just one 
overall credit-rationing category, also shows an insignificant coefficient of credit-rationed 
farmers.  
Table 3.6: Parameter estimates: Informal loan regression with random effect probit model 
 Three credit-
rationed 
categories 
Quantity-
rationed 
category 
Pooled credit-
rationed 
categories 
QUANTITY RATIONED (A) 
-0.564 -0.576  
 [0.346] [0.344]  
RISK RATIONED (B) 
-0.499   
 [0.601]   
TRANSACTION COST RATIONED (C) 1.100   
 [0.450]   
T. COST AND RISK RATIONED (B+C) 
   
 
   
RATIONED (A+B+C) 
  -0.370 
 
  [0.446] 
NO_PROGRAM 
-1.461** -1.464** -1.480** 
 [0.011] [0.012] [0.011] 
WINE_GRAPE 
-1.271 -1.312 -1.349 
 [0.238] [0.235] [0.221] 
TABLE_GRAPE 1.044* 1.048* 1.041* 
 [0.069] [0.078] [0.079] 
CHERRY 
-1.267 -1.325 -1.337 
 [0.264] [0.255] [0.250] 
CLUSTER 1.061*** 1.058*** 1.035*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Constant 
-1.536*** -1.532*** -1.496*** 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
N 354 354 354 
Log likelihood 
-172.9 -173.4 -173.5 
Individual 177 177 177 
Wald Test 25.45*** 24.51*** 24.42*** 
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively; Wald test for the significance of all regressors but the constant. 
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All these results suggest that formal credit rationing does not affect demand for 
informal credit. However, we caution that these results may be biased, because credit 
constraints likely are endogenous. For example, wealthier farmers are both more likely to 
demand informal credit and less likely to be quantity rationed. Therefore, we next perform a 
set of estimates using an endogenous switching approach that controls for the endogeneity of 
credit constraints. 
To estimate the endogenous switching model, we must specify equations (3.2) and 
(3.3), that is, one equation for the demand for informal credit and another that explains credit 
constraints. For equation (3.2), we use the same specification as in the random effects model, 
whereas for equation (3.3), we also include variables that do not appear in the equation for the 
demand for informal credit. The endogenous switching model is formally identified through 
its functional form (Heckman, 1978; Wilde, 2000; Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006).  
Nevertheless, to achieve an economic identification, at least one variable affecting 
credit constraint status must be excluded from informal credit use. In our model, we include 
an indicator of the number of owned hectares. Furthermore, because a model with an 
exogenous switching variable is nested within the endogenous switching model, we can 
perform the test for the endogeneity of CC in equation (3.2) using a simple likelihood ratio 
test for 0=ρ
.
  
Our econometric model also enables us to distinguish among some alternative 
hypotheses regarding the effect of credit constraint categories on the use of informal sources. 
In particular, we distinguish four situations:  
1) The correlation coefficient ρ  is not statistically different from 0 and the 
coefficient for credit constraint status in the informal credit use equation is 
statistically significant. Therefore, credit constraint status is exogenous with 
respect to informal credit use, and its effect is causal.  
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2) The correlation coefficient ρ  is statistically significant but the coefficient for 
credit constraints in the informal credit use equation is not. In this case, the credit 
constraint status is endogenous with respect to informal credit use, and the 
correlation between CC and informal credit use is driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
3) Both the correlation coefficient ρ  and the coefficient on CC in the informal credit 
use equation are significant. Although CC thus is endogenous with informal credit 
use, it also has a causal impact on informal credit use.  
4) The correlation coefficient and coefficient on CC in the informal credit use 
equation are both insignificant, and our analysis does not support any of the 
hypotheses outlined in the literature review. 
To avoid further complications in the estimation procedure (because we have so few 
transaction cost– or risk-constrained farmers), we only estimate two variants of the model: 
one with a dummy for credit constraints based on the merger of the three individual rationing 
categories, and one with a dummy for credit constraints based only on quantity-rationed 
farmers. To estimate both models, we use generalized linear latent and mixed models (Rabe-
Hesketh et al., 2002).17  
The results in Table 3.7 indicate a significant negative effect of credit constraints on 
the use of informal credit, and a significant positive correlation between unobservable 
heterogeneity in informal use and credit constraint equations in both models. These results 
                                               
17 This model is estimated using maximum likelihood, and the convergence of the negative of the inverse of the 
Hessian matrix provides an estimator of the covariance matrix. Robust standard errors can be obtained as usual. 
To evaluate the likelihood function, we must integrate out the random term itµ , for which we use adaptive 
quadrature Rabe-Hesketh, S., A. Skrondal and A. Pickles (2002) Reliable estimation of generalized linear mixed 
models using adaptive quadrature. Stata Journal, 2(1), pp. 1-21. Adaptive quadrature is a numerical integration 
technique that, at each iteration, updates the location and weights of the Gauss-Hermite quadrature points using 
the posterior distribution of itµ . After the update, the locations center around the posterior mean and spread out 
equally according to the posterior standard deviation. Adaptive quadrature achieves higher accuracy with fewer 
integration points than ordinary Gauss-Hermite quadrature. 
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provide evidence that credit constraints have a causal impact on the use of informal credit and 
that credit constraints are endogenous with respect to the informal use of credit. If credit 
constraints are randomly distributed across market-oriented farmers, their effect on the use of 
informal credit is significantly negative. Therefore, formal and informal loans are 
complements. Formal credit appears useful for funding investments, but informal credit can 
fund working capital. This explanation is in line with our preceding descriptive analysis. It is 
noteworthy that our result is also in line with Karlan and Zinman (2009). Using a randomized 
controlled experiment, they e.g. examine the relationship between formal (micro) credit and 
informal finance for micro-entrepreneurs in Manila, and find that credit complements 
informal finance.   
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Table 3.7: Parameter estimates: Informal loan regression with an endogenous switching dummy 
variable model 
Informal Loan Model Model 1 Model 2 
CREDIT_CONSTRAINT [A+B+C) 
 -0.400** 
 
 [0.038] 
QUANTITY_CONSTRAINT 
-0.753***  
 [0.010]  
NO_PROGRAM 
-0.533** -0.393** 
 [0.018] [0.045] 
CLUSTER 0.402*** 0.285*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
WINE_GRAPE 
-0.420 -0.440* 
 [0.354] [0.091] 
TABLE_GRAPE 0.335 0.790*** 
 [0.121] [0.000] 
CHERRY 
-0.521 0.228 
 [0.306] [0.614] 
Constant 
-0.504*** -0.670*** 
 [0.008] [0.000] 
ENDOGENOUS DUMMY MODEL QUANTITY_CONSTRAINT CREDIT_CONSTRAINT Model 
HECTARES 
-0.009*** -0.006*** 
 [0.003] [0.001] 
CLUSTER 0.204* 0.065 
 [0.099] [0.548] 
INSURANCE 2.071*** 2.234*** 
 [0.001] [0.000] 
NO_PROGRAM 0.410* 0.266 
 [0.053] [0.126] 
AVOCADO 0.658 0.981*** 
 [0.132] [0.005] 
ALMOND 0.868* 0.806** 
 [0.056] [0.047] 
WINE_GRAPE 0.875** 0.572 
 [0.043] [0.141] 
CANNED PEACH 0.732* 0.389 
 [0.082] [0.321] 
Constant 
-1.599*** -1.182*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Random Effect 
  
Individual level  
  
2
δσ  32.494 72.557 
 [0.602] [0.717] 
2
τσ  4.447 1.845 
 [0.102] [0.110] 
δτσ  3.584 1.651 
 [0.444] [0.631] 
( )δτCORR  0.298 0.142 
 [0.202] [0.476] 
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Random Effect  
Observation level 
  
ρ ( ititi 1µλζδ ++ , ititi 2µζτ ++ ) 0.649*** 0.645*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Observations 354 354 
Individuals 177 177 
Log likelihood 
-258.407 -292.704 
LR Test 88.756*** 80.801*** 
Wald-test 59.75*** 118.52*** 
 
  
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively; both models are estimated by maximum likelihood with 12 quadrature points, 
adding extra quadrature points did not produce important changes in coefficients and/or 
standards errors;  2δσ  and 
2
τσ refer to the unexplained variance at the individual level for the 
informal credit use and the endogenous variable equations respectively;   Likelihood ratio test 
(LR test) compares the exogenous (H0) with the endogenous model (Ha) and Wald test for the 
significance of all regressors but the constant. 
 
3.7  Conclusions 
With this study, we attempt to gain a better understanding of the relationship between 
formal and informal loans for farmers in rural central Chile. In particular, we are interested in 
whether formal and informal loans are complements or substitutes. As a key innovation in our 
study, we use a panel endogenous switching binary model, which controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity and endogeneity problems.  
Although formal lenders are the most important source of credit in volume, a high 
percentage (48%) of market-oriented farmers in Chile still use informal sources of credit. 
Farmers use informal loans for working capital and formal loans for both working capital and 
long-term investment.   
We find evidence in support of our hypothesis that credit constraints are endogenous. In 
addition, our results suggest that an increase in formal credit constraints reduces the demand 
for informal credit. This outcome strongly suggests that formal and informal loans are 
complements. Thus, our results further support the hypothesis that in the Chilean context, 
formal and informal institutions complement each other in their provision of credit to farmers.  
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Traditional development programs have focused on encouraging rural financial 
institutions to solve problems of access to credit and reduce the dependence on expensive 
informal finance. Our study suggests that these policies will not end the existence of the 
informal credit market. It is even more likely that better access to formal credit will stimulate 
the demand for informal credit, with possible negative multiplier effects in terms of changes 
in the costs of informal finance if the supply of informal finance lags behind demand. The 
analysis shows that the formal and informal credit sectors complement each other, since they 
fulfill different tasks.  
Policies which aim to abolish the informal credit market are therefore questionable. It 
may even turn out to be beneficial to explore how informal lenders can be stimulated to 
provide other services, such as long-term credit or even co-signing bank loans with customers. 
In addition, the complementarity implies that the negative effects of formal credit market 
imperfections will and probably cannot be undone by an increase in lending from informal 
lenders. This seems to even increase the importance of government policies that improve 
access to formal credit markets. Hence, our study suggests that both the formal and informal 
credit markets are important and needed to improve performance of market-oriented farmers 
in Chile. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Impact of Access to Credit on Farm Productivity of Fruit and 
Vegetable Growers18 
4 Impact of Access to Credit on Farm Productivity of Fruit 
and Vegetable Growers 
Abstract 
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyze the factors that determine productivity of fruit 
and vegetable growers in central Chile, focusing especially on the effect of short-term credit 
on farm output production for market-oriented farmers. We explicitly test for possible 
selection bias using a panel data set from a survey conducted in 2006 and 2008 with 177 
farmers. Our results indicate that short-term credit does not have an impact on farm 
productivity, while other factors as education and the type of activity do.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
It is frequently argued in economic studies that rural development should be 
accompanied by agricultural credit reforms. After the financial structural adjustment of the 
1980s which adversely affected the intricate system of public agencies that provide farmers 
with access to land, credit, insurance, and inputs, farmer organizations in developing countries 
started demanding an institutional reconstruction of parts of the agriculture support system 
such as rural development banks (World Bank, 2007). They claim that financial crises 
aggravated the lack of financial services, even for market-oriented farmers.  
Rural development and, in particular, farm productivity, can be influenced by several 
factors; one is access to credit. Access to credit may affect farm productivity because farmers 
                                               
18
 This chapter is based on: Reyes, A., R. Lensink,  A. Kuyvenhoven, and H. A. J. Moll. Impact of Access to 
Credit on Farm Productivity of Fruit and Vegetable Growers in Central Chile. Paper under development. 
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facing binding capital constraints would tend to use lower levels of inputs in their production 
activities compared to those not constrained (Feder, Lau et al., 1989; Petrick, 2004b). 
Improved access to credit may therefore facilitate optimal input use and have a major impact 
on productivity. Thus, access to credit allows farmers to satisfy their cash needs induced by 
the agricultural production cycle and consumption requirements.   
Other factors such as the pre-existing household resource endowment, its demographic 
characteristics, and the conditions of the surrounding physical, social and economic 
environment are significant factors in determining household income. Thus, farm productivity 
may be constrained because of other factors far removed from credit availability, and reform 
of other input markets may have a larger impact on farm income, and hence productivity. 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the factors that determine farm productivity in 
central Chile, focusing especially on the effect of short-term credit. Determining whether or 
not this variable is significant may help to provide evidence for the impact of credit on farm 
productivity. Most of the literature has found credit constraint to have a negative impact on 
farm investment (Carter and Olinto, 2003; Petrick, 2004a), farm output (Feder, Lau et al., 
1990; Petrick, 2004b) farm profit (Carter, 1989; Foltz, 2004; Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 
2010) and farm productivity (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). In contrast, Kochar (1997) 
found credit to have no effect on efficiency. We hypothesize that, unlike most of the related 
studies and popular opinion in Chile, in a liberalized financial environment such as Chile’s, 
credit availability is not an important variable in explaining farm productivity.  
However, assessment of the expected productivity gain caused by credit availability is 
not trivial because the effect of credit is likely to differ between liquidity constrained and 
unconstrained credit farmers. This means that the marginal effect of credit may actually be 
zero for borrowers for whom liquidity is not a binding constraint. When liquidity is a binding 
constraint, the amount and combination of inputs used by a farmer will deviate from their 
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notional optimal level (the levels that would have been utilized if liquidity were not binding 
constraint). The marginal contribution of credit is therefore to bring input levels closer to 
optimal levels, thereby increasing output (Feder, Lau et al., 1990). Thus, measuring the 
difference of credit impact on unconstrained and constrained farmers must consider sample 
selection bias. 
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, we empirically test the impact of credit 
on farm productivity in central Chile, one of the most competitive and deregulated markets in 
Latin America. In deregulated financial markets the expectations are that by removing state 
influence from financial markets, private actors would take over the financial market, 
reducing their costs, improving their quality, and eliminating favoritism to well-connected 
groups. Although the financial sector in Chile is not completely deregulated and a financial 
supervisory system does exist, this regulation attempts to reduce bank failures and helps to 
ensure an adequate level of bank solvency.  
In addition, farmers in Chile can count on a well-spread network of informal lenders, 
namely input supplier and export firms. Informal lenders provide short-term credit usually 
payable at harvest with almost no requirements in collateral. Because informal lenders tend to 
rely less on collateral and more on monitoring to enforce repayments, informal loans became 
the dominant mode of finance by the mid 1990s (Foster and Valdes, 2006). An active 
informal sector may relax credit constrains that farmers face in the formal sector. Indeed, if 
the informal sector is a good substitute of an imperfect formal sector, then we would expect to 
find little differences in productivity of farmers that are constrained versus those who are 
unconstrained in the formal sector (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008).  
Secondly, this study utilizes a broad definition of credit constraints (Guirkinger, 2008; 
Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009; Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 
2010) to explain the influence of credit availability on farm productivity of credit-constrained 
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farmers in Chile. We include in our sample not only those farmers limited in their access to 
credit by banks, but also farmers who chose not to borrow as a result of high transaction costs 
or risk aversion. Moreover, we test not only for possible selection bias from credit-constrained 
farmers, but also for individual unobserved heterogeneity.   
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 provides a literature review on the 
credit constraint impact on farm productivity; section 4.3 presents the data collection process 
and the surveyed sample; section 4.4 describes the empirical approach used in this study; 
section 4.5 discusses the results; and finally, section 4.6 summarizes the findings and 
discusses policy options.  
4.2 Credit constraint and its impact on productivity 
The most popular definition of a credit constraint comes from the seminal paper of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Under their definition certain individuals obtain loans while 
apparently identical individuals, who are willing to borrow at precisely the same terms, do 
not. Because lenders may take on risky project applications only at high interest rates, they 
refuse to raise the interest rate to eliminate excess demand and, consequently, may ration their 
supply for credit. This type of credit constraint is called quantity rationing (Guirkinger, 2008; 
Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009; Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 
2010), pure credit rationing (Jaffee and Stiglitz, 1990b), or simply credit rationing (Feder, Lau 
et al., 1990; Kochar, 1997; Petrick, 2004b). A quantity constraint is thus a supply-side credit 
restriction. 
Several recent studies, however, have introduced two other forms of credit constraint  
(Guirkinger, 2008; Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009; 
Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 2010). First, farmers may not seek a formal loan because the 
transaction costs associated with the loan application are too high. This may be the result of 
screening mechanisms that lenders use to guard against adverse selection and moral hazard 
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problems. While these actions may help lenders to avoid granting loans to undesirable clients 
and may provide borrowers with incentives to avoid undesirable actions, they also pose 
significant monetary and time costs for borrowers. This type of credit constraint is called 
transaction-cost rationing. 
Secondly, farmers may not seek a loan because the risk implied by the available credit 
contract is too high.  Perhaps this cost arises because lenders want to counteract the risk of 
imperfect information by asking for collateral. Collateral-based credit contracts may lead to 
quantity constraints but they may also lead risk-averse farmers to voluntarily exclude 
themselves from credit markets. This type of credit constraint is called risk rationing. 
A common framework used to model the effects of credit constraints on farm output, 
and consequently, productivity, is a micro-economic agricultural household model where the 
utility maximization problem of a farmer depicts both the consumption and production 
decision of the farm household (Singh et al., 1986). In complete and competitive markets the 
consumption and production decisions of the farmers are separable, whereas in absent and 
non-competitive markets these decisions are not, meaning the product choice and factor 
productivities of the agricultural household are influenced by its preferences, characteristics, 
wealth, credit, and any other endowments. According to Benjamin (1992), this property of the 
independent household model can be used in empirical tests of market imperfections.  
The recent empirical literature has tested for non-separability decision as being rooted in 
market imperfection, suggesting that non-separability should be applicable only to those 
farmers whose choices are constrained by the underlying market imperfections. If, for 
example, land, labor, or credit markets are completely absent and all farmers are constrained 
by their absence, then a common estimation test for all farmers is appropriate. But if only 
some of the farmers are constrained, then the non-separability should characterize only those 
constrained farmers.   
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In the case of a credit market imperfection, the non-separability decision needs to be 
tested for those farmers whose choices are constrained by it. As was explained before in this 
section, although pure credit rationing is the most frequently used definition of credit market 
imperfection, transaction cost and risk are two additional means by which asymmetric 
information may affect farmers' terms of access to the credit market and hence their resource 
allocation decisions (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). In all three categories of credit 
constraints, farmers have a demand for credit but they are limited in accessing credit by a 
limited capacity to provide collateral, high transaction costs of the credit contract, or a high 
level of risk associated with the credit contract. In other words, all three types of credit 
constraints can lead to an imperfect or even inexistent credit market.  
Under this framework, Petrick (2004b) develops a two-period household model that 
allows an analysis of the effects of credit rationing with respect to short-term loans. In 
Petrick’s model, a binding and pure concept of credit constraint results in a household-internal 
shadow interest rate that is above the market interest rate of a first best solution. Therefore, 
input use is reduced, which implies a drop in output, income, and productivity as compared 
with the first best. A further implication of the binding credit constraint is that it breaks the 
separability of consumption and production decisions. 
4.3 Survey and data collection 
At this point we introduce a methodological variation to the work of Petrick (2004b). 
To measure credit constraint on farmers, we include non-price demand-side restrictions as in 
Boucher et al. (2009). Thus, in addition to the typical demographic and production sections, 
we added to our survey core questions dealing with credit behavior including information on 
loan sources, loan applications, credit contracts, credit from suppliers, traders, and collateral19. 
                                               
19See Appendix 1 to see questions applied in the survey. 
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The survey was carried out in 2006 and 2008 and contains data on the 2005–2006 and 
2007–2008 seasons, respectively. In the first wave of the survey, data consisted of a random 
sample of 200 farms located in six counties in the central region of Chile. During the second 
wave, we collected information from 200 farmers, 177 of which were in the first wave. The 
survey instrument was repeated with slight differences 20 . Table 4.1 provides descriptive 
characteristics of the farms taken in the sample.  
 
Table 4.1: Sample statistics of surveyed farms (n=354, pooled sample) 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
INCOME Total farm output production (millions of 
Ch$) 
358.32 424.37 
HECTARES Owned land (hectares) 76.80 111.22 
SHORT- TERM CREDIT Total outstanding short term credit from 
formal and informal lenders (millions of 
Ch$) 45.63 107.05 
ASSETS NO HA Total assets  (machinery and facilities) net 
from hectares (millions of Ch$) 243.58 554.28 
CLUSTER Number of firms connected with the firm 
as a cluster 
1.42 0.81 
INSURANCE 1 if the firm use insurance instruments, 0 
otherwise 0.03 0.18 
YEAR ADM Years farming (years) 22.90 12.34 
NO PROGRAM 1 if the firm do not have neither 
employees-training program nor GAP 
certification, 0 otherwise 0.23 0.42 
LOCATION 1 SB 1 if the farm is located in San Bernardo, 0 
otherwise 0.25 0.43 
LOCATION 2 LA 1 if the farm is located in Los Andes, 0 
otherwise  0.18 0.39 
LOCATION 3 CA 1 if the farm is located in Cachapoal, 0 
otherwise  0.37 0.48 
ALMOND 1 if the farm has Almond as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 0.05 0.21 
CHERRY 1 if the farm has Cherry as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 0.06 0.23 
TABLE GRAPE 1 if the farm has Table Grape as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 0.29 0.46 
WINE GRAPE 1 if the farm has Wine Grape as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 
0.06 0.24 
SCANNE PEACH 1 if the farm has Scanned Peaches as a 
main production, 0 otherwise 
0.06 0.23 
Note: 1,000 Chilean$= 1.58 US$; n stands for sample size 
 
                                               
20
 See Chapter 1 to see details on data (section 1.4). 
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Table 4.2 reports the number and average amount of short-term loans differentiated by 
formal sector rationing categories. Formal short-term credit is most used by unconstrained 
borrowers, while informal short-term credit is most used by risk and transaction-cost rationed 
farmers. In total, unconstrained borrowers together with risk and transaction-cost rationed 
farmers use more credit than those in the rest of the categories. It is important to note that risk 
and transaction cost categories use only informal credit. This situation arises because farmers 
in risk and transaction cost categories consider formal credit either to be more risky or to bear 
too much transaction cost. This suggests that these types of farmers prefer informal over 
formal credit, redirecting their demand for short-term credit from a formal to an informal 
sources of credit.  
Table 4.2: Number and average of short-term loans from formal and informal institutions by 
formal sector rationing categories, pooled sample 
Formal sector rationing 
categories 
Formal Informal Total short- 
term loans 
Total 
sample 
Unconstrained N X  N X  N X  N 
Borrowers 41 83.901 62 24.581 86 57.139 118 
Non-borrowers 0  80 22.243 80 22.243 184 
Constrained        
Quantity rationed  20 41.935 17 17.111 27 41.818 36 
Transaction cost rationed  0  5 60.680 5 60.680 6 
Risk rationed  0  4 65.689 4 65.689 10 
Subtotal  
Credit Constrained 
Categories  
20 41.935 26 32.963 36 47.090 52 
Total 61 70.142 168 24.765 202 41.528 354 
 
Table 4.3 reports the characteristics of farmers classified by rationing categories from 
the formal credit sector. Unconstrained borrowers and transaction-cost rationed farmers own 
more hectares than those in the rest of the rationing categories, while quantity-rationed 
farmers have less titled land. Farm size appears a variable that affects a quantity constraint, 
the most important category of credit constraints: The 36 quantity-rationed farmers averaged 
just 40.6 owned hectares each, whereas the total average is 76.8 hectares per farmer. 
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Table 4.3: Farm characteristics by formal sector rationing categories, pooled sample 
Formal sector rationing categories 
Average 
Owned 
hectares 
Average 
assets 
Average 
gross 
Income As
se
ts
/ 
ha
 
 
In
co
m
e/
ha
 
Unconstrained 
(Ha) (MM$) (MM$) (MM$
/ha) 
(MM$/
ha) 
Borrowers (n=118) 82.181 206.868 418.940 2.517 5.098 
Non-borrowers (n=184) 81.835 273.291 347.125 3.340 4.242 
Constrained      
Quantity rationed (n=36) 40.636 273.893 253.156 6.786 6.272 
Transaction cost rationed (n=6) 83.283 31.306 376.067 0.376 4.516 
Risk rationed (n=10) 46.800 148.477 216.992 3.390 4.954 
Subtotal  
Credit Constrained Categories 
(n=52) 
46.742 221.783 260.383 4.745 5.571 
Total (n=354) 76.795 243.584 358.321 3.172 4.666 
Note: n stands for sample size for each particular category and MM$ stands for Chilean peso in 
millions 
 
The average value of assets per hectare is high for quantity-rationed farmers, which can 
be explained by their capacity to both invest and to acquire new equipment or by a negative 
relation between quantity rationing and farm size. On the other hand, the low value of assets 
per hectare for transaction-cost constrained farmers reveals either a low propensity to invest 
or a positive relation between transaction cost and farm size. Although investments are not the 
scope of this chapter, this latter idea has to be tested taking into consideration endogeneity 
problems which arise for the variable credit constraint. This is tested in this next chapter. 
Unconstrained borrowers have the highest income. Although this may be related to 
access to credit, it may also be due to farm size. Unconstrained borrowers and non-borrowers 
as well as transaction-cost rationed farmers can be seen to have high levels of both farm size 
and income. Later we test to what extent farm size affects farm productivity. 
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4.4 Empirical model 
4.4.1 Econometric specification: A model for the selection mechanism with panel 
data 
In general a statistical model yields valid inferences only if the units, in this case 
farmers, are sampled at random. Selection bias may arise when the selection mechanism 
depends on unobservable variables correlated with the error term of the statistical model of 
interest. In our case, a farmer who operates at low productivity may have higher demand for 
credit as compared to more productive farmers. This may create selection bias in our 
estimators.  A classic way to avoid the selection bias is to add an equation which explicitly 
models the selection mechanism (Heckman, 1979). 
The sample selection model for farm productivity using panel data can be written as a 
system of equations for the substantive equation (productivity) and the selection equation 
(credit constraint). By treating the responses as repeated measurements nested within 
individuals, the sample selection model fits neatly into the multilevel framework (Skrondal 
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). Although there exist several other parametric (Wooldridge, 1995) 
and semi-parametric (Kyriazidou, 1997) techniques to deal with residual selection using panel 
data, we prefer to use multilevel analysis because it allows to use the entire set of data without 
using a subsample of farmers for which the constraint regime does not change across periods, 
as others techniques do.  Let us label with ity  the output production for farmer i  (i=1,…, N) 
at time t (t=1,…,T). The binary variable *2itCC  simply indicates the presence or absence of all 
three categories of credit constraints (quantity, transaction cost, and risk rationing). As was 
explained in section 4.2, non-separability should be tested for those farmers whose choices are 
constrained by credit market imperfections, either because of collateral, transaction cost, or 
risk. Then farm productivity can be observed only if a credit constraint )1( *2 =itCC  is met.  
The joint model is thus defined by the following equations: 
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ititit xy 11 εβ +′=            (4.1) 
ititit zCC 2
*
2 εγ +′=            (4.2) 
 
Where itx  and itz  represent the vectors of explanatory variables affecting output 
production and credit constraint status, respectively. The coefficients γ and β are the 
parameters to be estimated.  
To take into account the panel data structure and induce the dependence between both 
residuals, the residual in equations (4.1) and (4.2) are discomposed as ititiit 111 µλδξε ++=  
and ititiit 222 µδξε ++= .  The three terms capture the unobservable heterogeneity: i1ξ  and 
i2ξ  are the random intercepts for each individual, normally distributed with zero mean and 
variance, 2
1iξσ  and 
2
2iξσ , respectively and covariance 
2
; 21 ii ξξσ  ; itδ  is a shared random effect to 
induce dependence between substantive and selection equation by the factor λ , normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance 2δσ ; it1µ  and it2µ  represent random error specific for 
output production and credit constraint status, respectively, and are assumed to be normally 
distributed and independent of itx  and itz  with zero mean and variance 
2
1itµσ  and 
2
2itµσ , 
respectively. Therefore, 22221 11)( ititiitVar µδξ σσλσε ++= , 2222 22)( ititiitVar µδξ σσσε ++=  and 
2
;
2
21 21
),(
iiitit
Cov ξξδ σλσεε += . Equations (4.1) and 4.2) can now be rewritten as: 
ititiitit xy 111 µλδξβ +++′=                         (4.3) 
ititiitit zCC 22
*
2 µδξγ +++′=                         (4.4) 
In the system of equations (4.3) and (4.4) there are six variance-covariance parameters, 
( λσσσσσ δµµξξ ,,,,, 22222 2121 itititii ). However, there are only four quantities to estimate: the residual 
variance of ity1 , namely 2222
11 iti µδξ σσλσ ++ ; the variance of i1ξ  and i2ξ , identified through the 
intraclass correlation in the substantive  and selection model respectively; and the correlation 
between  the total residual of the two equations namely: 
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++++
+
=       (4.5) 
Therefore, it is necessary to impose two restrictions. One restriction comes directly 
from the binary nature of the selection equation, so 2
2 itµσ  is implicitly fixed to a value 
determined in the model estimated in the selection equation (we use the probit model for the 
selection model, hence 12
2
=
itµσ ). The second restriction needed for identification must be 
stated explicitly: here we fixed the factor variance to one ( 12 =δσ ). For discussions and 
alternatives restrictions see Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004).  
Thus the covariance matrix of the residual is given by: 

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=∑ 22;
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And the correlation is  
)2)(( 2222
;
211
21
+++
+
=
iiti
ii
ξµξ
ξξ
σσλσ
σλ
ρ         (4.7) 
The estimation of ρ  will be relevant in our model, because it gives statistical evidence 
of the sample selection bias in our model.  
The estimation of this model is by maximum likelihood, with the likelihood function 
evaluated by the adaptive quadrature numerical technique shown by Rabe-Hesketh et al. 
(2005). This technique has shown to be superior to standard quadrature methods, particularly 
where the number of cross-sectional observations is large and/or the intra-class correlation is 
high. Maximization of the likelihood function over the set of parameters is achieved by the 
Newton-Ramhson algorithm. The productivity function is estimated as a Tobit model, which 
includes random effects for households-level heterogeneity (Rabe-Hesketh 2004). 
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4.4.2 Variable specification 
The dependent variable in equations (4.3) is farm productivity, measured as the value of 
farm output production per hectare in Chilean pesos (Ch$)21. Due to the multiproduct farm 
households in central Chile, the value of farm production is an aggregate of fruit and 
horticultural crop production in 2006 and in 2008. The production is valued using prices 
declared by the household at the time of the household survey. In the case of exported 
products, we consider the average dollar (US$) value for each year to estimate total value of 
farm production in pesos. 
The following independent variables are typically included to explain farm productivity  
(Feder, Lau et al., 1990; Moschini and Hennessy, 2001; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009):  
short-term credit availability ( K ), initial liquidity endowment (E), and household (zh) and 
production (zy) characteristics.  
For credit available ( K ) we consider the amount of credit borrowed from all available 
sources (formal and informal institutions). Because short-term credit is linked with liquidity 
available for current inputs and directly affects productivity, some authors state that short-
term rather than long-term credit is the most appropriate variable for affecting productivity22. 
However, all credit available may also affect farm productivity as a result of continuous 
improvement in productivity by means of investments (Feder, Lau et al., 1990; Foltz, 2004; 
Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008). In addition, credit constraint variables consider both long- 
and short-term credit restrictions. From our data set, we cannot separate short-term from long-
term credit restrictions. Although farmers from the survey are more likely to report long-term 
credit constraints, those constraints are not directly assessed in the survey. Nevertheless, to 
                                               
21
 The exchange rate between the Chilean peso and the US dollar is 651 peso per dollar. 
22
 It is important to note that we consider short-term credit as liquidity because households consider the 
allocation of resources at the beginning of the production period between current consumption, investment, and 
the purchase of variable inputs for current production (including labor and fertilizer). Variable inputs, in 
combination with land and existing capital, will produce this period’s output. Because investment will not 
mature by the time this period’s output is produced, investment in not considered as a factor in one-period 
production functions. It is just considered as initial capital. Thus long-term credit would not be a relevant 
variable for one-period production. 
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consider both arguments about the duration of the period pertinent to the outstanding credit 
variable and the possible mismatching of a period affecting credit constraint and outstanding 
credit variables, we estimate the switching regression model of farm productivity specified in 
equations (4.3) and (4.4) using two alternative variables proxying for credit variables: short-
term and total credit availability. We define short-term credit as loans with a maximum 
maturity of 12 months because these types of loans are required to finance inputs or current 
consumption.    
The credit variable will be relevant to indicate whether consumption and production 
decision are separated or not. If this variable is positively significant, there is evidence for 
non-separability, and farm productivity would be effectively constrained by lack of access to 
credit. If the credit variable is not significant, it would be not important to explain farm 
productivity, and credit is not a binding constraint limiting production.  
The independent variable representing household characteristics (zh) is education. The 
expectation is that the high-educated managers could have a positive impact on the farm's 
productivity. The household resource endowment (E) is represented by farm size because land 
is the most important asset that farmers have. The a priori expectation is that these factors 
have a positive influence on farm productivity. Production characteristics (zy) are captured by 
the type of farm activity. We expect that for higher value crops such as avocados and grapes, 
the value of farm productivity is also higher.  
The number of adult males or females in the household is not included in our analysis. 
Farmers in Chile do business as would a regular company. They hire workers for jobs and 
family members are normally not part of the farm’s workforce. Instead, this study includes the 
characteristics of the owner and his or her abilities to take control of the business. 
Thus, for farm productivity empirical model (equation 4.3), explanatory and observable 
variables are as follows (Table 4.4): 
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Table 4.4: Explanatory and observable variables explaining farm productivity 
Explanatory Variables Observable variables 
Credit access (K) Volume of outstanding credit (Ch$) 
Endowment (Z) Farm size (hectares) 
Household characteristics (zh) Education 
Problems with export company 
Production characteristics (zy) Specialization (type of fruit or vegetable) 
 
In the credit constraint empirical model (equation 4.4), explanatory and observable 
variables are taken from previous studies (Foltz, 2004; Petrick, 2004b; Guirkinger and 
Boucher, 2008) that analyzed this stage in detail. In this chapter the model and independent 
variables used to determine credit constraint are as follows (Table 4.5): 
Table 4.5: Explanatory and observable variables explaining credit constraint 
Explanatory Variable Observable variable 
Initial wealth Titled land (hectares) 
Production characteristics Specialization (type of fruit or vegetable) 
Farmer’s management skills Problems with export company (0-1) 
 Insurance 
 No training and certification programs 
 Education 
 
4.5 Results 
The primary objective of this chapter is to determine to what extent available credit 
affects farm productivity of credit constrained farmers. As explained in section 4.4.1, we 
estimate the switching regression model of farm productivity specified in equation (4.3) and 
(4.4) using two alternative variables proxying for credit variable: short-term and total credit 
availability.  
As farm productivity is observable only for credit-constrained farmers and as there is a 
likely correlation between credit constraints and income, we need to control for a possible 
selection bias within the panel data structure using switching regression models (Miranda, 
2006). Although we recognize that modeling unconstrained farmers may suffer from 
misspecification and endogeneity problems not captured by credit constraint variables, all two 
specifications for farm productivity are estimated separately for credit-constrained and 
unconstrained subsamples to compare the significance of the parameters in both subsamples. 
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The coefficients of the constrained sample selection model are estimated on 52 observations 
because only credit-constrained farmers are included. The rest of the observations (125) are 
used to estimate the unconstrained sample selection model.  
Table 4.6 presents estimates of the two switching regression models of farm 
productivity for formal credit constrained and unconstrained farmers. All regressors from the 
productivity equation are regressors in the selection equation. However the selection equation 
has some variables excluded from the productivity equation to ensure identification of the 
model. The variables included in the selection equation and excluded from productivity 
equation are: whether use has made of insurance instruments, whether a training and a 
certification program has been completed, and a dummy for farm activities such as avocado 
and peach growing.  
Before turning to the main results, we briefly comment on the parameter estimates of the 
selection equation representing the credit constraint (Equation 4.4). These parameters are 
reported in the first column of each model of Table 4.6. As expected, possession of land 
reduces the probability of being credit constrained in the two models. Titled land may be used 
as collateral which helps formal financial institutions overcome adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Another parameter that is significant and increases the probability of being 
credit constrained is the use of insurance. This result is in line with the Leland-Pyle model 
(Leland and Pyle, 1977). According to their model, poor organizations, or farms in this case, 
try to get full insurance, whereas good farms try to signal their quality by being only partially 
insured. This implies that farms that are insured are poorer-quality farms that will have a 
higher probability of being quantity rationed.  
Finally, avocado and almond growers are more likely to be credit constrained. Two 
different reasons may explain this result: In the case of avocado growers, with a long tradition 
in Chilean agriculture, this result may reflect a situation where growers may reach a credit 
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ceiling, and banks are less willing to extend extra credit. In the case of almonds, which is not 
a typical crop in Chile, the constraint may suggest that less experienced bank officers are 
assessing almond projects, so that banks may be less willing to extend a loan to these lesser 
known entrepreneurial activities. 
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Table 4.6: Parameter estimates of Switching Selection Model for farm productivity under binding and no-binding credit constraint 
 Model 1   Model 2:    
Productivity CC Prod 
Cons 
Prod 
Uncons 
CC Prod 
Cons 
Prod 
Uncons 
HECTARES -0.008*** -0.00695 -0.00345 -0.007*** -0.00179 -0.00326 
 [0.005] [0.595] [0.364] [0.006] [0.918] [0.392] 
ST CREDIT 0.002 0.00176 -0.00282    
 [0.222] [0.769] [0.484]    
TOTAL DEBT    0.001 -0.00272 0.00330 
    [0.453] [0.762] [0.215] 
EDUCATION -0.040 3.159** -2.264** -0.040 3.204** -2.449*** 
 [0.899] [0.035] [0.012] [0.901] [0.034] [0.007] 
TABLE GRAPES 0.220 6.930*** 2.453*** 0.255 6.980*** 2.340*** 
 [0.534] [0.000] [0.003] [0.463] [0.000] [0.005] 
ALMOND 1.184** 9.036*** -0.862 1.186** 9.119*** -0.730 
 [0.041] [0.000] [0.670] [0.039] [0.000] [0.718] 
WINE GRAPES 0.777 8.555*** 0.710 0.752 8.672*** 0.607 
 [0.157] [0.001] [0.665] [0.168] [0.001] [0.712] 
CHERRY -0.183 4.738 5.014*** -0.180 4.762 5.112*** 
 [0.802] [0.265] [0.002] [0.803] [0.263] [0.001] 
EXPORT_PROB 0.511 -1.981 -2.123** 0.506 -1.946 -2.196** 
 [0.117] [0.125] [0.013] [0.117] [0.133] [0.010] 
INSURANCE 2.915***   2.898***   
 [0.001]   [0.001]   
NO PROGRAM 0.413   0.413   
 [0.180]   [0.181]   
AVOCADO 1.520***   1.501***   
 [0.002]   [0.002]   
SCANNED PEACH 0.555   0.594   
 [0.316]   [0.277]   
CONSTANT -1.603*** 3.802** 8.332*** -1.617*** 3.694* 8.251*** 
 [0.000] [0.049] [0.000] [0.000] [0.055] [0.000] 
 95
       
Random Effect 
      
Observation level 
      
Var ( )it1µ   5.215** 11.489***  5.208** 11.387*** 
 
 [0.015] [0.000]  [0.015] [0.000] 
Var ( )it2µ   Fixed fixed  fixed fixed 
 
      
Individual  level 
      
2
1iξσ   12.401** 15.403***  12.449** 15.488*** 
 
 [0.011] [0.000]  [0.011] [0.000] 
2
2 iξσ   5.295 11.970  5.444 12.133* 
 
 [0.169] [0.101]  [0.167] [0.100] 
ii 21 ξξσ   -4.057 1.040  -4.048 1.2016 
 
 [0.264] [0.770]  [0.270] [0.736] 
CORR( ii 21 ;ξξ )  -0.501 -0.077  -0.492 -0.088 
 
 [0.185] [0.769]  [0.189] [0.775] 
Observations 
 406 656  406 656 
Individuals 
 52 125  52 125 
Log likelihood 
 -257.8 -1013.9  -258.3 -1013.8 
LR Test 
 7.08*** 0.18  6.38*** 0.13 
Wald-test (21) 
 88.63*** 70.18***  89.44*** 71.98*** 
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; both models are estimated by maximum 
likelihood with 12 quadrature points, adding extra quadrature points did not produce important changes in coefficients and/or standards errors; 
2
1iξσ  and 
2
2 iξσ refer to the unexplained variance at the individual level for the farm productivity model and the selection model respectively; 
Likelihood ratio test (LR test) compares the exogenous (H0) with the endogenous model (Ha) and Wald test for the significance of all regressors but 
the constant. 
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We now turn to the primary results of the regressions in Table 4.6. The second and third 
columns give parameters estimates for constrained and unconstrained productivity equations 
for short-term credit specification while the fifth and sixth columns do for constrained and 
unconstrained productivity equations for total debt specification .  
The regression results of the farm productivity equation under a binding credit 
constraint for the two specifications show that the following variables affect farm 
productivity: education of the manager of the farm, and being almond, wine grape and table 
grape growers. The most important result, however, is the insignificant effect of short-term 
and total credit on farm productivity for constrained farmers. This result also indicates that 
constrained farmers, most of them quantity rationed, can separate production and 
consumption decisions and thus optimally choose their levels of input so that farm 
productivity is not affected. Although farmers feel themselves credit constrained, credit is not 
actually limiting their farm productivity. In other words, although farmers perceive 
themselves to be credit constrained, production and input-use decisions are not linked to their 
outstanding credit.  
As expected, productivity for unconstrained farmers is not influenced by the 
availability of short neither by total debt. Although some farmers are credit constrained from 
formal credit institutions, the outstanding credit does not limit their productivity because they 
either have short-term credit available from informal institutions and probably shift demand 
for credit to the informal sector, or they find other sources to fund working capital such as 
cash reserves or near liquid assets. Indeed, we find little difference in the impact of short-term 
credit allocation on productivity for farmers that are constrained versus those who are 
unconstrained in the formal sector, suggesting that in the short term the informal sector is a 
good substitute or complement for an imperfect formal one.  
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Analyzing our control variables, we see that education is one of the variables that has a 
positive significant influence on farm productivity. This is an indication that education 
increases farm productivity. Given their constrained access to credit, more educated managers 
have more skills and tools to improve productivity. 
Finally, variables related to specific farm activities also positively affect farm 
productivity under a credit constraint. For instance, almond growers, compared to farmers of 
other crops apart from cherries and table and wine grapes, increase their productivity by Ch$ 
9 million per hectare (see model 1). In the meantime wine and table grape growers, compared 
to farmers of other crops, increase their income by Ch$ 8.67 and Ch$ 6.9 million per hectare, 
respectively. Good prices for these products in recent seasons may have affected these results.  
The switching regression model for farm productivity under a binding credit constraint 
for the two specifications reports that the parameter is statistically insignificant. However, the 
LR test for selection bias is significant, suggesting that the selection bias is relevant under 
binding credit, and the coefficients may differ from constrained and unconstrained samples.  
Since both ρ  parameters for constrained and unconstrained farmers are statistically 
insignificant, this result is not conclusive with respect to whether or not credit-constrained or 
unconstrained farmers are more or less productive than a random farmer.  
 
4.6 Discussion and conclusions 
The present work analyses farm productivity conditional on selection criteria for access 
to formal credit using a panel data structure for market-oriented farmers in Chile. The 
complexity arises from the panel structure of the data and from the need to adjust for a 
possible selection bias. In our results, neglecting sample selection problems lead to biased 
estimators, for example for the impact of credit on farm productivity. 
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Most comparable studies suggest that while the productivity of unconstrained farmers is 
independent of their endowments such as liquidity, the productivity of constrained farmers is 
linked with their endowments. Specifically Guikenger (2008) suggests that credit constraints 
have a negative impact on productivity on constrained farmers in Peru. Their study suggests 
that Peruvian farmers do not have other financing alternatives such as an informal sector, 
capable to fully meet the liquidity need for constrained farmers in the formal sector.  Their 
results break the independence between farmer`s resource allocation and endowments, 
implying credit market failures.  
However, the most important result of this chapter is that, despite some evidence of 
credit constraints due to asymmetric information and adverse selection prevalent in rural areas 
in Chile, the marginal effect of credit on farm productivity is nil across credit constrained and 
unconstrained farmers. Thus, access to credit does not seem to change farmers' production 
decisions for market-oriented farmers. The credit constraint condition is not binding, which 
implies that the available amount of credit does not restrict productivity and farmers do not 
need more credit to improve their income per hectare. A possible explanation for not finding 
significant effects for credit constrained firms in the formal sector is that informal credit 
institutions act as complement providers of credit, as it is shown in Chapter 3. An active 
informal sector may thus relax credit constraints that prevail due to asymmetric information as 
well as risk and transaction cost.  
This finding is relevant in a country like Chile that is currently discussing the pertinence 
of an agricultural bank, specialized in agricultural credit. Our results suggest that an increase 
in the availability of short-term credit will not have an impact on farm productivity. Others 
factors may have a larger impact on farm productivity such as education and farm activities 
such as avocado and almond. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Dynamics of Investment for Market-Oriented Farmers23 
5 Dynamics of Investment for Market-Oriented Farmers 
Abstract 
 
Using panel data from a survey conducted in 2006 and 2008 of 177 market-oriented 
farmers in central Chile, we investigate investment under imperfect capital markets. 
Specifically we determine the impact of formal credit constraints on fixed investment. By 
controlling for endogeneity problems, we find credit constraints to have a significant negative 
impact on fixed investment. In addition, a time trend is significant, which we understand as 
evidence of the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007. 
 
5.1  Introduction  
An investment can be broadly defined as an outlay of cash in exchange for expected 
future cash returns (Barry and Robison, 2001: p.84), and it is possible to distinguish between 
capital investments and financial investments. The former is the purchase of capital goods 
(such as a machine or buildings) to produce goods for future consumption. The latter is the 
purchase of assets (such as securities, bank deposits) with a primary view to their financial 
return, either as income or capital gain; this form represents a means of saving. In this study 
we focus on the capital (or real) investment. 
Market-oriented farmers need more capital for three main reasons: to invest in new 
technologies, to meet the requirements of international regulations on quality and food safety, 
and to obtain scale and scope economies. All these investments play an important role in 
increasing the productivity and efficiency of a firm.  
                                               
23
  This chapter is based on:  A. Reyes et al.  Dynamics of Investment for Market-Oriented Farmers in Central 
Chile. Paper under development. 
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However, to invest in certain goods carry costs which farmers have to face. Changes 
in capital stock are associated with additional costs of machinery, administration and planning 
the capital expansion. All these costs are assumed by farmers if they expect higher prices and 
productivity. However, when expectations are uncertain, as in a global financial crisis period, 
these uncertainties lead to lower investments by risk-averse farmers.  
The objective of this chapter is to explore the factors that influence the decision to 
invest in fixed capital for farmers in Chile. Specifically we focus on the impact of formal 
credit constraints on investment decisions. In doing so we also try to detect the time trend in a  
investment model. The panel data structure of our data base allows us to test differences in 
farmers' probability to invest during the years of our study, which were strongly influenced by 
the global financial crisis of 2007. Increasing volatility and uncertainty may cause higher 
interest rates in the financial market and may influence investment decisions (Demir, 2009). 
Then, irreversible fixed investment in the farming sector may be negatively affected by the 
uncertainty of the future.  
Our contribution is two-fold: First, we empirically estimate the impact of credit 
constraints on investment in a developing country context, using a direct measure for capital 
constraints. Although investment studies under capital market imperfections are extensive, 
most of this literature is based on the idea that investment is only sensitive to internal funds if 
there are imperfect capital markets. Empirically these studies, first introduced by Fazzari et al. 
(1988), have been conducted by dividing the study sample according to an a priori measure of 
financing constraints, after which a variable that proxies for internal funds is compared in 
both subsamples. In some studies the variable that proxies for internal funds is cash flow.  
Some authors, however, question the relevance of the use of cash flow as a measure of 
financial constraints. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that investment-cash flow sensitivities 
do not provide useful evidence about the presence of financial constraints. Demir (2009) 
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shows that the availability of internal funds may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for financing a real investment project. In addition, an a priori classification of financing 
constraints is problematic since the threshold used to classify firms in different groups is set 
arbitrarily (Bo et al., 2003). Some exceptions to the previous measurement of credit constraint 
methods are Petrick (2004a) and Feder (2001) who propose to proxy the credit constraint 
status by using results of a direct survey. In their survey farmers were directly asked about 
their perception of credit constraints. Both studies, conducted in Poland and China 
respectively, found that credit constraints negatively affect investment.  
A completely different approach is used by Rajan and Zingales (1998) in trying to 
determine the impact of financial market imperfections on investment and growth. 
Specifically their study uses the interaction between industry`s dependence on external funds 
and financial market development in a country as indicator of financial market imperfections 
in the investment model. Their study suggests that financial development may play a 
particularly beneficial role in investment in new firms. If new firms are the source of new 
ideas, financial development can enhance innovation, and this, in turn, enhances growth in 
indirect ways. Although their approach partly solves the problems associated with the 
investment cash-flow estimates, it still does suffer from not using a direct measure for capital 
constraints.  
To estimate investment decisions this study directly measures credit constraints based 
on a direct elicitation approach (Guirkinger, 2008; Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009) where 
the randomly selected farmers were asked about the perception of their formal credit 
constraint status. Although one drawback of directly asking responders about their borrowing 
experience is that such an approach relies only on an individual’s subjective assessment of his 
situation, it is better than relying on an arbitrarily chosen variable that may not distinguish 
between credit-constrained and unconstrained farmers.  
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Second, we address the potential endogeneity problems of a credit constraint variable 
by using a discrete switching endogenous model (Miranda & Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). The 
endogeneity problems arise in a credit-market context because several unobserved 
characteristics may at the same time affect investments and the probability of becoming credit 
constrained. For instance, some farmers who are unknown to banks but who are very 
innovative may have a higher probability of being credit constrained, but they also may have 
more investments. In this case, not controlling for this “unobserved” factor will lead to an 
underestimation of the effect of credit constraints because the positive effect of innovation 
skills will also be picked up by the credit constraint variable which will, in and of itself, 
counteract the negative effect of credit constraints. On the other hand, farmers with poor 
entrepreneurial ability (an unobservable factor) are both less likely to invest in fixed capital 
and more likely to be limited in their access to credit. In this case, not controlling for 
endogeneity will lead to an overestimation of  the effect of credit constraints. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview of  
empirical investment models applied in the literature. Section 5.3 presents the empirical 
approach used in this chapter based on an endogenous switching dummy variable model with 
state dependence. Section 5.4 describes the context of our study together with the data 
collection. Sections 5.5 shows the results of two different econometric strategies on an 
estimated investment model with potential endogeneity problems. Finally section 5.6 
concludes and discusses the main findings. 
5.2 Theoretical framework 
In this section we explain the most relevant studies about how to empirically estimate  
investment under capital market imperfections24. Under the assumption of perfect capital 
                                               
24
  For a complete survey on investment equations we referred to  Lensink, R., H. Bo and E. Sterken 
(2001) Investment, capital market imperfections, and uncertainty: Theory and empirical results (Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar)., and Petrick, M. (2005) Empirical measurement of credit rationing in agriculture: a 
methodological survey. Agricultural Economics, 33(2), pp. 191-203. 
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markets with firms having equal and unlimited access to invest at an exogenously determined 
cost, financing decisions or the capital structure of a firm should not have any impact on 
private investment decisions (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, under imperfect capital 
markets related to asymmetric information problems, the Modigliani and Miller proposition 
no longer holds and liquidity variables, such as cash flow, has a significant effect on 
investment decisions.  
The literature has been developed in several ways to empirically estimate the 
investment model under imperfect capital markets. Three basic types of models have been 
applied: the q model of investment (also called the flexible accelerator model or Tobin’s q 
investment model), the structural investment model (also called the stochastic Euler equation) 
and the reduced form model. 
First, the q model of investment proposed by Tobin (1969) states that all fluctuations 
in investment are related to the q indicator, which is the ratio of the market value of installed 
capital to the replacement cost of installed capital. An increase in Tobin’s q should have a 
positive effect on investment. In this equation, variables that may say something about 
financial constraint are added to the basic reduced-form equation of investment. Based on the 
idea that investments are sensitive to internal funds in imperfect capital markets, it is common 
to include cash flow as a measure of internal sources.  
On the other hand, since most firms (including farms) are likely to be financially 
constrained in some sense, the investment-cash flow sensitivity indicator would be positive 
for almost all firms. To get around this problem it is common to divide the sample into two 
groups where each may be more or less likely to be credit constrained and to compare the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity indicator for both subsamples. A greater investment-cash 
flow sensitivity coefficient is seen as an indicator of more severe capital restrictions. This 
approach is popularized by Fazzary, Hubbard and Petersen (Fazzari, Hubbard et al., 1988) and 
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is widely used in literature with different splitting criteria. A sample-splitting criteria that 
have been considered in literature include dividend payout ratios (Fazzari, Hubbard et al., 
1988), firm size, age or growth (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990), the firm credit rating 
(Whited, 1992) the dispersion in the firm’s share ownership (Schaller, 1993); whether the firm 
is affiliated to a larger corporate grouping (Hoshi et al., 1991; Hermes and Lensink, 1998); 
and the firm has a relationship with a particular bank (Elston, 1993).  
However some criticism of this approach has arisen mainly because of the use of 
investment cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints and the a priori 
classification of firms into different groups.  Kaplan and Zingles  (1997) criticize Fazzary, 
Hubbard and Petersen's approach by pointing out that while constrained firms should be 
sensitive to internal cash flow and unconstrained firms may not need to be, it is not 
necessarily true that the magnitude of the sensibility increases with the degree of financing 
constraints. In particular, their results indicate that a higher sensitivity of investment to cash 
flow is not associated with more financially constrained firms.    
In addition, two problems may arise from a priori classification of firms into different 
groups. Firstly, the threshold used to classify firms in different groups is set arbitrarily, and 
secondly, although it might be possible to identify constrained firms, it is quite often 
impossible to identify the years during which a firm is constrained. This makes it impossible 
to differentiate between firm-specific effects on investment and the effects of financing 
constraints  (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Bo, Lensink et al., 2003). 
The second approach to estimating an investment equation is the structural investment 
model approach, also called the Euler model of investment (Bond and Meghir, 1994). The 
idea of the structural investment model is to maximize the firm’s present value subject to 
capital accumulation and external borrowing constraints. With this optimization problem the 
optimal path for investment is derived, which yields an empirical Euler equation under the 
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null hypothesis of no financial constraints. Like the previous model, the sample needs to be 
divided into two groups—credit constrained farmers and unconstrained farmers—in order to 
test the Euler equation. This Euler equation has a lagged investment variable which is most 
likely correlated with current investment. Then in estimating this equation, state dependency 
needs to be considered25. This approach does not necessarily need an explicit investment 
equation and, consequently, it is not necessary to estimate a Tobin’s q, avoiding problems 
related to the measurement of Tobin’s q. Some example of this approach are Whited (1992), 
Bond and Meghir, (1994), Hubbard (1995) Demir (2009).  
However, the structural models of investment that have been proposed to date have 
not been successful in characterizing a dynamics process, possibly because they have 
neglected the potential importance of endogeneity and measurement errors in average q (Bond 
and Van Reenen, 2007). An intermediate possibility is to rely on dynamic econometric 
specifications that are not explicitly derived as optimal firm behavior, but address questions 
without fully specifying the nature of investment equations. A favorable interpretation of such 
reduced-form models is that they represent an empirical approximation to some complex 
underlying process that was generated by the data. However, a less favorable interpretation is 
that they compound the parameters adjustment process with parameters of the expectation-
formation process in determining investment, causing identification problems. Fortunately, 
some possible solutions to the identification problems can be found. Models like this have 
been introduced into the investment literature by Bean (1981), Bond et al. (2003) and Petrick 
(2004a).  
The model considered in this chapter follows the approach that use a reduce-form of 
dynamic investment decision model. These reduced-form investment models have the 
                                               
25
 For lagged variables in a continuous model see Arellano and Bond Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991) Some 
tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 58(2), pp. 277-297. and for discrete lagged variables see Woodridge Wooldridge, J. 
M. (2005) Simple solutions to the initial conditions problem in dynamic, nonlinear panel data models with 
unobserved heterogeneity. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20(1), pp. 39-54.. 
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following implications (Petrick, 2004a): First, limited access to credit causes a lagged 
adjustment of capital stocks to a steady state. Second, optimal investment is dependent on the 
equity formation of the household in terms of the profit retention or savings, or more 
generally, on the availability of collateral. Finally, investment and credit demand are thus 
neither separable from consumption decisions nor independent of the equity position of the 
farm. These implications are followed in the empirical model used in this chapter. 
In addition, three characteristics distinguish the model used in this chapter.  First, we 
use a discrete instead of a continuous variable for investment in order to empirically estimate 
the impact of credit constraints on the probability of farmers to invest. Our interest is to study 
the variables that impact the decision whether to invest in fixed capital with two-year data set. 
In addition, for a continuous model of investment, at least a three-year data set is needed 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). Thus, we need to limit our analysis to that covered in a dynamic 
investment decision model because we have less than three years of data.  Second, we include 
a credit constraint variable, which allows us to test our primary question, the impact of credit 
constraint on investment. Instead of using a proxy for a credit constraint, we use a directly 
collected variable for a credit constraint which include a broader definition of credit 
constraints (Boucher, Guirkinger et al., 2009).  
Finally, we include a lagged investment variable to retain the dynamic process of 
investment.   
5.3  Empirical approach 
To deal with the dynamic estimation of a discrete variable for investment and a 
possible endogenous credit constraint variable, this section sets out a statistical model that 
permits identification of state dependence, taking into account the potentially confounding 
effect of unobserved individual heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2005).  
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Let us label with ity*  the latent continuous variable representing investment decision 
for farmer i  (i=1,…, N) at time t (t=1,…,T). The dynamic investment decision model is thus 
defined by the following equations: 
itiititit yxy εαγβ +++′= −1*           (5.1) 
With  
1=ity  if 0
* >ity  
0=ity  if 0
* ≤ity  
Where itx  represents the vector of explanatory variables affecting the investment 
decision and 1−ity  is the lagged investment decision variable. The coefficients γ  and β  are 
the parameters to be estimated. The term iα captures unobserved heterogeneity and accounts 
for all time invariant unobserved individual characteristics that influence investment decision. 
This will include, for example, entrepreneurial abilities or capacities.  The null hypothesis of 
no state dependence implies that 0=γ . The parameter γ  should be interpreted as the average 
effect over the time period considered.  
The model is dynamic in the sense that it allows the unobservable farmer’s probability 
to invest to be a function of previous farmer investment. Defining a state as a realization of a 
stochastic process, we may think of state dependence in term of the actual investment pattern 
being dependent on the state of investment decision that was revealed for the previous 
investment of the same farmer.  
However, equation (5.1) has two methodical problems related with its estimation: 
initial conditions and an endogeneity problem.  
The initial condition problem arises in our estimation because iα  is an individual-
specific term, which appears in every equation for the same individual over time. In 
particular, it will appear in the equation for ity  and also in the equation for 1−ity . Therefore in 
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the equation for ity  the regressor 1−ity  is necessary correlated with the error component iα . 
This will cause endogeneity problems of 1−ity and, if unaddressed, will tend to produce a bias 
in the coefficient estimate of 1−ity , which provides an estimate of state dependence. This is 
called “the initial condition problem”. Intuitively, the problem is that the model describes a 
dynamic process, and we need to allow for it to start. The probability to invest in the current 
year depend on whether the farmer invested in the year before and the probability to invest in 
the year before depends on whether the farmer invested two years before, and so on. However 
information on whether the farmer invests in the first year is most of the time missing.  
Fortunately, Wooldridge (2005) proposed a simple strategy to address this problem in 
dynamic nonlinear panel data models with unobserved heterogeneity. This paper suggests to 
model the distribution of the unobserved effect conditional on the initial value and any 
exogenous explanatory variables. On using this suggestion to estimate probit, ordered probit, 
tobit and poisson regressions, an auxiliary distribution can be chosen that leads to 
straightforward estimation, namely the introduction of the same time-invariant initial 
observation as a regressor in the equation for ity . With this simple shortcut, partial effect on 
mean responses, averaged across the distribution of observables, are identified. Thus, equation 
(5.1) can be re-written as: 
itiiititit yyxy εαϕγβ ++++′= − 01          (5.2) 
With  
1=ity  if 0
* >ity  
0=ity  if 0
*
=ity  
Where 0iy is the time-invariant initial condition of investment decision and ϕ  is the 
regressor to be estimated. The term ϕ  will also indicate the correlation between the initial and 
current investment decision.  
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In determining the effect of a credit constraint on probability to invest, another major 
problem is the possible endogeneity of a credit constraint in the sense that credit constraint 
status is correlated with unobservable heterogeneity. For instance, farmers with poor 
entrepreneurial ability (unobservable heterogeneity) are both less likely to invest in fixed 
capital and more likely to be limited in their access to credit.  
To get around this problem, an endogenous switching binary variable for a dynamic 
investment decision model in panel data can be written as a system of equations for the 
substantive equation (investment equation) and the endogenous equation (credit constraint). 
By treating the responses as repeated measurements nested within individuals, the 
endogenous switching  model fits neatly into a multilevel framework (Skrondal and Rabe-
Hesketh, 2004). We keep the same specification of probability to invest ( ity ) for farmer i  
(i=1,…, N) at time t (t=1,…,T). The binary variable *2itCC  simply indicates presence or 
absence of a credit constraint. The joint model is thus defined by the following equations: 
itiititit CCyyxy 101
*
1 εφϕγβ ++++′= −         (5.3) 
 
With  
1=ity  if 0
* >ity  
0=ity  if 0
*
=ity  
And 
ititit zCC 2
*
2 εγ +′=            (5.4) 
 
With  
12 =itCC  if 0
*
2 >itCC  
02 =itCC  if 0
*
2 =itCC  
Where itx  and itz  represent the vectors of explanatory variables affecting the decision 
to invest and credit constraint status, respectively. The coefficients γ  and β  are the 
parameters to be estimated.  
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To take into account the panel data structure and impose dependence between both 
residuals, the residuals in equations (5.3) and (5.4) are decomposed as ititiit 111 µλδαε ++=  
and ititiit 222 µδαε ++= .  These three terms capture unobservable heterogeneity: i1α  and i2α  
are the random intercepts for each individual normally distributed with zero mean and 
variance 21ασ  and 
2
2ασ , respectively, and covariance 
2
2;1 αασ  ; itδ  is a shared random effect to 
induce dependence between substantive and endogenous equation by the factor λ , normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance 2
itδσ ; it1µ  and it2µ  represent the random error 
specific for output production and credit constraint status, respectively, and are assumed to be 
normally distributed and independent of itx  and itz  with zero mean and variance 
2
1itµσ and 
2
2 itµσ , respectively. Therefore, 
2222
1 11
)(
ititiit
Var µδα σσλσε ++= , 2222 22)( ititiitVar µδα σσσε ++= and 
2
;
2
21 21
),(
iiititit
Cov ααδ σλσεε += . Then equations (5.3) and (5.4) are now; 
ititiiititit CCyyxy 1101
*
1 µλδαφϕγβ ++++++′= −       (5.5) 
With  
1=ity  if 0
* >ity  
0=ity  if 0
*
=ity  
And 
ititiitit zCC 22
*
2 µδαγ +++′=          (5.6)26 
 
With  
12 =itCC  if 0
*
2 >itCC  
02 =itCC  if 0
*
2 =itCC  
 
                                               
26
 See Appendix 6 for details about identification problem. 
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5.4  The survey 
The data we use derives from a survey of a random sample of farms in central Chile, 
recorded by the Natural Resources Information Center (CIREN). We only consider market-
oriented farmers, that is, farmers who manage a minimum of 10 productive hectares and sell 
their crops to a third party (market). We exclude subsistence, non-cultivated, and recreational 
farms, because formal financial institutions do not target these farmers, and because market-
oriented farmers are the main players in the Chilean agricultural sector. We choose 10 
hectares as the minimum productive area because it represents the minimum size required to 
support a family in Chile.  
The survey was carried out in 2006 and 2008 and contains data on the 2005–2006 and 
2007–2008 seasons, respectively. In the first wave of the survey, data consisted of a random 
sample of 200 farms located in six counties in the central region of Chile. During the second 
wave, we collected information from 205 farmers, 177 of which were in the first wave. The 
survey instrument was repeated with slight differences 27 . Table 5.1 provides descriptive 
characteristics of the farms taken in the sample. 
                                               
27
 See Chapter 1 to see details on data (section 1.4) and Appendix 1 to see questions applied in the survey. 
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Table 5.1:Sample statistics of surveyed farms (n=354, pooled sample) 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
HECTARES Farm size (hectares) 76.80 111.22 
ASSETS NO HA Total assets (machinery and 
facilities) net from hectares 
(millions of Chilean$) 
243.58 554.28 
INV Binary dummy with a 1 if the 
farmer decided to invest in the 
current season  
0.53 0.50 
LAGGED INV Binary dummy with a 1 if the 
farmer decided to invest in the 
past season 
0.69 0.46 
INI INV Binary dummy with a 1 if the 
farmer decided to invest in the  
season 2003-2004 
0.72 0.45 
CREDIT CONSTRAINT Binary dummy with a 1 if 
farmer is either quantity, risk or 
transaction-cost constraint 
0.15 0.35 
INSURANCE Binary dummy with a 1 if the 
firm use insurance instruments, 0 
otherwise 
0.03 0.18 
CLUSTER Number of  relationships that a 
firm has with export and/or input 
supplier firms.  
1.42 0.81 
YEAR ADM Years farming (years) 22.90 12.34 
NO PROGRAM 1 if the firm do not have neither 
employees-training program nor 
GAP certification, 0 otherwise 
0.23 0.42 
ALMOND 1 if the farm has Almond as a main 
production, 0 otherwise 
0.04 0.21 
AVOCADO 1 if the farm has Avocado as a 
main production, 0 otherwise 
0.07 0.26 
WINE GRAPE 1 if the farm has Wine Grape as a 
main production, 0 otherwise 
0.06 0.24 
Notes: 1,000 Chilean $= 1.58 US 
 
Table 5.2 shows the investment activity by farmers in different years. Investment 
refers to the gross investment made during the current and previous calendar year because 
investment occurs across a longer period than one year (e.g., plantation and irrigation 
systems). The 2006 survey shows investments from 2005 to 2006, while the survey made in 
2008 collected information on investments from 2007 to 2008. In addition, during the first 
round in 2006, farmers were required to recall investments made from 2003 to 2004. As 
illustrated in Table 5.2, investment decreased from a total of $39 million in 2003 and 2004 to 
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$15 million in 2007 and 2008. This can be explained by the uncertainty caused by the 
financial crisis in 2008. It is commonly known that in uncertain economic environments, 
entrepreneurs invest less (Demir, 2009). In addition, only 40% of our sample invested in 2007 
and 2008, in contrast to the 70% who decided to invest in 2003 and 2004. 
 
Table 5.2: Investment behavior by farmers, 2003-2008 
 2003-2004 2005-2006 2007-2008 
Investment (million Ch$) (1) 38.74 38.08 14.83 
Percentage of farmers investing 72 66 40 
Number of farmers 177 177 177 
(1)Investment in million Chilean pesos; 1,000 Chilean$= 1.58 US$ 
 
In the context of investment decision models, firms will be financially constrained if 
external sources of finance (for example, from new share issues or borrowing) are assumed to 
be more expensive than internal sources of finance (for, example, from retained earnings) 
Bond (2007). Under this context, the three categories of credit constraints (quantity, risk and 
transaction cost) introduced by Boucher (2009) may be relevant in determining the impact of 
credit constraint on investment decision28. In all three categories of credit constraints, farmers 
have a demand for credit but they are constrained in accessing credit by a limited capacity to 
provide collateral, high transaction costs of the credit contract, or a high level of risk 
associated with the credit contract. In other words, all three types of credit constraints can lead 
to an imperfect or even inexistent credit market and, thus, both sources of finance, internal 
and external, are not perfect substitute. 
Table 5.3 shows that on average 53% of farmers in our sample invested (pooled 
sample), with higher investment activities for borrowers (59%) and transaction-cost rationed 
farmers (67%). Quantity-rationed farmers are those who invested less with only 47% 
investing in fixed capital. On the other hand, unconstrained borrowers and nonborrowers 
seemed to be wealthier farmers with larger holdings than quantity- and risk-rationed farmers.   
                                               
28
 See Chapter 1 to see details on Boucher’s categories of credit constraints and questions applied in the survey 
(section 1.4.3) 
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From our results it seems that investment decision is driven by credit status, with the 
exception of transaction-cost rationed credit constraint. However, farm size and endowment 
seems to be correlated with credit status as well. This may cause endogeneity problems in 
trying to explain the investment decision process.  
We also observe in Table 5.3 that the number of farmers who were transaction-cost and 
risk-rationed was very low (6 and 10, respectively). We therefore merge the two categories in 
the remainder of this chapter. 
Table 5.3: Investments by farmers classified according to credit constraint status, pooled sample 
2006 and 2008 
Credit Constraint 
Status 
Investment per farm Land 
size 
Assets Total 
sample 
Unconstrained Volume 
(million 
Ch$) 
Proportion of farmers 
investing 
(%) 
(ha) Volume 
(million 
Ch$) 
Sample 
size 
Borrowers  36.6 59 82 1336 118 
Non-borrowers  21.2 49 82 1463 184 
Sub-total  27.2 53 82 1413 302 
Formal sector 
credit constrained 
     
Quantity rationed 12.7 47 41 836 36 
Transaction cost 
rationed 
55.1 67 83 863 6 
Risk rationed  34.7 50 47 840 10 
Sub-total  21.9 50 47 840 52 
Total 26.4 53 77 1329 354 
 
5.5  Are investments influenced by a credit constraint? 
 
We now present the estimation results for the dynamic investment decision model 
without considering endogeneity problems for credit constraint variable, presented in section 
5.3 in equation (5.2). As our model is dynamic, we include a two-period lagged investment 
decision as a variable to capture state dependence. We also include the initial investment 
decision as a regressor in order to avoid initial condition problems (Wooldridge, 2005).  
In addition, we include some control variables in the model, including variables that 
proxy for credit constraints, existing capital stock, for observable farm(er)-specific effects and 
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for a time trend. The credit constraint variable indicate presence or absence of credit 
constraint, considering as credit constraint all three forms of formal credit rationing: quantity, 
risk and transaction cost (see note 5). The proxy for existing capital stock is the amount of 
assets, measured as the valued total of farm assets including land, machinery and facilities (in 
logs). All assets are priced using market prices. The effect of the amount of assets on the 
probability to invest depends on the size of the capital stock or farm size. A negative sign of 
the amount of assets implies that large farms have less probability to invest, meaning that the 
farm size decrease over time, whereas a positive sign implies an increasing farm size. 
The proxies for observable farm(er)-specific characteristics are years of farming 
experience (in logs), farmer participation in a training or certification program, and farm 
activity.  From prior observations the expectation was that the experience of the household 
head could have a positive impact on the probability to invest because skilled farmers tend to 
invest more (Petrick, 2004). Production characteristics of farm activity are captured by 
variables related to specialization in a particular fruit or horticulture product. The expectation 
is that specialization in a higher-value crop such as almonds or avocados tends to result in a 
higher probability to invest. Finally, we expect a negative sign for the time trend. This is 
because the 2008 global financial crisis affected investment decisions.  
Table 5.4 presents the results of the dynamic investment model if we deny endogeneity 
problems. We first estimate the model without considering the lagged investment and the 
initial condition variables (model 1). Then, in model 2 these variables are included. Finally, 
model 3 keeps all statistically significant variables at a level of 20%29, with two exceptions.  
The initial investment variable is maintained to avoid the initial condition problems explained 
in section 5.2, and the credit constraint dummy variable. We include this variable to be able to 
compare this result with the later analysis.  
                                               
29
 We chose 20% as a level of significance to avoid any omitted variable problems in non-lineal estimations. In 
this case omitted variables could cause biased estimators. 
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Table 5.4 shows that the total amount of assets and time trend are statistically significant 
in all models. This preliminary result means that having a larger number of assets has a 
positive effect on the probability to invest, suggesting that on average farm size in Chile is 
growing. However, we will return to this analysis in the next table where endogeneity 
problems are considered. In addition, the time trend indicates that there is a strong negative 
relation between the time trend and investment. The financial crisis that affected the world in 
2008 may be the explanation of this result. This crisis may have affected the investment 
decisions of farmers who decided to postpone investment in no urgent assets to later years 
when they hoped to find a less uncertain environment.  Finally, Table 5.4 shows that the 
credit constraint dummy variable is insignificant in all specifications, suggesting as primary 
result that rural financial market are efficient in Chile.  
Since the random intercept is shared between each observation for the same individual, 
intraclass correlation explains the proportion of the total variance that is explained by 
individuals. In our case the proportion of the total variance explained by individuals is very 
low in all models. This is because explaining variables, specially the time trend and the 
amount of assets, capture most of the variance explained by individuals.    
Although Table 5.4 shows that the level of state dependence is not significant, we can 
see differences in the unobservable heterogeneity between both models. In model 1, 7.5% of 
the unexplained variation is captured by the individual effect. In contrast, the unobservable 
heterogeneity practically disappears in model 2. This may be due to the fact that we have 
explicitly taken into account the presence of state dependence by means of the lagged 
investment variable.  
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Table 5.4: Parameter estimates from the dynamic investment decision model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
LAGGED INVESTMENT 
 0.261 0.268 
 
 [0.154] [0.140] 
INITIAL INVESTMENT 
 0.115 0.111 
 
 [0.542] [0.555] 
LN (YEAR FARM+1) 0.0909 0.0809  
 [0.411] [0.446]  
NO_PROGRAMME 0.0144 0.0394  
 [0.935] [0.815]  
AVOCADO 
-0.0846 -0.0689  
 [0.762] [0.797]  
ALMOND 
-0.458 -0.539 -0.520 
 [0.220] [0.134] [0.141] 
LN[ASSETS] 0.157** 0.139* 0.128* 
 [0.045] [0.060] [0.078] 
TIME TREND 
-0.749*** -0.711*** -0.705*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
CREDIT CONSTRAINT 
-0.0164 -0.0443 -0.0488 
 [0.939] [0.829] [0.809] 
Constant 
-0.102 -0.272 0.0420 
 [0.882] [0.681] [0.936] 
N 354 354 354 
Log likelihood 
-228.5 -226.2 -226.6 
Individual 177 177 177 
Wald Test 28.12*** 35.09*** 34.53*** 
Intraclass correlation 0.076 0.000 0.000 
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively; all models are estimated using probit models; Wald test for the significance of all 
regressors but the constant; Continuous variables such as assets and years farming are 
measured in logarithms to avoid possible heterogeneity problems. 
 
We now move to determine to what extent formal credit constraints affect the 
investment decision-making process for market-oriented farmers in central Chile taking into 
account endogeneity problems. Because there is likely a dependence between a credit 
constraint and investment, we need to prevent a possible endogenous credit constraint variable 
within the panel data structure. In addition, because investment is a dynamic decision process 
we need to take state dependence into account.  
As we saw in section 5.3, to estimate investment equation (5.5) and endogenous 
switching credit constraint equation (5.6), we use a multilevel approach (Rabe-Hesketh, 
Skrondal et al., 2005). We start using model 3 investment specification for investment 
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equation. For the credit constraint switching variable we include variables that do not appear 
in the investment equation and that correlate with credit constraint status. These variables are 
the number of clusters that the firm belongs to, whether or not the farmer uses insurance, 
farmer participation in a training and certification program, and variables related to farm 
activity such as avocado and wine-grapes. Although the endogenous switching model is 
formally identified through its functional form (Wilde, 2000), we keep some variables as 
exclusion restriction in the endogenous switching equation in order to maintain an economic 
identification (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006).  
Because a model with an exogenous switching variable is nested within the endogenous 
switching model, the test for the endogeneity of credit constraint (CC) in equation (5.5) can be 
performed on the basis of a simple likelihood ratio test for correlation between investment 
decision and credit constraint equation at the observation level ( 0=ρ ).  
The econometric model will enable to distinguish some alternative hypotheses regarding 
the effect of credit constraint categories on the probability to invest for market-oriented 
farmers in Chile. In particular, we will be able to distinguish four different situations:  
1) The correlation coefficient ρ  is not statistically different from zero, and the 
coefficient on credit constraint status in the probability to invest equation is 
statistically significant. In this case the credit constraint status is exogenous with 
respect to probability to invest and its effect is causal.  
2) The correlation coefficient ρ  is statistically significant while the coefficient for 
credit constraints in the probability to invest equation is not. In this case the credit 
constraint status is endogenous with respect to probability to invest, and the 
correlation between CC and probability to invest is driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
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3) Both the correlation coefficient ρ  and the coefficient on CC in the probability to 
invest equation are significant. In this case, although CC is endogenous with 
probability to invest, it also has a causal impact on probability to invest.  
4) The correlation coefficient and the coefficient on CC in the probability to invest 
equation are both insignificant. In this case our analysis will not support any of the 
hypotheses outlined in the literature review. 
 We estimate two models: The panel data investment model considers a dummy 
endogenous variable for credit constraint, with (model 4) and without (model 5) considering 
the state dependence (Table 5.5). The parameter estimates show two outstanding results in 
both models: a significant positive correlation between unobservable heterogeneity in the 
investment and credit constraint equations, and a significant negative effect of credit 
constraints on investment decisions.  
First, the likelihood ratio test (LR Test) which compares the exogenous against the 
endogenous model is statistically different from zero at the 5% level in both models. This 
evidence is in favor of endogenous credit constraint. Even if the LR test for endogenous bias 
has low power, endogeneity of credit constraint is confirmed as we see differences in the 
parameter estimates from model 3 (Table 5.4) and model 5 (Table 5.5).  The endogenous 
adjustment does cause a significant change in two of the output estimators: assets and credit 
constraint. Thus, neglecting the potential endogeneity of credit constraint variable on 
estimating farmer’s probability to invest may result in a serious bias. In this case the bias 
changes the coefficient from insignificant to negatively significant30. 
Second, the estimation results provide evidence that credit constraints have a causal 
impact on investment, and that a credit constraint condition is endogenous with respect to 
                                               
30
 Note that the correlation between the error in the probability to invest equation and credit constraint equation 
is positive and statically significant at 1%. Hence, unobservable heterogeneity in investment equation is positive 
correlated with the one in credit constraint. In this context, the positive ρ  can be associated to the exclusion of 
the other relevant variables. This can be explained by, for instance, farmers with highly- return risky project. 
These farmers are more likely to be credit constraint and more willing to invest. 
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investment. In other words, when credit constraint treatment is randomly distributed among 
market-oriented farmers, the effect of credit constraints on investment decision is significantly 
negative.  
As we can see from model 4 in Table 5.5, the coefficient of lagged investment fails to 
be statistically significant, suggesting no state dependence in the probability to invest 
equation. This result is confirmed by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Akaike’s 
Information Criterion (AIC), which favors model 5.   
Again the unobservable heterogeneity from individuals is very low. Only 7.1% (model 
4) and 14.5% (model 5) of the unexplained variation is captured by the individual effect. The 
difference between the unobservable heterogeneity from individuals in models 4 and 5 may be 
due to the fact that we have explicitly taken into account the presence of state dependence by 
means of the lagged investment in model 4.  
Another variable that remains significant is the time trend. This variable is believed to 
measure the effect of the financial crisis on investment. On the other hand, the significance of 
the variable on the total amount of assets changed compared with the previous analysis. 
Taking endogeneity into account, the coefficient for total assets is not statistically significant.  
Other than in the previous section, the variable assets (in logs) is not statistically 
significant. Its coefficient goes from positive and significant in the probit model to 
insignificant in the endogenous switching model. This result indicates that unobservable 
factors that influence both credit constraint status and probability to invest also affect assets. 
Removing this effect by considering endogeneity problems of the credit constraint variable 
shows that the value of assets does not affect the probability to invest. Thus, it is incorrect to 
state that large farmers invest more. 
The coefficients for the variables included in the credit constraint model for models 4 
and 5 show that they are strong predictors of credit-constrained farmers (Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.5: Parameter estimates from the dynamic investment decision model with an 
endogenous switching binary variable 
Investment equation Model 4 Model 5 
LAGGED INVESTMENT 0.250  
 [0.196]  
INITIAL INVESTMENT 0.140  
 [0.464]  
ALMOND -0.246 -0.193 
 [0.482] [0.604] 
LN[ASSETS] 0.046 0.069 
 [0.531] [0.399] 
TIME TREND -0.685*** -0.698*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
CREDIT CONSTRAINT 
-1.051*** -0.912** 
 [0.000] [0.042] 
Constant 0.670 0.798 
 [0.213] [0.164] 
ENDOGENOUS CREDIT CONSTRAINT MODEL 
LAGGED INVESTMENT 0.329  
 [0.243]  
INITIAL INVESTMENT -0.241  
 [0.396]  
ALMOND 0.850* 0,828* 
 [0.061] [0,061] 
LN[ASSETS] -0.436*** -0,429*** 
 [0.000] [0,000] 
TIME TREND -0.116 -0,130 
 [0.453] [0,409] 
CLUSTER 0.049 0,060 
 [0.664] [0,595] 
INSURANCE 2.009*** 1,988*** 
 [0.000] [0,000] 
NO_PROGRAMME 0.224 0,243 
 [0.172] [0,143] 
AVOCADO 0.835*** 0,783** 
 [0.007] [0,010] 
WINE GRAPE 0.953** 0,876** 
 [0.011] [0,018] 
Constant 1.463** 1,495** 
 [0.049] [0,045] 
Random Effect   
Observation level   
Var ( )itit 1µλδ +  6.098 1.680163 
 [0.645] [0.379] 
Var ( )itit 2µδ +  2 2 
   
ρ ( )ititiititi 2211 ; µδαµλδα ++++  0.647*** 0.450 
 [0.000] [0.232] 
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Individual  level   
2
1iα
σ  0.462 0.284 
 [0.712] [0.579] 
2
2 iα
σ  2.120* 2.128* 
 [0.090] [0.089] 
ii 21 αα
σ
 
0.990 0.748 
 [0.482] [0.198] 
CORR ( ii 21 αα ) 1.000 0.963 
 [0.000]*** [0.063]* 
Intraclass correlation 0.0705 0.1446 
Observations 354 354 
Individuals 177 177 
Log likelihood -339.632 -342.696 
LR Test 3.756* 4.586** 
Wald-test  198.45*** 189.85*** 
AIC 723.26 721.39 
BIC 823.63 803.51 
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance 
respectively; both models are estimated by maximum likelihood with 12 quadrature points, 
adding extra quadrature points did not produce important changes in coefficients and/or 
standards errors; 2
1iα
σ
 and 
2
1iα
σ refer to the unexplained variance at the individual level for the 
investment model and the endogenous variable equations respectively; Likelihood ratio test (LR 
test) compares the exogenous (H0) with the endogenous model (Ha) and Wald test for the 
significance of all regressors but the constant; BIC and AIC stand for Bayesian Information 
Criterion and Akaike’s Information Criterion, respectively; The continuous asset variable is 
measured in logarithms to avoid possible heterogeneity problems. 
 
Since model 5 is preferred over model 4, the analysis continues by retaining the model 
5 estimations reported in Table 5.5. Thus, Table 5.6 shows the odds ratios of model 5 on the 
probability to invest for the two variables we focus on: credit constraint and time trend. 
Comparing farmers with and without a constraint, with all other variables unchanged, the 
odds of investment are 2.5 times as high for farmers who do not face a credit constraint 
compared to farmers who do.  
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Table 5.6: Odds ratios for investment equation 
Variable Odds ratios Standard error 95% CI 
Restricted 2.49    1.12      1.03     5.99 
Time trend 2.01         0.26 1.55     2.60 
 
 
To better understand the effect of a credit constraint on investment, we need to explore 
the potential difference between constrained and unconstrained farmers for different levels of 
assets. To do so, we plot an unconstrained farmer's predicted probability to invest as a 
function of an extended range of values of total assets (in logs), and compare the results with 
constrained ones. The outcome can be seen in Figure 5.1. The range of total assets (in logs) 
actually observed in the data lies approximately between the two vertical lines. 
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Figure 5.1: Predicted probabilities by total asset 
 
As expected, the probability to invest increases with a farmer’s wealth. As was shown 
for the odds rations, the probability to invest for unconstrained farmers is about 2.5 times 
more than for constrained farmers in the same range of total assets.  
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Next, comparing farmers’ probability to invest in 2006 to 2008 shown in Table 5.6 
with all other variables remaining the same, the odds of investment are 2.0 times as high for 
farmers who invested in 2006 compared to farmers who did so in 2008. 
5.6  Discussion 
The present work estimates the impact of credit constraint on investment for market-
oriented farmers in central Chile. Specifically we estimate a dynamic investment model that 
takes into account endogenous problems arising from credit constraint variables. The results 
show that credit constraint is an endogenous variable in determining investment decision. 
This means that if we estimate investment without taking into account the endogenous 
determination of credit constraint, we would have biased estimators. Second, it can be 
assumed that there is not state dependence in the investment equation. 
In our study, investment is observed to depend on credit constraint status. It can be 
interpreted as evidence of imperfect capital markets because constrained farmers, most of 
them quantity rationed, cannot separate investment and financing decisions. Based on an 
endogenous switching modeling framework, unconstrained farmers invest more than 2.5 
times that of credit constrained farmers in Chile. Although not tested in this chapter, this 
situation can be explained because the only providers of long-term credit are commercial 
banks for whom lending in the long term is more risky. In addition, agricultural projects can 
be complex, making their assessment difficult. Variation in market price and weather 
conditions and foreign exchange fluctuations make farming projects often more uncertain than 
other projects. Under these circumstances. banks can be hesitant to extend credit to 
agricultural activities.  
This study also reveals the negative impact of time trend on investment decisions. In 
our sample, roughly 70% of the farmers invested in fixed capital before the 2007 financial 
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crisis. By contrast, 40% of them made investments during 2007-2008. We hypothesize that 
this may be an effect of the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007.  
A few policy recommendations can be derived from our findings. As providing credit 
for long-term investment is risky for banks under asymmetric information, more information 
is needed about the creditworthiness of farmers. Policies to improve information about the  
position of farmers in the credit market is therefore needed. For instance, for farmers it would 
be important to have well audited balance sheets and income statements to document their 
reputation as an entrepreneur. In this way farmers can assure banks of the quality of their 
farming projects as investments and obtain better lending conditions. In addition, other 
mechanisms to improve information in rural financial markets would be for banks to have risk 
evaluation departments specialized in agricultural projects. Bank officers well-trained in 
assessing agro-projects may help in discriminating between good and bad projects. Finally, 
other instruments need to be explored to avoid asymmetric information like co-signed long-
term credit by business cluster member; venture capital to provide financial capital to early-
stage, high potential projects; or insurance to control the risk derived from output and prices 
uncertainties.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1 Overview 
Rural financial markets have been extensively studied in the past. In most cases these 
markets are characterized by strong credit constraints, even for commercial, market-oriented 
farmers. Some characteristics of the agricultural sector that make it more likely to face credit 
constraints include remote location of farms where access to bank officers is difficult; long 
gestation lags between investment and harvest, implying that long periods need to be bridged 
with working capital; high asset specificity, for which funding is more expensive and 
difficult; and a large number of small-scale farms with relatively limited repayment capacity. 
In addition, in developing countries problems of credit access can be even worse because of 
formal financial institutions' lack of information to discriminate between bad and good 
borrowers.  
Some of these problems, however, can be overcome as in the case of Chile where 
particular characteristics confine problems of access to credit to a small number of farmers. 
Large average land size, long-standing bank-farm relationships, and widespread informal 
lending make Chile a country with specific lending conditions. However, rigorous empirical 
studies about credit constraints in Chile are very limited.   
  This study investigates the credit-rationing status of Chilean farmers and its effect on 
productivity and investment. In so doing, this research contributes to (1) new knowledge on 
the impact of credit constraints in the context of developing countries and (2) methodological 
approaches in estimating models in panel data context. Thus, a broad definition of being 
credit constrained is used that includes rationing mechanisms operating through risk and 
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transaction costs. In addition, multilevel analysis approach is used to deal with unobservable 
heterogeneity due to individual characteristics. 
In the reminder of this chapter four issues are presented. In section 6.2 the 
contributions and the main findings of this study are discussed. Next, given the use in all 
empirical chapters, a brief explanation of multilevel analysis is presented in section 6.3. In 
section 6.4 directions for further research are identified. Finally, in section 6.5 policy 
implications of this study are derived. 
6.2 Are market-oriented farmers credit constrained? 
This study makes a contribution to measuring credit constraints and empirically 
determining the effects of credit constraints on productivity and investment for market-
oriented farmers. More specifically, the first aim of this study is to identify the main factors 
that influence access to credit for market-oriented farmers, which are addressed in Chapter 2. 
The second aim is to determine whether informal financial institutions act as complements to 
or substitutes for farmers’ strategies for funding, and this is considered in Chapter 3. Chapter 
4 is concerned with the third aim, which is to determine the effect of credit constraints by 
formal financial institutions on farm productivity. Finally, Chapter 5 addresses the fourth aim, 
which is to identify the factors that limit farm investment. 
Using data from two surveys conducted in 2006 and 2008 with 177 farmers, Chapter 2 
applies three definitions of credit constraints used in literature. In line with Guirkinger (2008), 
Boucher et al. (2009) and Fletschner et al. (2010), we explicitly differentiate between credit 
constraints due to high transaction cost, risk aversion and quantity constraints. This implies 
that we measure in our sample not only those farmers limited in their access to bank credit, 
but also farmers who chose not to borrow as a result of high transaction costs or risk aversion. 
We find for central Chile that 16.4% and 13.6% of the sample felt credit constrained in 2006 
and 2008 respectively, with most farmers being quantity rationed (10.7% and 9.6%, 
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respectively) and a much lower share for farmers constrained by risk (2.8% and 3.4%, 
respectively) and transaction cost (2.8% and 0.6%, respectively). The most important variable 
explaining quantity rationing is found to be land size. The negative and significant impact of 
land size supports the fact that titled land can be used as collateral and is able to overcome 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. On the other hand, the insignificant effect of the 
length of the relationship between the bank and a farm may indicate that a long-term 
relationship not only improves information about the farm, but also that this information can 
be used by banks for calculating a credit ceiling. As both effects work in opposite directions, 
the combined effect is indeterminate. 
However, both relationship variables, namely the number of relationships that a farm 
has with export and/or input supplier firms, and the length of the farm-bank relationship, 
reduce the probability that a farmer would be risk and transaction-cost rationed. This may 
indicate that higher social capital reduces the transaction cost and risk associated with credit 
contracts. 
A comparable study, Boucher et al. (2009), finds evidence for the importance of credit 
constraints in Peru. Their study suggests that the fraction of households that are credit 
constrained is about 50%, higher than our result of 15%. One possible explanation of this 
difference is that unlike Peru, Chile has a financial sector that is highly competitive and 
deregulated, which may mitigate financial market imperfections. 
Although the results in Chapter 2 show some degree of market imperfection in Chile, 
the study is not conclusive here in that it cannot quantify the severity of credit rationing for 
rural financial markets in Chile. Chapters 4 and 5 try to address this question and extend the 
analysis given in Chapter 2 by testing two theories that would explain financial market 
imperfections.  
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In Chapter 3 we identify the relation between formal lenders (mainly banks) and 
informal lenders (such as export and input supplier firms) by determining whether formal and 
informal loans act as complements or substitutes in rural financial markets. If they are 
substitutes, the relationship between formal and informal financial institutions is horizontal 
(Floro and Ray, 1997), so the formal sector compete directly with informal providers of 
funds. Borrowers then should try to obtain loans first from the formal market, and then their 
excess demand spills over into the informal market. Accordingly, borrowers who are 
confronted with greater credit constraints from formal lenders should increase their borrowing 
from informal lenders.  
If informal and formal loans are complements, the informal and formal financial 
sectors exhibit a vertical relationship (Floro and Ray, 1997). For example, in agricultural 
markets a complementary relationship might emerge because informal credit is the only type 
available at the beginning of the crop cycle, whereas formal credit becomes available later 
(Gupta and Chaudhuri, 1997). Inputs needed at the beginning of the production process then 
get financed by informal credit, but later inputs can be financed by formal credit. Such a 
complementary relationship also implies a positive relationship between informal and formal 
credit, such that an increase in formal credit constraints decreases demand for informal credit.   
As a special feature, the study explores the determinants that influence access to 
informal credit using a panel probit model that controls for the endogeneity of credit 
constraints. When controlling for endogeneity, the analysis suggests that formal and informal 
credit are complementary due to their distinct uses: formal credit funds investments, whereas 
informal credit funds working capital. If farmers invest less because they are credit 
constrained by formal institutions, they need less working capital, so their demand for 
informal credit also declines. This results is in contrast to the study by Guirkinger (2008) 
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who, using a model that does not control for endogeneity, finds that formal and informal 
credit in Peru are substitutes for one another.    
In Chapter 4 we empirically test the impact of formal credit on farm productivity in 
central Chile by using the hypothesis of non-separability of consumption and production 
decisions. If credit availability affects production and, consequently, productivity, that would 
be evidence for supporting non-separability of consumption and production decisions and 
thus, financial market failures. Otherwise, the financial market for short-term credit would not 
limit production and would allow separation of consumption and production decisions. 
However, in testing the effect of credit on farm productivity, causality problems can emerge. 
This is because less productive farmers may be more likely to pursue a loan than highly 
productive farmers. If true, credit constrained farmers may be correlated with those who have 
lower productivity. These endogeneity problems are addressed by using a subsample of 
constrained farmers where the decision to provide a loan was externally chosen. A drawback 
of this sample selection procedure is the selectivity that might introduce biased estimates. We 
tested for this bias by using a sample selection model for panel data.  
Although comparable studies suggest that credit constraints have a negative impact on 
farm investments (Carter and Olinto, 2003; Petrick, 2004a), farm output (Feder, Lau et al., 
1990; Petrick, 2004b), farm profit (Carter, 1989; Foltz, 2004; Fletschner, Guirkinger et al., 
2010) and farm productivity (Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008), the most important result of this 
chapter is that the marginal effect of credit on farm productivity is nil across both credit-
constrained and unconstrained farmers. This result implies that although farmers may be 
credit constrained, this condition does not limit their productivity. A possible explanation for 
not finding significant effects for credit constrained firms in the formal sector is that informal 
credit institutions act as complement providers of short-term credit, as it is shown in Chapter 
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3. The active informal sector in Chile may thus relax credit constraints that prevail due to 
asymmetric information and to risk and transaction cost in short-term decision process. 
In Chapter 5 we search for the determinants of the probability to invest, focusing on 
the impact of credit constraints. In testing the effect of credit availability on investment, two 
considerations are important. First, we need to take into account the dynamic process of 
investment, because current investment is influenced by past investment decisions. It is likely 
that farmers who invested in the past also invest in the present for reasons other than farmer 
characteristics. For instance, investment decisions may be influenced by conditions such as an 
economic boom or a crisis. However, introducing a lagged investment variable may cause 
correlation with the error term in the panel data structure.  
Second, the effect of credit constraints on investment decision may suffer again from 
endogeneity problems. Farmers who are more likely to invest are also often the ones more 
likely to pursue a loan. Both problems are addressed in Chapter 5 by using initial conditions 
(Wooldridge, 2005) and endogenous switching modeling (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh, 2006). 
Although it would be convenient to estimate a continuous variable for investment, three 
rounds of farm-level survey data are needed to estimate Bond-Arellano estimators (Bond and 
Meghir, 1994). Thus, the two rounds of data collected allows just enough information to 
estimate a discrete-dependent variable. Then, the probability to invest was chosen as 
dependent variable.  
Results show that credit constraint status has a negative impact on investment 
decision, reducing the probability to invest for farmers in central Chile by a factor 2.5. This 
outcome reveals long-term financial market imperfections, most probably because the only 
providers of long-term credit are commercial banks for whom long-term lending is considered 
risky. To evaluate risk in farming projects, the bank officer's experience in assessing farming 
projects is very important. Agricultural projects have complexities that make assessing 
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difficult. Variable market prices and weather conditions as well as exchange rate fluctuations 
make farming projects more uncertain than most other activities. If a bank does not have well-
versed officers capable of assessing the risk of the farming project, it will be less willing to 
extend a loan to an agricultural project compared to other, better-known projects.    
The other variable that limits the investment decision is the time trend.  This result 
shows that farmers' probability to invest decreased from 2006 to 2008, revealing the negative 
effect of the 2007’s global financial crises on investment.  
The results in Chapters 4 and 5 are supported by those in Chapter 3. One of the 
explanations for formal credit not having an effect on productivity is that formal and informal 
sources of credit have either a substitutive or complementary relationship. If formal and 
informal lenders have a substitutive relationship to one another, then credit-constrained 
farmers in the formal sector could switch from formal to informal loans, either in the short- or 
long-term, without having an impact on both long-term investment and short-term 
productivity. Alternatively, if this relation is complementary, farmers would use informal 
loans for working capital and formal loans for long-term investment, not having an impact on 
productivity where both sources of credit can be used, and having an impact on investment 
only where formal credit is available. This is the case for the results in Chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively. Similarly, a significant and negative effect of formal credit constraints on the use 
of informal credit is found in Chapter 3. This provides evidence that a credit constraint has a 
causal impact on the use of informal credit, and indicates that formal and informal loans are 
complements.  
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6.3 Using multilevel analysis 
Multilevel analysis applies to situations where unit observations fall into groups or 
clusters. For instance, observations could be nested in firms, families, hospitals, or schools. 
Panel data also consist of clusters of observations made at different occasions for the same 
individual.  
In many economic studies one cannot hope to explain all variability between clusters 
(between individuals for instance) using observable variables. There are some variables like 
entrepreneurial ability, risk aversion, or motivations, that are difficult to measure. Therefore, 
there is unobservable heterogeneity (or unexplained variability) between clusters. This means 
that two observations in the same cluster are correlated and more similar than are observations 
in a different cluster. By using multilevel analysis it is possible to deal with unobservable 
heterogeneity for different types of responses, including continuous, count, dichotomous, 
ordered, and multinomial (unordered) responses (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).    
Stressing multilevel analysis tools, Chapter 2 uses an approach where a multinomial 
model with random effects is estimated using multilevel techniques. In other studies, a simple 
multinomial model is used. The most important characteristic of multilevel analysis approach 
in estimating multinomial logit model in panel data context is that multilevel analyses allows 
to fit de model with random effects and correlated intercept for each category (alternative-
specific intercepts). It accounts for the fact that each individual is classified in one of the 
categories which cannot be assumed to be independent. Probability of each category for 
repeated observations on the same individual share the same unobservable random effects and 
are assumed to be correlated. Allowing correlation between alternatives, the estimations do 
not suffer from Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2003). 
Specifically in Chapter 2 a multinomial logit model with random effect is applied to quantify 
determinants and probabilities for farmers to be in one of the four distinct credit access and 
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constraint categories: borrowers, non-borrowers, quantity rationed, and risk and transaction-
cost rationed farmers. 
In addition, multilevel analysis also allows for modeling situations where endogeneity 
and sample selection problems are present. In general, sample selection bias refers to 
problems where the dependent variable is observed for a restricted, non-random sample. 
Endogeneity problems refer to the fact that an independent variable included in the model is 
potentially a choice variable, correlated with unobservable variables relegated to the error 
term. The dependent variable, however, is observed for all observations in the data.  In either 
case, problems arise because standard regression techniques result in biased and inconsistent 
estimators if unobservable variables affecting the dependent variable are correlated with 
unobservable factors affecting the endogenous or selection variable. 
For strictly continuous outcome variables, simple two-stage regression strategies have 
been developed to address these problems (Heckman, 1979). For binary responses, 
straightforward programs have recently been developed (Miranda, 2006). However, for the 
case of continuous and discrete responses, accounting for sample selection and endogenous 
problems in panel data contexts has rarely been developed. Although non-parametric two-
stage procedures analogous to the Heckman (1979) methods are implemented in some studies 
(Wooldridge, 1995; Kyriazidou, 1997), they are only approximate procedures, and no 
appropriated distribution results for the estimators are available. Chapters 3 and 5 apply a 
novel methodology for modeling discrete response accounting for endogeneity in a panel data 
context, using an endogenous switching framework (Miranda, 2006) adjusted for panel data 
structure (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal et al., 2002). Chapter 4 uses a similar model but for sample 
selection problems.  
Although the natural methods for this analysis would have been randomized 
experiments, multilevel analysis is used because of the observational nature of the data 
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available. In contrast to randomized studies, a major problem in estimating a dichotomous 
variable effect from observational studies is that the dichotomous variable is often an 
endogenous variable in the sense that this variable is correlated with unobserved 
heterogeneity. However, an endogenous switching framework tackles this problem, allowing 
randomization of the units to the dichotomous variable, and making the dichotomous variable 
exogenous because the dichotomous variable would become independent of the unobservable 
heterogeneity. Thus valid inferences regarding the regressors can be obtained from the main 
response. 
6.4 Suggestions for further research 
As was mentioned before, the literature about access to credit and credit constraints is 
vast. However, there is still room for empirical research on new topics such as (1) other 
variables that may influence a credit constraint, (2) database requirements to measure 
productivity and investment in the agricultural sector, (3) measurement errors involved in 
using survey data to measure and make inferences about borrowing, and (4) identification 
problems in estimating credit constraint effects.  
First, the results in Chapter 2 highlight the effect of social capital variables on the 
probability for farmers to be classified as risk and transaction-cost rationed as well as on 
entitled land as a determinant of quantity-constrained farmers. However, the links among 
access to credit, bank performance, and the sustainability of bank lending are not studied. For 
example, it may be the case that banks were lending to successful farmers only, hence loans 
were fully serviced or repaid, and banks could expand lending. As a result of the lending 
expansion of the bank sector, less successful farmers are granted a loan, fewer farms are credit 
constrained now, and the sector performed well. The link between access to credit and bank 
performance can be studied in a dynamic model which incorporates bank performance 
variables. 
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In addition, further research needs to be done on the reasons why farmers do not 
invest. Although Chapter 4 highlights the impact of the global financial crisis, before the 
crisis just 40% of farmers claimed to invest in fixed capital. This level is considered to be 
low. Further research needs to be done to explain this low level as well as the high level of 
farmers who decide not to borrow.  
Second, although a two-round survey to estimate the probability to invest was used in 
this study, at least a three-round dataset is needed to estimate the variables explaining the 
amount to invest, which include variables that determine the farmer’s profile for investing. 
With a three-round dataset it would be possible to estimate, for example, Arellano-Bond 
estimators in a dynamic context for continuous investment dependent variable. As explained 
in section 1.3, limited data available in the agricultural sector in Chile currently limits further 
research. Field surveys with a larger number of respondents are needed to address issues such 
as modeling dynamic investment and productivity.  
Third, there is a growing body of literature about measurement issues involved in 
using survey data to measure and make inferences about borrowing. A drawback of directly 
asking responders about their borrowing experience is that such an approach relies only on an 
individual’s subjective assessment of his or her situation. It is admittedly better than relying 
on an arbitrarily chosen variable that may not distinguish between credit-constrained and 
unconstrained farmers. However, more research is needed to eliminate probable measurement 
errors in these surveys. 
Finally, because studies that consider credit constraints involve endogeneity problems, 
other techniques may be tested to improve accuracy in modeling. Experimental economics is 
a flourishing field, but the work done in rural financial markets in developing countries is 
rather limited compared to work in other countries and disciplines. For instance, as a 
randomized experiment is difficult to set up, other econometrics techniques can also be 
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applied in observational data. A very interesting application of modeling with endogeneity 
problems is given in Gine (2010) and Miranda (2010) who consider a simultaneous equation 
in panel data structure. Employing multiple strategies may help to check the robustness of 
such methods used.  
6.5  Policy implications 
When attempting to generalize the results of this study, it is important to consider the 
particular conditions of the Chilean case. Although Chile can be considered a good case study 
because of its solid and longstanding open trade policy, the labor intensity and land 
concentration characteristics of non-traditional crops are particularities not common to all 
developing countries. In different environments and regions, different results for agricultural 
development may therefore emerge (Valdes and Jara, 2008). 
However, three policy implications can be derived from this study: First, this study 
shows that although to some extent a credit constraint was found, it is not generally prevalent 
in the Chilean rural financial market. This has probably to do with the result of the economic 
liberalization in both financial and trade markets which took place in the 1970s. However, the 
Chilean context suggests that to get the benefit of liberation policies, it is important to develop 
some degree of coordination in the market by, for example, clusters. Long-term relationships 
between banks and farmers and the formation of clusters ensure more and better information 
between banks and farmers, and consequently more trust. In the case of Chile, cluster 
formations and long-term relationships were organized by private parties who saw an 
economic interest in cluster formations. Policies may help in cluster formation by facilitating 
the interaction between a cluster coordinator and farms. For instance, state development 
agencies may put effort into creating programs that facilitate business connections between 
small-scale farmers and agro-processing/export firms. 
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Second, results in Chapter 5 find imperfections in long-term credit markets as 
illustrated by the significant and negative impact of long-term credit on investments. This 
imperfection is caused by the higher requirements banks require for evaluating long-term 
credit because these loans are more risky. Banks assess these kinds of loans more carefully 
and reject more clients. In addition, no alternative lenders provide long-term credit, making 
the situation worse.  
Policies may aim to improve information about farmers in the credit market. For 
instance, for farmers it would be important to have well-audited balance sheets, income 
statements and accounting systems to ensure their reliability as an entrepreneur. This may also 
enhance the quality of their investment projects submitted for funding to the banks and enable 
them to obtain better conditions in their loan contracts. An illustrative policy proposal could 
be to provide accounting management service to farmers adopting accounting management 
practices. Other mechanisms to improve information in rural financial markets would be for 
banks to have risk evaluation departments specialized in agricultural projects. Bank officers 
well-trained in assessing agro-projects may help in discriminating between good and bad 
projects.  
Finally, an important other finding in this study is that formal and informal lenders 
complement each other in providing credit to farmers. This finding suggests that instead of 
policies that try to abolish informal lenders by encouraging formal lenders, policies may be 
more productive if they explore how informal lenders can be stimulated to provide other 
services such as long-term credit.   
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Appendix 1 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Name of firm  
Code  
Name of manager  
Address  
Phone  
County  
Fax  
Email  
 
 
SECTION 1:  GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Name of the manager (who makes decisions in the firm) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
VARIABLE   POSSIBLE   NAME OF   ANSWER 
    ANSWERS  VARIABLE 
Manager 
• Highest completed education level  
    1 Primary School  EDU  _____________ 
    2 Secondary School 
    3 Technical degree 
    4 Professional degree 
    5 Graduate degree 
 
• Specialization   1 Fruit plantations  ESP  _____________ 
    2 Crops 
    3 Livestock 
    4 Annual crops 
    5 Management 
    6 Engineering 
    7 Other 
 
• Age    Number (10-100) AGE   _____________ 
     
 
• Years managing  Number of years YEAR_ADM  _____________ 
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Firm 
• Year the firm started 
        YEAR_CO  _____________ 
 
 
• Main activity of the farm (considering total income):    
1 Fruits  ACT   ____________ 
2 Annual crops 
3 Livestock 
4 Food processing  
5 Commercial activity 
6 Tourism 
7 Construction 
    8 Other 
 
• Is this farm the main activity of the owners? 
    1 Yes   ACT_PRIN  ____________ 
   2 No   
      
If the answer is no, which of the following is the main activity?  (mining, tourism, 
services, construction)        
  
____________ 
  
 
 
• Stage of the firm’s life-cycle:  
    01 Star-up stage CYCLE  ____________ 
    02 Expansion stage 
    03 Mature stage 
    04 Exit stage 
 
• Does the firm have certification for good agricultural practice? 
    1 No   CERT_01   _______ 
    2 Yes,  
 
• Which one? 
1 EUREP GAP CERT_02   _______ 
2 USA GAP 
3 CHILE GAP 
4 HACCP 
5 BPM 
6 Others? 
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SECTION 2: CREDIT  
CR 1 What type of financial services does the firm use?: 
1. Credit      CR1   _______ 
2. Insurance 
3. Option or future contracts 
4. Trade credit 
5. Factoring 
6. Leasing 
7. Owned capital 
 
CR 2 If pertinent, what type of insurance does the firm use? 
1. Fire insurance 
2. Life insurance 
3. Crop insurance 
4. Other_________     CR2   _______ 
 
CR 3 What is the shortest distance from the firm to a bank office? 
        CR 3   _______ 
 
CR 4 Does the firm work with commercial banks? 
1 No, please skip to question CR 6   CR4   _______ 
2 Yes 
 
CR 5 For how many years has the firm worked with the bank?   
CR 5   _______
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CR6 Did the firm receive any loans from export or input supplying firms within the past 3 years? 
 
    1 No,     CR6   _______ 
2 Yes, please fill out the next table 
 
Name of the 
lender 
What was the 
value of the 
loan? 
Did the firm want a larger 
loan at this same 
interest rate? 
What was the 
interest rate? 
How much 
did the firm 
pay in each 
monthly 
installment? 
When did the 
firm receive 
this loan? 
When will 
the firm 
finish 
paying it 
off? 
What was the 
loan used for? 
How many 
years do has the 
firm worked 
with this 
institution?  
         
         
 
CR7 Did you receive any loans from commercial banks within the past 3 years? 
    1 No, please skip to question CR9    CR7   _______ 
2 Yes, please fill out the next table 
 
 
 
Name of the 
lender 
What was the 
value of the 
loan? 
Did the firm 
want a larger 
loan at this same 
interest rate? 
What was the 
interest rate? 
How much 
did the firm 
pay in each 
monthly 
installment? 
When did the 
firm receive 
this loan? 
When will 
the firm 
finish 
paying it 
off? 
What was the 
loan used for? 
How many 
years has the 
firm worked 
with this 
institution?  
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CR 8 Would the firm wish to receive a loan from another institution besides the one from 
which it has already received a loan? 
 1 No        CR8   _______ 
2 Yes, please fill out the table  
 
Name of the lender How much would the firm have 
liked to receive? 
  
  
  
 
(Skip to the next section) 
 
CR 9 Did the firm apply for a loan within the past three years? 
 1 No, please skip to question CR 10  
CR9   _______ 
2 Yes, please fill out the next table and skip to section 2 
 
Name of the lender Year Why did the credit institution reject 
the application? 
   
 
 
 
 
CR10 If the firm had applied, would a formal credit institution have accepted the application? 
1 No, skip to question  CR 13    CR10  _______ 
2 Yes, 
 
CR 11 Why did the firm not apply for a loan? 
 
1 The loan was not needed. 
2 The interest rate was too high. 
3 Farming does not give the firm enough profit to repay the 
debt. 
4 The firm did not want to risk its land holdings. 
5 Worry and/or fear. 
6 Formal lenders are too strict; they are not as flexible as 
informal ones. 
7 Formal lenders do not offer refinancing. 
8 The bank branch was too far away. 
9 Banks require too much paper work associated with the 
application. 
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CR 12 What aspect would you improve from formal credit contracts to which the firm is able 
to apply? 
1. Collateral requirements  CR12   _______ 
2. Long-term credit  
3. Annual payment  
4. Paperwork  
5. Other_____________________ 
 
(skip to the next section) 
 
CR 13 If the firm had applied, why wouldn’t a formal credit institution have accepted the 
application? 
1. Lack of collateral    CR13   _______ 
2. Lack of revenues 
3. Lack of accountability 
4. The firm is small 
5. The agricultural activity is risky 
6. Other_________________________________ 
 
CR 14 If the firm had been certain that a commercial bank would approve its application, 
would it have applied? 
1 No,     CR14   _______ 
2 Yes, skip to the next section 
 
CR 15 Why did the firm not apply for a loan if a commercial bank likely would have 
approved the application? 
       CR15  
 _______ 
1 The loan was not needed. 
2 The interest rate was too high. 
3 Farming does not give the firm enough profit to repay the 
debt. 
4 The firm did not want to risk its land holdings. 
5 Worry and/or fear.  
6 Formal lenders are too strict; they are not as flexible as 
informal ones. 
7 Formal lenders do not offer refinancing. 
8 The bank branch was too far away. 
9 Banks require too much paper work associated with the 
application. 
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CR 16 What aspect would you improve from formal credit contracts to which the firm is able 
to apply? 
6. Collateral requirements   CR16   _______ 
7. Long-term credit   
8. Annual payment  
9. Paperwork  
10. Other_____________________ 
 
(skip to the next section) 
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SECTION 3: LAND USE  
 
FRUIT PLANTATION VARIATY 
YEAR OF 
PLANTING 
SEASON 2005-2006 
 
SUP 
(HAS) YIELD UNIT 
PRICE Was changed 
from last year 
(Yes/no) 
   
     
   
     
   
     
        
   
     
 SUB-TOTAL (A)      
 
ANNUAL CROPS VARIATY SEASON 2005-2006 
  SUP (HAS) YIELD UNIT 
PRICE Was changed from 
last year (Yes/no) 
       
       
SUB – TOTAL       
  (B)      
        
  (C)      
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SECTION 4: INFRAESTRUCTURE 
Please specify assets belonging to the farm such as a residential house, stables, barns, 
greenhouses, cooling houses, and so on.  
 
Buildings     
Type Size (m2) Year of 
construction 
Good or 
bad 
condition 
Is this building a 
change from the 
previous year? 
(Yes/no) 
     
     
 
 
 Please specify farm machinery, equipment, and vehicles such as tractor, truck, etc.   
Machinery, equipment and 
vehicles 
    
Type Brand Year of 
manufacturing 
Condit
ion 
(G/B) 
Was changed 
from last year 
(Yes/no) 
     
     
 
• Do you consider the use of machinery in the farm to be 
1 Underused     MAQ_NI  _______ 
2 Sufficiently used 
3 Overused  
• Apart from the owned machinery, does the firm rent machinery?  
1 Never     MAQ_CON  _______ 
2 A few times a year 
3 Monthly 
   4 Weekly 
 
 
 156 
 
SECTION 5: COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 
What is the quality of the service of the following communication systems in the firm? 
 
• Radio system      COM_RA  _______ 
     1 No problems 
2 Some problems 
   3 Not available 
• PHONE       COM_TEL  _______ 
     1 No problems 
2 Some problems 
    3 Not available 
• FAX       COM_FAX  _______ 
     1 No problems 
2 Some problems 
    3 Not available  
• INTERNET      COM_INT  _______ 
     1 No problems 
2 Some problems 
    3 Not available 
 
 
SECTION 6:  ACCOUNTING AND TAX PAYMENT SYSTEM 
• The tax payment system is calculated by      
    1 Simplified balance sheet  TRI_EMP   _______ 
2 Effective balance sheet 
    
• How often does the firm use the Sence training program  (the government agency for 
training)? 
1 Never     TRI_SEN  _______ 
2 A few times a year 
3 Monthly 
   4 Weekly 
 
• How would you categorize the quality of the firm's accounting system? 
1 Excellent     TRI_CON  _______ 
2 Good 
3 Regular 
   4 Bad 
 
• What accounting software does the firm use? 
1 MS Excel    TRI_UTILIZA  _______ 
2 Softland 
3 Don Juan 
   4 Other_______________ 
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SECTION 7: LABOR FORCE 
 
Hired Labor  
Position          Number        Observations 
   
   
 
Temporal labor 
Position          Number        Months  
   
   
 
 
SECTION 8:  SALES CHANNELS 
Which export firm does your firm work with and what percentage of the firm's total income 
does that work represent? 
 
• First export company      EXP_FS  _______ 
        EXP_FS_PERC _______ 
 
• Second        EXP_SC  _______ 
     EXP_SC_PERC _______ 
 
• Third        EXP_TR  _______ 
     EXP_TR_PERC _______ 
 
 
1 DOLE CHILE S.A.  
21 COMPANIA FRUTERA DEL 
NORTE S.A 
2 UNIFRUTTI TRADERS LTDA.  22 GREENWICH S.A. 
3 DEL MONTE FRESH 
PRODUCE(CHILE) S.A  
23 GESTION DE EXP.FRUTICOLA 
S.A. 
4 DAVID DEL CURTO S.A. 24 C Y D INTERNACIONAL S.A. 
5 RIO BLANCO LTDA. 25 HORTIFRUT S.A. 
6 CHIQUITA ENZA CHILE LTDA.  26 TRINIDAD EXPORTS S.A. 
7 COPEFRUT S.A.  27 AGRO FRIO S.A. 
8 RUCARAY S.A 28 VICONTO S.A.. 
9 COM.AGRICOM LTDA. 29 VITAL BERRY MARKETING 
10 FRUTERA SAN FERNANDO S.A.  30 SERGIO RUIZ TAGLE HUMERES 
11 VERFRUT LTDA. 31 CONOSUR LTDA. 
12 SUBSOLE S.A 32 CABILFRUT S.A. 
13 AGUA STA. 33 SAN CLEMENTE LTDA 
14 QUILLOTA S.A. 34 ATLAS S.A. 
15 FRUTAM S.A. 35 BEN DAVID LTDA 
16 GEOFRUT S.A.  36 STA. ELENA S.A. 
17 STA. CRUZ 37 FRUCENTRO S.A. 
18 ACONCAGUA LTDA 38 FRUTERA EUROAMERICA S.A. 
19 FRUTEXPORT S.A.  39 CORPORA AGRICOLA S.A. 
20 EXSER LTDA 40 CONTADOR FRUTOS S.A. 
 41 Other 
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Has the firm had any problems with the export company it works with? 
1 No    PROB_EXE  _______ 
2 If yes, which one? 
2.1 Unclear price information  
2.2 Unclear price charged for the service  
2.3 Delayed payments 
2.4 Technical assistance 
2.5 Other 
 
Please mark the service of your exporting companies your firm works with: 
                                                                                                              1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
First         
Second        
Third        
 
What is the main sales channel?: 
    EXPORT_MEDIO _______ 
1. Exporting company  
2. Supermarket  
3. Wholesaler 
4. Processing company 
5. Retail shop 
6. Others 
 
SECTION 9: PROBLEMS  
 
Which is the most important problem in limiting the firm’s economic performance? 
• First option      PROB_FS  _______ 
      
• Second option      PROB_SC  _______ 
 
• Third option      PROB_TR  _______ 
 
Available answers 
1 Credit: The firm does not have access to credit. 
2 Taxes: The firm paid too much in taxes. 
3 Labor: The firm does not have labor available. 
4 Water: The firm does not have water available. 
5 Price information. 
6 Monopoly power of wholesalers (supermarkets and export firms)  
7 State regulations and norms. 
8 New varieties and crops. 
9 Climate factors. 
10 Commercialization. 
11 Dollar price. 
12 Other, please specify. 
Comments 
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SECTION 10: INVESTMENT 
 
Specify the investment made during the current season 
 
INVESTMENTS Amount (M$) 
Source of fund (M$) 
CREDIT 
S.T. 
CREDIT 
L.T. 
Owned 
capital Other 
      
 
     
      
      
      
TOTAL 
INVESTMENT      
  
 
 
Observations________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Specify the investment made during the last 3 years 
 
INVESTMENTS Amount (M$) 
Source of fund (M$) 
CREDIT 
S.T. 
CREDIT 
L.T. 
Owned 
capital Other 
      
 
     
      
      
      
TOTAL 
INVESTMENT      
  
 
 
Observations________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Specify the future investments projected 
 
INVESTMENTS Amount (M$) 
Source of fund (M$) 
CREDIT 
S.T. 
CREDIT 
L.T. 
Owned 
capital Other 
      
 
     
      
      
      
TOTAL 
INVESTMENT      
  
 
 
Observations________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
SECTION 10: QUESTIONS FOR THE ENUMERATOR 
What is the degree of co-operation and interest of the interviewed person? 
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Appendix 2 
 
Direct elicitation method 
The following qualitative questions are included in the questionnaire to collect 
information on different sources of credit rationing.  
Question 1 
Did you receive a loan in the past three years from a formal credit institution?  
If so, we asked several questions with respect to the debt contract characteristics, such as the 
loan amount, the interest rate, and the loan period. In order to identify quantity rationing, we 
also asked whether the firm had received the desired amount. In addition, we asked whether 
the firm had received a loan from another financial institution, or if it would like to receive a 
loan from another credit institution. This information allowed us to identify cross constraints 
from different types of formal credit institutions. 
If the answer to question 1 was no, we continued with question 2 
 
Question 2 
Did you apply for a loan in the past three years? 
If so, we asked why the credit institution decided to reject the application.  
If the answer to question 2 was no, we continued with question 3. 
 
Question 3 
If you had applied, would a formal credit institution have accepted your application? 
If so, we asked why he/she did not apply for a loan. Table A2.1 provides possible answers and 
the associated rationing category.  
If the answer to question 3 was no, we continued with question 4. 
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Question 4 
If you were certain that a commercial bank would approve you application, would you apply? 
If the answer was yes, the firm was classified as quantity-constrained.  
If the answer was no, we asked why they would not apply for a loan. Again Table A2.1 shows 
possible answers and the rationing category associated. 
Table A2.1: Common answers to qualitative questions 
Answers Associated question Constraint Status 
I received the desired loan from formal 
lenders in the past three years. 
Question 1 Unconstrained 
(Borrowers) 
I do not need a loan. Question 3, 4 Unconstrained 
(Nonborrowers) Interest rate is too high. Question 3, 4 
Farming does not give me enough to repay a 
debt. 
Question 3, 4 
I received a loan from formal lenders in the 
past three years, but not the desired amount. 
Question 1 Constrained 
(Quantity Rationed) 
I applied for a loan in the past three years but 
my application was rejected. 
Question 2 
I did not apply for a loan because I did not 
think the formal institution would accept my 
application. 
Question 4 
I did not want to risk my land. Question 3, 4  
Constrained 
(Risk Rationed) 
I did not want to be worried/ I was afraid. Question 3, 4 
Formal lenders are too strict; they are not as 
flexible as informal ones. 
Question 3, 4 
Formal lenders do not offer refinancing. Question 3, 4 
The bank branch was too far away. Question 3, 4 Constrained 
(Transaction-cost 
Rationed) 
Banks require too much paper work associated 
with application. 
Question 3, 4 
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Appendix 3  
 
The multinominal logit model with random effects used in Chapter 2 
 
Let j index the J possible categories of the multiresponse variable, n index the N 
responders, and t index the T waves of the panel. The utility that responder n derives from 
choosing alternative j on choice occasion t is 
njtnjntjjnjt xU εµβα ++′+= , where jβ  is the 
vector of the alternative-specific coefficient, 
njtx  is a vector of observed attributes related to 
individual n and alternative j on wave t, 
njα  is unobservable random effects for each category 
and individual, and 
njtε  is a random term assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed. The probability that individual n will be classified in the j category of credit 
rationing on wave t is   
∑
=
++
++
=== J
k nkntkk
njntjj
ntnjt
X
XjyprobL
1
)exp(
)exp()(
µβα
µβα
 , for j = 1,…, J.                 (1) 
To estimate Equation 1, we use the mixlogit command from Stata 9.1, which uses maximum 
simulated likelihood estimations (Train, 2003; Hole, 2007) to implement the multinomial logit 
model with unobserved heterogeneity. Other commands, such as gllamm,31 help us estimate 
alternative-specific random intercepts by approximating the analytical solution of the 
maximization of the log-likelihood function, using simulation methods.  
Hole (2007) shows that the probability of the observed sequences of alternatives, 
conditional on knowing jβ , is given by ∏
=
=
T
t
jnjtjj LS
1
)()( ββ . The density for jβ  is denoted 
)( θβf , where θ  are the parameters of the distribution. The unconditional probability of the 
observed sequences of alternatives is the conditional probability, integrated over the 
                                               
31
 We also estimate our model using Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMMs) and we obtain 
similar results. 
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distribution of β : ( ) ( ) βθββθ dfSP nn ∫=)( . The log likelihood for the model is given by 
( )θθ ∑
=
=
N
n n
PLL
1
ln)( , which cannot be solved analytically and it is therefore approximated 
using simulation methods (Train 2003). The simulated log-likelihood is: 
( )






= ∑∑
==
rR
r n
N
n
S
R
SLL βθ
11
1ln)(
,                        (2)
 
where R is the number of replications, and rβ  is the rth draw from )( θβf . The maximum 
simulated likelihood estimator (MSLE) is the value of θ  that maximizes SLL. The 
maximization of equation 2 estimates all parameters in Equation 1. Equation 1 estimates the 
probability that a market-oriented farmer is associated with one of the remaining four 
mutually exclusive borrower categories. In turn, X refers to a vector of explanatory variables. 
The linear predictor includes individual-specific variables (Xnt) and a random intercept for 
each category. Thus, there are three random effects, 2nµ , 3nµ , 4nµ , for alternatives two, 
three, and four. We assume the random effects are correlated32.  
                                               
32
 As random effects are assumed to be correlated, this model does not suffer from Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives. For details see Skrondal, A. and S. Rabe-Hesketh (2003) Multilevel logistic regression for 
polytomous data and rankings. Psychometrika, 68(2), pp. 267-287. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Alternative models compared in Chapter 2 
 
Table A4.1. Coefficients of regressors on different categories of credit access 
(multinomial logit model without random effects)  
Variable Unconstrained 
Non-borrowers 
Constrained 
Quantity 
Rationed 
Constrained 
Transaction 
Cost and 
Risk 
Rationed 
Relationship variables: 
   
CLUSTER -0.829*** 0.125 -0.0209 
 [0.000] [0.554] [0.958] 
Ln(1+LENGTH) 0.0920 0.0633 -1.006*** 
 [0.548] [0.803] [0.009] 
Control variables    
HECTARES 0.00109 -0.0134** -0.00489 
 [0.549] [0.013] [0.289] 
YEAR_ADM 0.0214 0.0145 0.0255 
 [0.112] [0.384] [0.174] 
INSURANCE 0.538 5.016*** 4.174** 
 [0.614] [0.002] [0.012] 
NO_PROGRAM 0.466 1.211** 0.798 
 [0.254] [0.015] [0.195] 
ALMOND 1.496 2.574** 2.816 
 [0.184] [0.024] [0.143] 
AVOCADO -0.919 0.556 1.779* 
 [0.110] [0.618] [0.074] 
CONSTANT S 0.760 -1.875** -1.068 
 [0.109] [0.029] [0.289] 
Test  
 
 
ROC 0.695 0.788 0.757 
LR Test 78.79***   
Log-Likelihood 
-327.5   
Number of observations 354   
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; LR test 
is for test of joint significance of all regressors. 
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Table A4.2. Coefficient of regressors on different categories of credit access compared 
with unconstrained borrowers (multinomial logit model with random effect, adding 
distance to the closest bank office and different farm locations as control variables )  
Variable Unconstrained Non-
borrowers 
Constrained 
Quantity Rationed 
Constrained Transaction 
Cost and Risk Rationed 
Relationship variables: 
CLUSTER -1.386*** 0.649 -8.698** 
 [0.002] [0.236] [0.022] 
Ln(1+LENGTH) -0.310 -0.165 -25.57** 
 [0.437] [0.763] [0.036] 
Control variables  
  
HECTARES 0.0060 -0.0552** -0.0396* 
 [0.256] [0.025] [0.058] 
YEAR_ADM 0.0772** -0.0142 0.786** 
 [0.035] [0.710] [0.028] 
INSURANCE -0.707 15.80** 63.136 
 [0.762] [0.023] [0.031]** 
NO_PROGRAM  0.0276 2.265** 2.870** 
 [0.973] [0.024] [0.033] 
DISTANCE -0.0444 -0.0335 -1.318** 
 [0.490] [0.572] [0.011] 
ALMOND 1.558 5.594 9.276** 
 [0.383] [0.116] [0.019] 
AVOCADO -1.541 1.586 57.88** 
 [0.375] [0.253] [0.035] 
LOCATION 1 SB 3.877** -0.760 13.91** 
 [0.034] [0.589] [0.039] 
LOCATION 2 LA -2.682 0.540 7.635* 
 [0.121] [0.685] [0.073] 
LOCATION3 CA 0.596 -0.810 -37.57** 
 [0.685] [0.517] [0.033] 
CONSTANT 1.032 -2.044 -49.78** 
 [0.548] [0.212] [0.044] 
Random effects 
  
 
Var (
njµ ) 3.742*** 2.863* 60.62** 
 [0.000] [0.055] [0.030] 
Corr ( 2jµ , 3jµ ) -1.037  
 
 [0.239]   
Corr ( 3jµ , 4jµ ) -0.298 
 
 
 [0.468]   
Corr ( 2jµ , 4jµ ) -3.031 
  
 [0.305]   
Test  
 
 
Wald test(39) 86.27***   
Log-Likelihood 
-263.96   
Number of observations 354   
Number of individuals 177   
BIC 792.03   
AIC 617.92   
 167 
 
 
 
  
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; All 
variables are estimated using robust standards errors based on the White’s heteroskedasticity consistent 
estimators of variance; Wald test is for test of joint significance of all regressors; BIC stands for Bayesian 
Information Criterion  and AIC for Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). 
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Table A4.3. Coefficient of regressors on different categories of credit access compared 
with unconstrained borrowers (multinomial logit model with random effect, adding 
distance to closest bank office and total assets net from debt as control variables )  
Variable Unconstrained Non-
borrowers 
Constrained 
Quantity Rationed 
Constrained Transaction 
Cost and Risk Rationed 
Relationship variables: 
CLUSTER -1.678*** 0.556 -10.11** 
 [0.002] [0.329] [0.028] 
Ln(1+LENGTH) -0.504 -0.0994 -20.14** 
 [0.326] [0.851] [0.018] 
Control variables  
  
HECTARES -0.00170 -0.0580*** -0.105** 
 [0.781] [0.008] [0.015] 
YEAR_ADM 0.0769** -0.0103 0.817*** 
 [0.050] [0.765] [0.003] 
INSURANCE -0.296 16.29** 59.98*** 
 [0.896] [0.021] [0.006] 
NO_PROGRAM 0.807 2.065** -3.421 
 [0.360] [0.019] [0.222] 
DISTANCE -0.0256 -0.0596 -0.420*** 
 [0.654] [0.242] [0.001] 
ALMOND 2.137 5.087** 2.953 
 [0.211] [0.037] [0.354] 
AVOCADO -2.234 2.346 65.59** 
 [0.169] [0.124] [0.023] 
NET_ASSETS 0.00381** 0.00276 0.00642* 
 [0.027] [0.106] [0.053] 
CONSTANT 2.557 -2.580* -55.87** 
 [0.135] [0.063] [0.018] 
Random effects 
  
 
Var (
njµ ) 4.709*** 3.114*** 59.48** 
 [0.000] [0.008] [0.018] 
Corr ( 2jµ , 3jµ ) -1.156  
 
 [0.195] 
 
 
Corr ( 3jµ , 4jµ ) -0.0978 
 
 
 [0.904] 
 
 
Corr ( 2jµ , 4jµ ) -1.964 
  
 [0.567] 
  
Test  
 
 
Wald Test 76.41***   
Log-Likelihood 
-273.9   
Number of observations 354   
Number of individuals 177   
BIC 776.75   
AIC 625.85   
Notes: p-values in brackets; ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance respectively; All 
variables are estimated using robust standards errors based on the White’s heteroskedasticity consistent 
estimators of variance; Wald test is for test of joint significance of all regressors; BIC stands for Bayesian 
Information Criterion  and AIC for Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC). 
 169 
 
Appendix 5 
 
Identification alternative for endogenous switching model used in Chapter 3 
 
In the system of equations (3.2) and (3.3) there are six variance-covariance parameters, 
( λσσσσσ ζµµτδ ,,,,, 22222 21 itititii ). However, there are only three quantities to estimate: the variances 
of iδ  and iτ  identified through the intraclass correlation in the substantive and endogenous 
dummy variable model respectively; and the correlation between the total residual of the two 
equations ( ρ ). 
 Therefore, it is necessary to impose three restrictions. Two restrictions come directly 
from the binary nature of the substantive and endogenous equation, so it1µ  and it2µ  are 
implicitly fixed to a value determined in the model estimated in both equations (here we used 
the probit model for the substantive and endogenous models, then 122
21
==
itit µµ σσ ). The third 
restriction needed for identification must be stated explicitly: here we fixed the factor variance 
to one ( 12 =
itζσ ). For discussions and alternatives restrictions see Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 
(2004).  
Thus the covariance matrix of the residual is given by: 








++
+++
=∑ 2
1
2
;
;
22
iii
iii
ττδ
τδδ
σσλ
σλλσ
 
And the correlation at observation level  is  
)2)(1( 222
;
+++
+
=
ii
ii
τδ
τδ
σλσ
σλ
ρ  
The estimation of ρ  will be relevant in our model, because it gives statistical evidence 
of endogenous bias in our model.  
The estimation of this model is by maximum likelihood, with the likelihood function 
evaluated by the adaptive quadrature numerical technique shown by Rabe-Hesketh et al. 
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(2005). This technique has shown to be superior to standard quadrature methods, particularly 
where the number of cross-sectional observations is large and/or the intraclass correlation is 
high. Maximization of the likelihood function over the set of parameters is achieved by the 
Newton-Ramhson algorithm.  
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Appendix 6 
 
Identification alternative for endogenous switching model used in Chapter 5 
 
In the system of equations (5.5) and (5.6) there are six variance-covariance parameters, 
( λσσσσσ δµµαα ,,,,, 22222 2121 itititii ). However, there are only three quantities to estimate: the variance 
of i1α  and i2α  identified through the intraclass correlation in the substantive  and endogenous 
model respectively; and the correlation between  the total residual of the two equations ( ρ ). 
Therefore, it is necessary to impose three restrictions. Two restrictions directly comes 
from the binary nature of the substantive and endogenous equation, so 2
1itµσ and 
2
2 itµσ  are 
implicitly fixed to a value determined in the model estimated in both equations (here we use 
the probit model for the investment decision and endogenous credit constraint equations, then 
122
22
==
itit µµ σσ ). The third restriction needed for identification must be stated explicitly: here 
we fix the factor variance to one ( 12 =
itδσ ). For discussions and alternatives restrictions see 
Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, (2004).  
Thus the covariance matrix of the residual is given by: 








++
+++
=∑ 2
1
2
;
;
22
221
211
iii
iii
ααα
ααα
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And the correlation is  
)2)(1( 222
;
21
21
+++
+
=
ii
ii
αα
αα
σλσ
σλ
ρ  
The estimation of ρ  will be relevant in our model, because it gives statistical evidence 
of endogenous bias in our model.  
The estimation of this model is by maximum likelihood, with the likelihood function 
evaluated by the adaptative quadrature numerical technique shown by Rabe-Hesketh et al. 
 172 
 
(2005). to be superior to standard quadrature methods, particularly where the number of cross-
sectional observations is large and/or the intraclass correlation is high. Maximization of the 
likehood function over the set of parameters is achieved by the Newton-Ramhson algorithm.  
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Summary 
 
Rural development needs to be accompanied by farmers’ access to credit. If farmers are 
unconstrained, production and consumption decisions are separated. As such, credit-
unconstrained farmers can choose optimal levels of inputs for their production processes. In 
such a situation, the optimal decision does not depend on credit.  However, if farmers are 
credit constrained, investment decisions will depend on credit availability. Then, access to 
credit facilitates investments which can improve economic performance of the farmer by 
reducing costs through the adoption of better technology or by increasing income through 
adapting production to new challenges posed by phenomena such as global warming and 
changing customer preferences.  
However, existing empirical literature on access to credit for a country such as Chile is 
very limited. This issue still awaits rigorous empirical examination in measuring credit 
constraints, in determining the effect of informal credit institutions on credit constraints, and 
in determining the credit constraint effect on production and investment patterns.  
The aim of the research presented in this study is to measure access to credit and to 
empirically determine the effects of credit constraints on investment and production for 
market-oriented farmers in central Chile. More specifically, four issues are dealt with: (1) to 
identify the main factors that influence access to credit for market-oriented farmers, (2) to 
determine whether informal financial institutions act as complements to or substitutes for 
farmers’ strategies for funding, (3) to determine the effect of credit constraint by formal 
financial institutions on farm productivity, and (4) to identify the factors limiting investment 
in farms. The four issues are subsequently dealt with in Chapters 2 – 5. 
In approaching these objectives two innovative methods are used throughout. First, 
qualitative information collected in interviews is used to identify three categories of credit 
 174 
 
constraints from both the demand and supply side of the credit market, namely, quantity, risk, 
and transaction-cost constraints. Second, a panel-data structure is used in all econometric 
analysis in this study, which allows us to obtain estimators that are more efficient than those 
based on cross-sectional analysis only. 
Credit rationing status and its determinants are investigated in Chapter 2. Using data 
from two surveys conducted in 2006 and 2008 with a sample of 177 farmers, the research 
focuses on the importance of social capital variables, namely the number of relationships that 
a farm has with export and/or input supplier firms and the length of the farm-bank 
relationship. The main finding is that both variables reduce borrowers' transaction-cost and 
risk rationing, but not quantity rationing. Results show that 16.4% and 13.6% of the sample 
felt credit constrained in 2006 and 2008, respectively, with most farmers being quantity 
rationed (10.7% and 9.6%, respectively). A much lower share of farmers is constrained by 
risk (2.8% and 3.4%, respectively) and transaction cost (2.8% and 0.6%, respectively).  
Chapter 2 concludes that the most important variable explaining quantity rationing is 
land size. Its negative and significant impact support the fact that titled land can be used as 
collateral and is able to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems. On the other 
hand, the insignificant effect of the length of the relationship between the bank and farm may 
indicate that a long-term relationship not only improves information about the farm, but also 
that this information can be used by banks for calculating the credit ceiling. As both effects 
work in opposite directions, the combined effect is indeterminate. However,  both relationship 
variables, namely the number of relationships that a farm has with export and/or input 
supplier firms, and the length of the farm-bank relationship, reduce the probability that a 
farmer would be risk and transaction-cost rationed. This indicates that higher social capital 
reduces transaction cost and risk associated with credit contracts. 
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Chapter 3 identifies the relation between formal and informal lenders by determining 
whether formal and informal loans act as complements or substitutes in rural financial 
markets. As a special feature, the study explores the determinants that influence access to 
informal credit using a panel probit model that controls for the endogeneity of credit 
constraints. With a control for the endogeneity of credit constraints, the analysis suggests that 
formal and informal credit are complementary to one another. This complementary 
relationship appears due to their distinct uses; that is, formal credit funds investment in fixed 
assets, whereas informal credit funds working capital. If farmers invest less because they are 
credit constrained by formal institutions, they need less working capital, so their demand for 
informal credit also declines. 
Chapter 4 explores the factors that determine productivity of fruit and vegetable growers 
in central Chile, focusing especially on the effect of short-term credit on farm output for 
market-oriented farmers. If credit availability affects production and, consequently, 
productivity, that would be evidence for supporting non-separability of consumption and 
production decisions, and thus a financial market failure. Otherwise, the financial market for 
short-term credit would not affect production and allow separation of consumption and 
production decisions. However, in testing the effect of credit on farm productivity, causality 
problems may emerge because less productive farmers may be more likely to pursue a loan 
than highly productive ones. If true, credit constrained farmers may be correlated with those 
who have lower productivity. These endogeneity problems are addressed by using a 
subsample of constrained farmers where the decision to provide a loan was externally chosen. 
A drawback of this sample selection procedure is the selectivity that might introduce biased 
estimates. We test for this bias by using a sample selection model for panel data.  
Result show an insignificant effect of short-term credit on farm productivity under 
credit constraint conditions, implying that farmers can optimally choose their levels of input 
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regardless of access to credit. Although farmers may be credit constrained, it does not limit 
their productivity. An explanation for this result is the presence of informal lenders. Although 
some farmers are credit constrained from formal credit institutions, others have access to 
short-term credit from informal credit institutions as export and input supplier firms.  
In Chapter 5 farm investment under imperfect capital markets is investigated. 
Specifically, the aim is to determine the effect of the volume of formal credit on fixed 
investment. By controlling for endogeneity problems, results show that credit constraint status 
has a negative impact on investment decisions, reducing the probability to invest for farmers 
in central Chile by a factor 2.5. This outcome reveals long-term financial market 
imperfections, most probably because the only providers of long-term credit are commercial 
banks for whom long-term lending is considered risky.  
To evaluate risk in farming projects, the bank officer's experience in assessing farming 
projects is important. Agricultural projects have complexities that make assessment difficult. 
Variable market prices and weather conditions as well as exchange rate fluctuations make 
farming projects more uncertain than most other activities. If a bank does not have well-
versed officers capable of assessing the risk of farming projects, it will be less willing to 
extend a loan to such projects as compared to other, more familiar projects.    
The other variable that affects farm investment decisions is a time trend.  This result 
shows that farmers' probability to invest decreased from 2006 to 2008, revealing the negative 
effect of the 2007 global financial crises on investment. 
In the final chapter, several implications of the present research concerning rural 
financial markets are discussed. (1) Although to some extent a credit constraint was found to 
be effective, this study does not generally find it prevalent in the Chilean rural financial 
market. This has probably to do with the result of the economic liberalization in both financial 
and trade markets which took place in the 1970s. However, the Chilean context suggests that 
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to get the benefits of liberation policies, it is important to develop some degree of 
coordination in the market, for example, through clusters, combinations of farmers and trade 
firms operating in the market chain. (2)  Results in Chapter 5 point to imperfections in long-
term credit markets. Policies to address this problem may aim at improving information about 
farmers in the credit market by, for instance, having them adopt proper accounting 
management practices. Other mechanisms to improve information in rural financial markets 
would be for banks to have risk evaluation departments specialized in agricultural projects. 
(3) An important outcome of this study is that formal and informal lenders complement each 
other in providing credit to farmers. This finding suggests that instead of policies that try to 
abolish informal lenders by encouraging formal lenders, it may be better to explore how 
informal lenders can be stimulated to provide other services such as long-term credit.   
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Samenvatting 
 
Voor rurale ontwikkeling is toegang tot agrarisch krediet voor landbouwers essentieel. 
Bij onbeperkte toegang tot krediet kunnen productie- en consumptiebeslissingen 
onafhankelijk van elkaar worden genomen. Als gevolg daarvan kunnen boeren de voor het 
productieproces benodigde inputs optimaal kiezen, zonder daarbij afhankelijk te zijn van 
krediet. Zijn landbouwers echter beperkt in hun toegang tot krediet, dan hangen 
bedrijfsbeslissingen van de beschikbaarheid van krediet af. Betere toegang tot krediet 
bevordert dan investeringen en betere inzet van inputs, en daarmee het bedrijfsresultaat Te 
denken valt aan kostenbesparingen via toepassing van betere technologie, of 
inkomensverbetering als gevolg van aanpassingen in het productieproces om uitdagingen als 
veranderende consumentenvoorkeuren of opwarmingsverschijnselen het hoofd te bieden. 
Voor een land als Chili zijn weinig studies over de toegang tot agrarisch krediet 
beschikbaar. Er is daarom behoefte aan grondig empirisch onderzoek om kredietbeperking 
door banken te meten, om het effect van informele kredietinstellingen op deze beperkingen te 
bepalen, en om het effect van kredietbeperking op het productie- en investeringspatroon vast 
te stellen. 
Doel van het onderzoek dat in deze studie wordt gepresenteerd is het meten van de 
toegang tot krediet, en het empirisch vaststellen van de effecten van kredietbeperking op 
productie en investeringen van op de markt gerichte agrarische producenten in centraal Chili. 
Meer in het bijzonder worden vier onderwerpen onderscheiden: (1) het identificeren van de 
belangrijkste factoren die de toegang tot krediet voor marktgerichte producenten bepalen; (2) 
het nagaan of informele financiële kanalen complementair aan of concurrerend zijn met 
formele kredietinstellingen bij de financiering van agrarische bedrijven; (3) het vaststellen van 
de effecten van kredietbeperkingen van formele financiële instellingen op de 
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bedrijfsproductiviteit; en (4) het identificeren van factoren die agrarische investeringen 
beperken. Deze onderwerpen worden achtereenvolgens in hoofdstukken 2-5 behandeld. 
Bij het uitwerken van dit onderzoek worden door de gehele studie heen twee 
vernieuwende methoden toegepast. Ten eerste wordt er kwalitatieve informatie gebruikt, 
verzameld door middel van uitgebreide interviews, om drie soorten kredietbeperkingen vanuit 
de vraag- en aanbodzijde van de kredietmarkt vast te stellen. Dit betreft (1) beperkingen van 
kwantitatieve aard, (2) beperkingen die samenhangen met risico, en (3) beperkingen als 
gevolg van transactiekosten. Ten tweede wordt voor alle econometrische analyses een panel 
data structuur gebruikt die het mogelijk maakt schatters vast te stellen die betrouwbaarder zijn 
dan schatters die alleen via cross-secties worden verkregen. 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden de verschillende vormen van kredietbeperking en de factoren die 
deze bepalen nagegaan. Op basis van een tweetal surveys in centraal Chili onder 177 
landbouwbedrijven in 2006 en 2008, richt het onderzoek zich vooral op de betekenis van 
variabelen die met sociaal kapitaal samenhangen, namelijk het aantal relaties dat een agrarisch 
bedrijf heeft met een exporteur en/of een leverancier van inputs, en de lengte van de relatie 
tussen bank en bedrijf. Beide variabelen blijken de kredietbeperking die samenhangt met 
transactiekosten en risico te verminderen, maar niet de kwantitatieve kredietbeperking die een 
bank kan opleggen. Van het aantal onderzochte bedrijven blijkt in 2006 en 2008 resp.16,4% 
en 13,6% aan een kredietbeperking onderhevig te zijn. Voor de meeste agrariërs geldt dat 
deze beperking een kwantitatief plafond betreft (10,7% en 9,6%). Beperkingen op basis van 
risico zijn aanmerkelijk lager (2.8% en 3,4%), die als gevolg van hoge transactiekosten 
komen nog lager uit (2,8% en 0,6%).  
De belangrijkste variabele die kwantitatieve kredietbeperking bepaalt is de 
bedrijfsomvang in ha. De gevonden negatieve invloed geeft steun aan de veronderstelling dat 
geregistreerd land als onderpand kan dienen en daarbij tevens de problemen van adverse 
 180 
 
selection en moral hazard kan voorkomen. Het effect van de lengte van een relatie met de 
bank blijkt voor een bedrijf niet significant te zijn. Dit kan er op wijzen dat de duur van een 
relatie niet alleen leidt tot meer informatie over het agrarische bedrijf, maar ook dat deze 
informatie door de bank kan worden benut om een kredietplafond te bepalen. Aangezien 
beide effecten in tegengestelde richting werken, is het totaaleffect onbepaald. Daarentegen 
verminderen de beide gehanteerde relatievariabelen, het aantal contacten dat een bedrijf met 
een exporteur en/of leverancier heeft en de contactduur tussen  bank en bedrijf, de 
waarschijnlijkheid dat een agrariër door risico of transactiekosten een kredietbeperking 
ervaart. De mate van sociaal kapitaal werkt dus gunstig uit op de toegang tot krediet. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de relatie tussen formele en informele kredietverschaffers 
geanalyseerd door na te gaan of formele en informele instellingen complementair dan wel 
concurrerend zijn in rurale financiële markten. Bijzonder in dit hoofdstuk is het onderzoek 
naar de determinanten van de toegang tot informeel krediet met behulp van een panel probit 
model dat rekening houdt met een mogelijke endogeen zijn van kredietbeperkingen. Op basis 
hiervan suggereert de analyse dat formeel en informeel krediet als complementair beschouwd 
kunnen worden. Deze complementariteit blijkt veroorzaakt te worden door verschillen in 
kredietgebruik: formeel krediet financiert investeringen in vaste activa terwijl informeel 
krediet in werkkapitaal voorziet. Als boeren minder investeren als gevolg van een 
kredietbeperking die opgelegd wordt door formele instellingen, dan zal ook de behoefte aan 
werkkapitaal afnemen, en daarmee de vraag naar informeel krediet. 
Hoofdstuk 4 verkent de factoren die de bedrijfsproductiviteit bepalen van groente- en 
fruitkwekers in centraal Chili. Daarbij gaat speciale aandacht uit naar het effect van kort 
krediet op de productie van marktgerichte bedrijven. Als beschikbaarheid van krediet de 
productie, en daarmee de productiviteit, metterdaad beïnvloedt, dan zijn beslissingen over 
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productie en consumptie binnen een agrarische huishouding niet langer te scheiden, en is er 
daarmee sprake van falen van de financiële markt.  
Bij het toetsen van het effect dat krediet op de productiviteit van een landbouwbedrijf 
heeft, kunnen causaliteitsproblemen rijzen omdat, bij gelijke omstandigheden, minder 
productieve ondernemers eerder een lening nodig zullen hebben dan hun meer productieve 
collega’s. In dat geval zijn door krediet beperkte ondernemers ook degenen die een lagere 
productiviteit hebben. Aan dit endogeniteitsprobleem wordt het hoofd geboden door gebruik 
te maken van een deelverzameling van producenten voor wie de beslissing om hen een lening 
te verschaffen extern is genomen. Een nadeel van deze procedure is het selectieve karakter dat 
kan leiden tot een bias in de schattingen. Deze mogelijke bias wordt daarom getoetst door 
gebruik te maken van een model voor steekproefselectie uit panel gegevens. 
Resultaten van de modelberekeningen geven aan dat het effect van kredietbeperkingen 
voor kort krediet op de bedrijfsproductiviteit niet significant is. Dit houdt in dat landbouwers 
het niveau van inputs optimaal kunnen kiezen, los van de toegankelijkheid tot krediet. 
Ofschoon agrarische bedrijven aan kredietbeperkingen onderhevig kunnen zijn, blijkt dat hun 
productiviteit niet te beïnvloeden. Een verklaring van dit resultaat kan gelegen zijn in de rol 
die informeel krediet speelt. Waar sommige boeren een kredietbeperking door formele 
kredietinstellingen ondervinden, zullen anderen toegang hebben tot informeel krediet 
afkomstig van exporteurs en leveranciers.  
Hoofdstuk 5 behandelt het investeringsgedrag door landbouwbedrijven in het geval de 
kapitaalmarkt onvolkomen functioneert. Daarbij wordt in het bijzonder nagegaan wat het 
effect is van de omvang van formeel krediet op het investeringsvolume. Rekening houdend 
met mogelijke endogeniteit, tonen de resultaten aan dat de vorm van de kredietbeperking een 
negatieve invloed heeft op investeringsbeslissingen: de waarschijnlijkheid dat agrarische 
bedrijven in centraal Chili investeren vermindert bij beperkte kredietvoorziening met een 
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factor 2,5. Deze uitkomst illustreert de onvolkomenheden in de markt voor lang krediet. Deze 
worden waarschijnlijk veroorzaakt worden door het riskante karakter dat lange-termijn 
landbouwkrediet heeft in de ogen van commerciële banken.  
Om het risico van landbouwprojecten juist in te schatten is de nodige expertise bij de 
kredietverschaffer onontbeerlijk. Land- en tuinbouwprojecten zijn doorgaans complex, 
hebben met wisselende prijzen te maken, zijn onderhevig aan weersfluctuaties, en staan door 
hun sterk op het buitenland gerichte afzet bloot aan veranderende wisselkoersen. Dit alles 
maakt landbouwprojecten in de ogen van de bank onzekerder dan veel andere projecten. Bij 
gebrek aan voldoende expertise om de risico’s van agrarische projecten te beoordelen, zal dit 
een negatieve weerslag hebben op de bereidheid leningen ten behoeve van dit type projecten 
te verschaffen. Een tweede factor die landbouwinvesteringen blijkt te beperken is de tijdstrend. 
Tussen 2006 en 2008 is de waarschijnlijkheid van investeren aanmerkelijk gedaald, 
ongetwijfeld als gevolg van de wereldwijde financiële crisis vanaf 2007. 
In het laatste hoofdstuk wordt een aantal implicaties van dit onderzoek voor rurale 
financiële markten besproken. (1) Ofschoon van een zekere mate van kredietbeperking sprake 
is, laat deze studie zien dat dit niet in algemene zin voor Chili geldt. Waarschijnlijk is dit het 
gevolg van de economische liberalisering op de financiële en handelsmarkten die in de 
jaren ’70 plaats vond. In de Chileense verhoudingen is het echter van belang te onderkennen 
dat, om deel te hebben aan de voordelen van liberalisering, enige coördinatie in de markt van 
belang is, bijvoorbeeld via clustervorming door in de marktketen opererende boeren en 
handelaren. (2) De resultaten in hoofdstuk 5 wijzen op onvolkomenheden in de markt voor 
lang krediet. Om deze te redresseren valt te overwegen een beleid te ontwikkelen dat tot 
betere informatie over agrarische bedrijven leidt, bijvoorbeeld door het aanbieden van 
diensten op het gebied van accounting en management aan deze bedrijven. Het opzetten van 
speciale afdelingen bij banken voor de beoordeling van risico bij agrarische projecten kan 
 183 
 
daarbij ook tot beter functioneren van de markt voor lang krediet leiden. (3) Tenslotte is een 
belangrijke uitkomst van deze studie dat formele en informele kredietverschaffers elkaar 
complementeren. Dit resultaat suggereert dat in plaats van een beleid te voeren dat formele 
instellingen ten koste van informele stimuleert, het beter is om te verkennen hoe informele 
kredietverschaffers ook andere diensten zoals lang krediet kunnen aanbieden. 
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